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In his masterful work on comparative law, Professor
Schlesinger reminds us that "large sections of the United States
have a heritage of Spanish and French law derived from early
settlers and conquerors." Although "these remnants of the civil law
* Issue 6 of Volume 60 of the Cornell Law Review was a dedication to Professor Rudolf B.
Schlesinger. This Article is a part of the Cornell Law Review's tribute to Professor Schlesinger.
t Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Civil Law, The University of Texas School of Law. A.B.
1949, Syracuse University; LL.B., LL.M., 1955, Duke University. My research assistant, Mr.J.J.
Jewett III, then a thirdyear law student at The University of Texas, rendered invaluable
assistance, which is gratefully acknowledged here.
This Article is dedicated to "Rudi" Schlesinger who has always been and will long
continue to be an inspiration to all of us.
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often are hidden under a thick layer of common law," they occa-
sionally rise to the surface even today. Especially when dealing with
problems of land tides, mining law, water rights, or matrimonial
property in Florida, Louisiana, Texas, New, Mexico, Arizona, or
California, Schlesinger concludes, lawyers would be well advised to
familiarize themselves with the civil law antecedents of currently
prevailing rules.'
Leaving aside Louisiana, where the civil law as such has sur-
vived, and Florida, 'which is not a community property state,
lawyers in the Southern, Southwestern, and Western United States
would readily accept Professor Schlesinger's thumbnail sketch of
currently viable legal institutions derived from the civil law so far
as their own states are concerned. With considerable effort, they
might augment or perhaps even marginally enlarge some of his
finds;2 if historically oriented, they might even add some almost
archeological discoveries of their own, such as succession to church
property, 3 or the influence of Spanish law on early Texas civil
procedure.
4
Texas lawyers, in particular, would be likely to make two
rather fundamental qualifying observations. First, as illustrated by
some of the examples just given, historical titles tend to be phased
out by prescription,5 and judicially adopted (or, perhaps, adapted)
rules based on civil law are rapidly absorbed into the general
corpus of the common law. Thus, the current relevance of the
discovery of the historical roots of legal institutions is rather
severely limited. Second, however, Texas lawyers would be quick to
acknowledge the abiding indebtedness of their legal order to Spain
R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (3d ed. 1970) (italics omitted).
2 See generally authorities collected in E. VAN KLEFFENS, HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF
THE MIDDLE AGES 266-77 (1968).To the cases cited in R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 11
nn.31-36, the author would especially add State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961), aff'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962); and Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500,
324 S.W.2d 167 (1958). The former case is discussed in McKnight, The Spanish Watercourses of
Texas, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOR OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 373,384-85 (M. Forkosch
ed. 1966), and the latter case in Winters, The ShorelineforSpanish and Mexican Grants in Texas, 38
TEXAS L. REV. 523 (1960).
3 See, e.g., San Antonio v. Odin, 15 Tex. 539 (1855); Blair v. Odin, 3 Tex. 288 (1849). The
case first cited was a dispute over title to the Alamo.
4 See generally McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TEXAS
L,.REv. 24 (1959). Muir, Thelntellectual Climate ofHoustonDuringthePeriod oftheRepublic, 62 S.W.
HIST. Q. 312 (1959), speaks of "the blending of the civil and the common law, the abolition of
special pleading, [and] the marriage of law and equity in a single court, the distinctive
contributions of Texas to western civilization."Id at 313. This is, incidentally, a highly amusing
and informative article, and of course a very brief one.
5 Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1947). Cf. Atchley v.
Superior Oil Company, 482 S.W.2d 883, 899-902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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for what they have come to regard as the civil law rule of matrimo-
nial property: the ganancial community of acquests by onerous title
during coverture. Their feelings on this subject would be generally
shared-possibly with somewhat less emphasis 6-- by lawyers in
other Southwestern and Western States where the community
property system prevails.
It therefore seems reasonably clear that Spanish law has left a
permanent imprint on the matrimonial property law of the South-
western and Western States, but its influence there has otherwise
been temporary and is currently rather insignificant. The explana-
tion for this long-range inconsistency in performance can be
sought at two levels. First, it might be asked why Spanish family law
has had more staying power than Spanish civil law generally.
Second, and on a much lower level of abstraction, there might be
speculation as to the reasons for the tenacity of Spanish matrimo-
nial property law as opposed to that of Spanish family law gener-
ally.
The first line of inquiry does not seem to promise new in-
sights. For analytical purposes, civil law might be divided along the
still widely accepted Pandectist lines into five components or mas-
ses: normae generales; things (real and personal property); obliga-
tions (contracts, unjust enrichment, torts); family law; and succes-
sions.7 The "general part" of the civil law could not, in the nature
of things, survive the wholesale reception of the common law. The
Spanish law of real property in what is now Anglophonic North
America was primarily and almost exclusively a public law system
of land allocation by the sovereign rather than a private law system
regulating land transfers between individuals. At least during
Spanish rule, personal property rights, especially those of Anglo-
Saxon immigrants, were of little consequence, since most of these
immigrants were desperately poor. For the same reasons, the law
of contracts was of little practical importance. Torts, one gathers,
tended to be "amerced" by extrajudicial means.8 If the rather fully
6 TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876), defines the separate property of the wife and thus,
indirectly, community property. See generally Huie, The Texas Constitutional Defnition of the Wife's
Separate Property, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 1054 (1957). Only two other states have constitutional
provisions dealing with this subject. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of
Development and Reform, 8 CALIF. W.L. REv. 117, 118 n.7 (1971). Recent reform projects,
although designed to streamline the Texas constitution, have not even questioned the current
justification of the separate property provision.
7 See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 220-21, 371-76.
8 E. BARKER, THE LIn oF STEPHEN F. AUSrIN 153 (1925), states that "[t]here was some petty
thieving, some litigation about contracts, some suits to collect notes, some gambling, and,
judging from Austin's occasional outburst of exasperation against drunkards, too much
19751
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documented early legal and social history of Texas is accepted as
reasonably illustrative of conditions generally prevailing in the
Spanish and Mexican Southwest, the primary function of what
might be called the "market transactions" sector of the then pre-
vailing law of things and obligations was the protection of the
immigrants from their American creditors.9
The "family wealth" sector, on the other hand, presents a
different picture. The acquisition, improvement, and familial
transmission of land was the basic aim of Anglo-Saxon settlement
in Spanish and Mexican North America. The ganancial system of
matrimonial property was readily accepted by the settlers as best
designed for local conditions, and it has survived because, with
appropriate modifications, it is even today demonstrably superior
to any other. 10 Forced heirship, however, rapidly succumbed to the
individualistic spirit of Anglo-American law."
If the main contours of Spanish matrimonial property law
survived more or less intact, why did Spanish family law as a whole
fail to persevere? The present study is, at-base, a search for an
answer to that question. As already indicated by the title, however,
our inquiry will be limited to one issue: the form of marriage.
There are several reasons for narrowing the scope of our inquiry.
drinking" in Austin's colony. As for the inclination towards self-help in a slightly later period,
see W. HOGAN, THE TEXAS REPUBLIC, A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 267-90 (1946).
9 See generally London, The Initial Homestead Exemption in Texas, 57 S.W. HIST. Q. 432
(1954), and sources cited therein; Nackman, Anglo-American Migrants to the West: Men of
Broken Fortunes? The Case of Texas, 1821-46, 5 W. HxsT. Q. 441 (1974). As early as Dec. 22,
1824, Stephen Austin had recommended to the Legislature of Coahuila and Texas the
enactment of a law "protecting the new Emigrants from all old foreign debts for at least
Twelve Years." The Austin Papers, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATIoN FOR THE YEAR 1919, at 996-97 (E. Barker ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN
PAPERS 1919]. Upon his renewed request in 1828, such a moratorium law was enacted in
1829. State of Coahuila and Texas, Decree No. 70, art. 2, 1 THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897,
at 220, 221 (H. Gammel ed. 1898) (10 vols.) [hereinafter cited as GAMMEL; all page
references are to renumbered pages]. The specific contributions of Texas in this connection
include the abolition of imprisonment for debt because of inability to pay (TEx. CONST. OF
1836, Declaration of Rights, § 12, 1 GAMMEL 1069, 1083) and a provision in the Bankruptcy
Act to the effect that, subject to some qualifications as to judgments in rem and in admiralty,
"no suit, proceeding, judgment or decree, shall be brought, prosecuted, or sustained in any
court or judicial magistracy of this republic, on any judgment or decree of any court or
tribunal of any foreign nation, state or territory ...." Act of Jan. 19, 1841, Rule 12, § 2, 2
GAMMEL 502, 508. "Foreign," of course, was actually a synonym for the United States. See
Lambeth v. Turner, I Tex. 364 (1847).
10 Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TUL.
L. REv. 21 (1974).
11 Forced heirship was codified in Texas in 1840. Wills Act of 1840, §§ 13, 15, 2
GAMMEL 341, 344. These provisions were repealed, and freedom of testation was introduced
in 1856. Laws of the State of Texas, 1856, ch. 85, § 7, 4 GAMMEL 421, 423. Note the
similarity in the development of Canadian law, where freedom of testation was introduced in
1774. Quebec Act, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, § 10 (1774).
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To start with the most obvious one, wherever Spanish or Mexican
law had no pertinent rules at the time the umbilical cord was
severed, it could not influence future developments. The prime
example is divorce, but this is likely to include most of custody and
much of alimony and support. At the other extreme, there are
some remnants of Spanish family status law rules that do survive,
but these are either not specifically Spanish, or have merged into
the general corpus of enlightened American statutory family law
reform. Examples that readily come to mind in this connection are
putative marriage, 12 legitimation,'13 and adoption. 14
The rules governing the formal validity of marriage in Spanish
North America, on the other hand, were, at least in their severity,
uniquely Spanish. They were also intimately linked to the law of
family wealth transmissions. This interrelationship was, as will be
seen, quite well known to the non-Spanish settlers. Especially for
this reason, a study of the history of the form of marriage in
Spanish North America is likely to afford new insights into the
question of the comparative viability of "legal transplants."' 5
I
"MARRIAGE BY BOND" IN COLONIAL TEXAS
The title of this section is borrowed from a recent study by
Bennett Smith,' 6 which has brought back to memory an almost
12 This was first applied in Smith v. Smith, I Tex. 621, 627-34 (1847), most recently in
Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1974). See McKnight, supra note 6, at 123, 132.
13 Intestate Succession Act of 1840, § 15, 2 GAMMEL 306, 309, construed in Hartwell v.
Jackson, 7 Tex. 576, 580 (1852) (now TEx. PROB. CODE § 42 (1956), and TEx. FAM. CODE
§ 12.02(b) (pamph. 1973)). See Smith, Commentary, 5 TXAs TECH. L. Rav. 389, 415 (1974).
See also Legitimation Act of 1841, 2 GAMMEL 678; note 37 infra.
14 The Spanish and Mexican law of adoption is discussed, and applied to pre-1840
adoptions, in Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516, 520 (1863), and in Ortiz v. de Benavides, 61 Tex.
60, 67-68 (1884). The second Texas adoption statute (and also the second such statute
enacted in the United States outside of Louisiana) dates from 1850. Laws of the State of
Texas, 1850, ch. 39, 3 GAMMEL 439, 474. The state of Texas law of adoption between the
reception of the common law in 1840 (see note 49 infra) and the enactment of that statute
remains obscure. However, there were a number of special laws approving or authorizing
individual adoptions. See Act of Dec. 20, 1841, 2 GAMMEL 693; Act of Jan. 10, 1845, id. at
1060; Act of Feb. 1, 1845, id. at 1106; Act of Mar. 13, 1848, ch. 210, 3 GAMIEL 385. Since
such special laws were also enacted after the passage of the 1850 Adoption Act (e.g., Act of
Feb. 3, 1860, ch. 82, 5 GAMMEL 134-35; Act of Dec. 31, 1861, ch. 39, i. at 542-43) these
enactments prove no more than a very hospitable legislative attitude toward adoptions. The
same tendency has characterized Texas case law. See Bailey, Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 TEXAS
L. REv. 30 (1957).
1" See generally A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
16 B. SMITH, MARRIAGE BY BOND IN COLONIAL TExAS (1972). The present study was to a
considerable extent prompted and inspired by that handsome volume.
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forgotten bit of Texas folklore. The practice itself is best illustrated
by a letter of one of the signers of the Texas Declaration of
Independence, Thomas Barnett, to Stephen Austin, dated June 15,
1831. In pertinent part, it reads as follows:
I have recently understood that yourself and Padre Mul-
doon will shortly pay a visit to the Fort Settlement, where the
neighbourhood will assemble for the purpose of marriages, and
Christening. Owing to the extreme indisposition of myself and
the helpless situation of my family it will be inconvenient for me
to attend. I have therefore to request you, and through you the
Rev father Muldoon to call at my house on your way down. [sic]
to the end that the marriage contract betwixt myself and my wife
may be consummated and my children christened.
17
The marriage contract between the author of this letter and Nancy
Tubbs (Spencer) was evidenced by a marriage bond dated April 20,
1825, which is still extant and on file.' Its wording is virtually
identical to that used in other marriage bonds executed in Austin's
colony at the time. After reciting the wish of the parties to unite in
marriage, the absence of a Roman Catholic priest in the colony to
perform the ceremony, and the agreement of the parties to take
each other as lawful spouses, the Barnett-Spencer bond provides
that the parties bind and obligate themselves to one another, under
the penalty of $10,000, "to have our marriage solemnized by a
Priest of this Colony or some other priest authorized to do so as
soon as an opportunity offers."'19
As suggested by Thomas Barnett's letter, the occasional ap-
pearance of a priest led to substantial gatherings for the purpose of
solemnizing marriages and baptizing children-for the intent ex-
pressed in the marriage bond seems to have been very present and
real.20 There is no record of a forfeiture of the penalty stipulated,
which varied from Mex$ 2,000 to 60,000.21 On the other hand, it
has been reported by contemporary authority that
17 The Austin Papers, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE YEAR 1922, at 666-67 (E. Barker ed. 1928) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN PAPERS
1922].
18 Thomas Barnett and Nancy Tubbs (Spencer), Apr. 24, 1825, Marriage Bond Records
7 (Office of the County Clerk of Austin County, Bellville, Texas). For a listing of this and
other marriage bonds on file there, see B. SMITH, supra note 16, at 63-66.
19 Barnett-Spencer marriage bond, supra note 18. A copy was procured by the author
from the county derk of Austin County at Bellville, Texas. See also Crownover-Castleman
bond, Apr. 29, 1824, B. SMITH, supra note 16, at 9-10; Burns-Kurykendall bond, Apr. 20,
1826, id. at 11-12.
20 Thomas and Nancy Barnett had six children, at least three of whom were born
before 1831. L KEMP, THE SIGNERS OF THE TEXAS DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 17-18
(1944).
21 B. SMITH, supra note 16, at 27.
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[m]any couples.., not finding the marriage state to possess all
the alluring charms which they had figured in their fond imam-
nations have taken advantage of this slip-[k]not plan-sought tle
bond, and by mutual consent committed it to the flames-
returned to the world as young as ever and free as the air.22
The legal reasons behind this quaint Texas custom are not
difficult to fathom. As will be seen below,23 Spanish law
generally proscribed non-Roman Catholics from the Empire. Ac-
cordingly, the communication of the Spanish Governor of Texas to
Moses Austin stipulated that the original three hundred settler
families had to be Catholics, or agree to become such, before
entering Spanish territory.24 The .same requirements were re-
peated in the authorization which Stephen Austin received from
Emperor Iturbide, and in the Colonization Law of the Mexican
State of Coahuila and Texas. 25 Mexican independence as such did
not mitigate the requirement that all inhabitants of the country be
Roman Catholics. Quite the contrary, as article four of the Mexican
Constitution of 1824 specifically provided: "The religion of the
Mexican nation is and shall perpetually remain the Roman Catholic
and Apostolic. The nation protects it by just and wise laws, and
prohibits the exercise of every other. '26 The outward compliance
of the Anglophonic settlers with this religious requirement was
complete. As Stephen Austin reported to Father Juan
Nepomuceno Pena in 1824: "Todas las familias que han emigrado
de otros paises 6 naciones i habitar en estas Colonias de mi Cargo,
son ,Cat6licos . *.".."27
The real situation seems to have been quite different. It is
estimated that only about one-fourth of the pre-independence
settlers were Roman Catholics or converts to that faith. 28 The latter
category included a number of prominent Texans, such as Presi-
22 Smith, Reminiscences of Henry Smith, 14 TEX. HisT. ASS'N Q. 24, 31 (1910) (reprodtuc-
tion of a letter dated Nov. 18, 1836). For an example of such an early variant of "common
law divorce," see Nichols v. Stewart, 15 Tex. 226, 233-34 (1855). This case is discussed at
notes 74-81 and accompanying text infra.
23 See notes 205-12 and accompanying text infra.
24 Letter from Gov. Martinez to Moses Austin, Feb. 8, 1821, 1 GAMMEL 25, 26.
25 Decree of the Emperor, Feb. 18, 1823, fifth recital, 1 GAMMEL 31; Colonization Law,
arts. 3, 5, id. at 40, 41.
26 MEX. CONST. OF 1824, art. 4, 1 GAMMEL 61.
27 "All the families which have emigrated from other countries or nations to live in
these colonies under my charge are Catholics." Letter from Stephen Austin to Father Juan
Nepomuceno Pefia, Aug. 26, 1824, AUSTIN PAPERS 1919, at 1032 (trans. by author).
28 W. RED, THE TEXAS COLONISTS AND RELIGION 1821-1836, at 5 (1924). See also
Fitzmorris, Four Decades of Catholicism in Texas 1820-1860, at 10-11, in 35 CATHOLIC UNIVER-
srrY OF AMERICA DISSERTATIONS (1926); 7 C. CASTAf4EDA, OUR CATHOLIC HERITAGE IN TEXAS,
THE CHURCH IN TEXAS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 2-3 (1958).
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dents Houston and Lamar. At least in some instances, however,
one may well doubt whether conversion was accompanied by the
intent requisite for canonical validity.29 To cite but one example,
another President of Texas, David Burnet, is reported to have
remarked about Mirabeau Lamar's oath to defend the Catholic
faith that "oaths like that have no importance. Oaths like that are
made only to be broken.
' 30
Be that as it may, it seems clear that in their dealings with the
Mexican authorities, the settlers from the United States were
careful not to disturb the legal presumption that they were adher-
ents of the Roman Catholic religion. The issue of tolerance was, in
Austin's words, "a dangerous subject to totich," one he never raised
officially with the Mexican authorities.3 1
Consequently, all Anglophonic settlers of Mexican Texas were
legally deemed to be, and accepted being treated as, adherents of
the Roman Catholic faith. From this, it followed in the view of both
the Mexican authorities and of the settlers themselves that the
latter could validly marry only in solemn Roman Catholic form,
i.e., through a ceremonial marriage assisted by a duly ordained
and authorized Roman Catholic cleric of the requisite rank. The
difficulty that arose in this connection was not attributable to any
reluctance of lukewarm or sham converts to go through a cere-
mony in an unfamiliar ritual, but, much more simply and funda-
mentally, to the absence of priests in the Anglo-Saxon settlements.
Stephen Austin sought to remedy this situation by securing the
permanent assignment of a priest to his settlement, but mainly for
financial reasons was unsuccessful. 32 Faced with a situation where
priests were likely to be available only intermittently, he brilliantly
improvised by sanctioning "marriages by bond" as described above.
He duly reported this practice to tlhe Mexican authorities, but
received no official sanction 33-indeed, it seems unlikely that any
could have been given.
See generally Hughes, The Juridical Nature of the Act of Joining the Catholic Church, 8
STUDIA CANONICA, CAN. CANON L. REV. 45 (1974). Msgr. Jean Marie Odin, the Vicar
Apostolic of Texas and later the first Bishop of Galveston, regarded adults baptized under
such circumstances, and without prior instruction, Roman Catholics "but in name." Letter
from Bishop Odin to Card. Fransoni, Sept. 22, 1851. Odin Transcripts, Catholic Archives of
Texas, Austin, Texas. This document is entitled "Petite Notice Sur Ia Diocese de Galveston
Texas." Like most of Bishop Odin's correspondence, it is in French.
30 Letter from Dubois de Saligny to Louis Thiers, Dec. 24, 1840, in 1 THE FRENCH
LEGATION IN TEXAS 178, 181 (N. Barker ed. 1971).
31 Quoted in E. BARKER, supra note 8, at 260.
32 Id. at 261.
33 Letter from Stephen Austin to Jos6 Antonio Saucedo, June 20, 1824, 2 AusTiN
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What, then, was the perceived legal effect of marriages by
bond before the "consummation" of the marriage contract by a
marriage ceremony infacie ecclesiae (before the church)? Seemingly
Austin's primary concern was the prevention of the scandal of
manifestly illegal cohabitation. The marriage bond removed this
element of scandal, but it could not achieve much more. This had
some potentially dangerous implications for the' legitimacy of
offspring. The Barnett marriage, for instance, was blessed in
advance at least three times before the arrival of Padre Muldoon.3 4
On closer inspection, however, these dangers proved to be
more apparent than real, as Mexican law recognized legitimatio per
matrimonium subsequens (legitimation by subsequent intermarriage of
the parents) . Of course, tragedy might intervene before the
arrival of the priest. Indeed, to return one more time to the
Barnett example, the previous husband of Mrs. Barnett had been
killed by Indians in 1824,36 and a similar fate could easily have
befallen her second spouse, Thomas, before the arrival of Padre
Muldoon. Events such as this probably explain why the Congress of
the Republic of Texas occasionally resorted to the more unusual
device of legitimatio per rescriptum principis (scil. Reipublicae) (le-
gitimation by edict of the prince of the republic) .3 With this
background, it is hardly surprising that the "civil law" rules on
legitimation found ready acceptance into the law of post-
independence Texas.
38
Nor should it be surprising that the Republic of Texas acted
swiftly and decisively to validate pre-independence marriages by
bond. The first attempt in this direction even antedates the formal
declaration of independence on March 2, 1836. An Ordinance and
Decree of the Consultation, dated January 22 of that year, empow-
ered "regular[ly] accredited ministers of the Gospel, of whatever
denomination, in addition to "all judges, alcaldes, and commissarios
• to celebrate the rites of matrimony in their respective
PAPERS 19i9 at 836; Letter from Jos6 Antonio Sa'ucedo to Stephen Austin, July 10, 1824, id
at 850-51. See also text accompanying note 26 supra.
34 See note 20 supra.
35 LAs SIrE PARTIDAS, pt. IV, tit. 13, 1. 1 [hereinafter cited as PARTIDAS]; 1 NUEVO
FEBRERO MEXICANO 100-01 (M. Galvdn Rivera ed. 1850).
36 L. KEhP, supra note 20, at 17.
37 Act of Dec. 18, 1837, 1 GAMMEL 1445; Resolution of May 24, 1838, id. at 1515; Act of
Jan. 26, 1839, 2 GAMMEL 14, This practice was continued by the Texas Legislature after
1845. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 4, 1846, id. at 1715 (legitimizing no less than eight named
children of a named couple). It should also be noted that a number of so-called private acts
authorizing changes of name might in reality be somewhat more tactful acts of legitimation,
or, perhaps, substitutes for adoption. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 18, 1845, id at 1064.
"s See note 13 supra.
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municipalities." 39 It also validated "all marriages heretofore cele-
brated by bond or otherwise, under the heretofore existing laws
with, however, the proviso that the bond or other evidence of such
marriage be filed with the appropriate court records.
40
It seems possible that the Consultation lacked legislative pow-
er, leaving this decree legally ineffective. 41 However, that defect
was cured by legislation of the Republic. Before turning to that
legislation, brief mention should be made of the Texas Declaration
of Independence, which evidences a remarkable shift of public
sentiment on the issue of religion. After describing the priesthood,
along with the army, as "the eternal enemies of civil liberty, the
ever ready minions of power, and the usual instruments of ty-
rants,' 42 and characterizing the prospects of Texas government
under Santa Anna as "the most intolerable of all tyrann[ies], the
combined despotism of the sword and the priesthood,' 43 the
document stated that the Mexican government
denies us the right of worshiping the Almighty according to the
dictates of our own conscience, by the support of a national
religion, calculated to promote the temporal interest of its
human functionaries, rather than the glory of the true and living
God.
44
The severity of this language has attracted criticism, some of
which can hardly be dismissed as mere apologetics.45 Colonial
Texas was surely not a priest-ridden country in the grip of the
Inquisition. Indeed, as we have seen, a constant complaint of the
settlers was that there were not enough priests to administer the
Sacraments as required. This is, however, a minor point. The
major lesson to be drawn from the events of 1836 in this respect is
that Anglo-American settlers in Spanish and Mexican lands in
North America expected; in the words of the same Declaration, to
"continue to enjoy that constitutional liberty and republican gov-
ernment to which they had been habituated in the land of their
birth, the United States of America,"46 and that this liberty, as
3" Ordinance and Decree for opening the several Courts of Justice, etc., § 9, 1 GAMMEL
1039, 1041 (emphasis added).
40 1 GAMMEL 1041.
" See B. SMITH, supra note 16, at 44. Note, however, that § 3 of the Ordinance, which
adopted the procedural probate law of Louisiana, 1 GAMMEL 1039, 1040, was routinely given
effect in Texas. See, e.g., Gortario v. Cantu, 7 Tex. 35, 45 (1851).
42 Texas Declaration of Independence, Mar. 2, 1836, 1 GAMMEL 1063.
43 Id. at 1064.
44 Id. at 1065.
41 C. CASTAEDA, supra note 28, at 3-4.
46 1 GAMMEL 1063, 1064. Note the classic retort to this argument by Channing:
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perceived by them, definitely included the freedom of religion.
This freedom was expressly reaffirmed in the Declaration of Rights
of the Constitution of the Republic of Texas. 47
When the first Congress elected under that constitution as-
sembled, the question of the validity of marriages in Texas had
assumed new dimensions. First, the adoption of the principles of
freedom of religion and of state neutrality between different
denominations militated irresistibly towards the adoption of a
prospective law of marriage formalities based on that prevailing in
the United States and thus familiar to the Anglophonic settlers. As
shown by the precipitate action ot the Cqnsultation, this was a
system based on the alternative requirements of a ceremonial
marriage before designated civil officials or before the minister of
any denomination.48 Second, given the possible invalidity of the
Consultation decree, the problem of the retrospective validation of
marriages by bond had to be faced anew. Third, for the same
reason, provisions now had to be made for the validation of
marriages celebrated pursuant to that decree. Parenthetically, it
should be added that the adoption of a system that recognized
"(common law" marriages, i.e., those entered into by agreement of
the parties without official intervention, might have resolved these
problems. But the common law as such was not adopted in Texas
until January 20, 1840, and as will be seen further below,4 9 the
topic of so-called common law marriages was then more compli-
cated than might appear at first sight.
These main problems are summarized with exemplary clarity
in the preamble of the Marriage Act of June 5, 1837, which recites
that "in many parts of Texas no person legally authorized to
A colony, emigrating from a highly civilized country, has no right to expect in a less
favored state the privileges it has left behind. The Texans must have been insane if,
on entering Mexico, they looked for an administration as faultless as that under
which they had lived. They might with equal reason have planted themselves in
Russia, and then have unfurled the banner of independence near the throne of the
Czar, because denied the immunities of their native land.
Letter from William E. Channing to Henry Clay, August 1, 1837, in W. CHANNING, THE
WORKS OF WILLIAM E. CHANNING 752, 756 (1890).
47 TEX. CONST. Declaration of Rights 3d: "No preference shall be given by law to any
religious, denomination or mode of worship over another, but every person shall be
permitted to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience." 1 GAMMEL 1069,
1082.
48 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
9 See text accompanying notes 420-23 infra. As regards the adoption of the common
law, see Act of January 20, 1840, 2 GAMMEL 177-78; Hall, An Account of the Adoption of the
Common Law by Texas, 28 TEXAS L. Rv. 801 (1950); Markham, The Reception of the Common




celebrate the rites of x. atrimony has existed," and that "from that
cause many persons, have resorted to the practice of marrying by
bond, and others have been married by various officers of Justice
not authorized to celebrate such marriages," 50 and sensibly con-
cludes that "public policy and the interests of families require some
legislative action on the subject.' ' The 1837 Act followed the
prototype of the 1836 decfee. Prospectively, it authorized "all
regular ordained Ministers of the Gospel, judges of the district
courts, justices of the county courts, and all justices of the peace of
the several counties of this republic ... to celebrate the rites of
matrimony. '52 Retrospectively, it empowered those who had previ-
ously intermarried before irregular officials or by bond to go
before any of these persons, and to "publicly solemnize the rites of
matrimony; and all marriages so solemnized [were] declared of
legal and binding effect, from the period the persons had previ-
ously intermarried agreeably to the custom of the times,"53 and the
issue of such persons were declared legitimate, with the proviso,
however, that the validating ceremony took place within six months
of the passage of the 1837 Act, i.e., before December 5 of that year.
Irregular marriages that could no longer be ratified by a marriage
ceremony because one of the spouses had died were validated
automatically on the condition that the parties had lived together
as husband and wife at the time of the death of either of them
54
Less than four years were to elapse after the passage of the
enactment just summarized before the Texas Congress acted again,
this time in a, much more decisive manner. The Act of February 5,
1841, "Legalizing and Confirming certain Marriages therein
named, 55 recited the same considerations that appeared in the
preamble of the 1837 Marriage Act. It then provided that all
marriages by bond or by ceremony before authorized justices of
the peace entered into prior to the 1837 enactment "are declared
legal and valid, to all intents and purposes; and the issue of such
persons are hereby declared legitimate children, and capable of
inheritance."5 6 Out of what now seems an overabundance of cau-
tion, this radical validation was expressly extended to cases where a




5' Act of June 5, 1837, Preamble, § 2, id. at 1293-94.
5' Act of Feb. 5, 1841, 2 GAMMEL 640.
5 Id. at 640, § 1.
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spouse had died before the passage of the 1841 act, and the issue,
of such marriages were "hereby legitimized.1
57
The subject of marriages by bond came up once again at the
Constitutional Convention of 1845, which drafted the first constitu-
tion of the state-to-be. At that time, it was moved that the state
constitution include a section reading as follows:
The legal effects of all marriages now or heretofore subsisting,
shall, for the future, be held and taken to be the same as though
such marriages had been good and valid from the beginning:
provided, that nothing herein contained shall work any revoca-
tion of vested rights. 58
This rather inelegant formulation drew opposition on two
grounds. First, the tendency of the section would be "to legalize
every marriage contracted in Texas, right or wrong, '59 and that
might produce conflicts between different sets of heirs. Second,
Isaak von Zandt said that the matter had been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner by the 1837 and 1841 statutes discussed
above-the former authorizing parties "to come forward, within a
given time, to have the ceremony performed again," and the latter
"ratifying all such marriages, whether the ceremony had been
performed over again or not."60
In opposition, the proponents of the bill argued that "hun-
dreds and thousands had been married in a political form, by
bond," and that the proposed section might "prevent a great deal
of difficulty with regard to the rights of children now growing
up. '61 In reply to the argument that the matter had already been
rectified by legislation, it was asserted that "the best lawyers have
doubted the constitutionality of the laws referred to"6 2 because of
their retrospective operation.
Somewhat surprisingly, Chief Judge Hemphill, who sat in the
1845 Convention as a delegate from Washington County and Who
headed the all-powerful Committee on the Judiciary, seemed to
agree with the proponents of the section, for he is recorded to have
said that there were "a good many marriages not covered by the laws
57 ld at 640, § 2.
58 DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION 358 (W. Weeks rep. 1846) (Mr. Brown Aug. 4,
1845).
s9 Id. (Mr. Ochiltree).
60 Id.
11 Id. (Mr. Jones).
62 Id. at 359.
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referred to."' 63 His suggestion that the matter be referred to the
Judiciary Committee was thereupon adopted by the Convention."
In its report of August 8, 1845, signed by ChiefJudge Hemphill,
the Committee on the Judiciary pointed out, first, that "[t]he laws
already legalise and confirm marriages where the rites of matrimony
have been celebrated by bond, or by officers supposed to be not
properly authorized for that purpose. 65 Second, it stated that the
Legislature would have power to legalize marriages not already
confirmed, and, in particular, to regulate the legal consequences of
such marriages. 66 The Committee requested to be discharged from
the further consideration of this subject, and on August 9, its report
was adopted by the impressive vote of 52 to 4.67
This was seemingly the last time that the question of marriages
by bond in Texas was considered by an elected chamber, although
we are informed by Mr. Smith that a paraphrase of the 1841
enactments managed to survive all statutory revisions until 1969
when it was eliminated by the new Family Code.68 There are only a
few decisions in point, and these would appear to confirm Mr. van
Zandt's view that the 1841 enactment had cleared up the matter.
69
In Smith v. Smith,7 0 decided at the first term of court after
statehood, the Supreme Court of Texas described the pre-1836
Texas law of marriage validity. Chief Judge Hemphill used the
following language to characterize the form of marriage observed
by one of the parties and her spouse in San Antonio in 1830:
[A]ll the formalities, rites and ceremonies having been duly
observed, and proclamation having been made on three festival
days, according to the ritual of the holy apostolic Catholic
church, and no impediment having been made, the deceased and
the appellee were married, infacie ecclesiae, by the actual priest of
the city of San Antonio.71
From this, it followed that the marriage in question was "not
impeachable for the want of ajny formality, but was in full com-
pliance with the laws regulating the marriage ceremonial.' '7 2 There
6 Id.
4 Id.
:5 Id at 470.
6O Id
:7 Id. at 483-84.
68 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4608 (repealed 1969); B. SMITH, supra note 16, at ix-x.
09 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
.o 1 Tex. 621 (1846).
71 Id. at 626.
72 Id.
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was thus no occasion to discuss other forms of marriage or the
effects of curative legislation. It should be noted, however, that the
terms employed by the learned Chief Judge are a close paraphrase
of the marriage legislation of the Council of Trent.Y
Nichols v. Stewart,7 4 the next case to be considered, involved
two marriages by bond. Rachael's mother (Sarah) had executed a
marriage bond with one Roe in November 1832. That bond was
filed with an alcalde at Gonzales, but later "cancelled" by mutual
consent of the parties. Sarah was at the time of the "cancellation"
already living with one William Sowell, and a marriage bond
between Sarah and Sowell was executed in 1834 but seemingly not
filed. Sowell died in 1837 before the enactment of the validating
legislation discussed above. Some time after Sowell's death, his
father also died and the estate was divided among the heirs.
Rachael, who was born before the execution of the second mar-
riage bond, claimed a part of the estate as the legitimate, or at least
legitimated, daughter of William Sowell.
Those opposing Rachael's claim argued that the Consultation
decree and the 1837 Act had validated Sarah's 1832 marriage to
Roe, so that her 1834 marriage to William Sowell was bigamous
and void. They also contended that the 1837 Act could not, in any
event, make Rachael a legitimate heir because the constitution of
the Republic prohibited "retrospective" laws. 5 It also seems likely
that they urged, in the alternative, the inapplicability of the 1837
Act in its own terms, for Rachael' was born before, not after, the
"marriage by bond" of her parents. Failure to register the second
bond, on the other hand, was harmless, for registration was not
required where one of the spouses had died before the effective
date of that act and, they were living together at the time of
death.7
6
Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Judge Lipscomb
held, first, that the 1837 Act did not merely legitimate children
born after the execution of the marriage bond, but also put the
marriages validated by its terms "upon the same footing as if
married with the legal sanction of the church. ' 7 The consequence
of a legal marriage at that time was to make children (acknowl-
'a See note 100 infra.
4 15 Tex. 226 (1855).
71 Id. at 228-29. Section Sixteenth of the Declaration of Rights provided in its second
sentence: "No retrospective or ex post facto law, or laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall be made." 1 GAMMEL 1069, 1084.
" Act of June 5, 1837, § 2, 1 GAMMEL 1293-94.
77 15 Tex. at 233.
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
edged by the father) legal heirs; this was "the Spanish law and
Mexican law at the time the marriage bond was executed. 78
It thus became necessary to decide whether the 1832 marriage
by bond was valid or had been validated. Judge Lipscomb held, as
counsel for Rachael had suggested, that this bond "had no validity,
and as there was no law to sanction such contract, there was none
to enforce it, and it could be violated without any penalty by either
party. 17 9 It followed that Sarah and Roe were, to introduce a terril,
"unbonded" when Sarah and Sowell executed the second bond,
and that Rachael was legitimated, as to Sowell, by the validation of
that marital bond in conjunction with the Spanish and Mexican law
of legitimatio per matrimonium subsequens.
Judge Lipscomb did not comment on the effect (if any) of the
1836 decree of the Consultation," but he did make some general
comnments on the subject of marriage custops in colonial Texas. If,
however, there had been no validating legislation on this subject,
he wrote,
it would not have followed as a necessary consequence that the
children of such parents should become bastardized (in after
time, when civil society became better organized) and held to be
incapable of holding as heirs to their parents. At the time that
these bonds were entered into, there was no means Of solemniz-
ing matrimony, in any form recognized by the law of the land,
there being no Ecclesiastics to whom resort could be had, who
alone, it 8eeims, could solemnize, with the sanctions of the
Church, matrimony; and parties were driven back to the primi-
tive elements, constituting the married state: and this, no doubt,
was the mutual consent of the parties.81
This suggestion was followed to its logical conclusion in Sapp v.
Newsom, s2 which involved the validity of a marital relationship
entered into by bond in 1830. A daughter was born in 1831, but
the parents were not living together when the father died in 1835.
The marriage bond was therefore not validated by the terms of the
Consultation Decree or the 1837 Act, although it was covered by
the Act of 1841.83 The court held, however, that this latter statute
"could not retroact to divest the rights of those upon whom descent
was cast as the heirs of [the ancestor], at the time of his death in
78 Id.
79 Id. at 233-34.
so See text accompanying notes 39-40 sizhra.
11 15 Tex. at 232.
82 27 Tex. 537 (1864).
83 See notes 39, 55-56 supra.
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1835. ''84 Nevertheless, this almost incredible conclusion 5 was de-
prived of any significance by a radical validation of all Texas
marriages by bond through judicial fiat. Said the court, speaking
through Judge Bell:
The condition of Texas ... in the year 1830, being such as to
render it impossible for the inhabitants to celebrate the rite of
matrimony in accordance with the forms prescribed by the
decrees of the church without going beyond the limits of the
province, and subjecting themselves to great dangers ih traveling
to one or two distant points, where ministers of the established
religion could be found, we think it the duty of the courts, upon
the highest considerations of public policy, to hold that the
marriages contracted ihi those times shouild be .regarded as mere
civil contracts, and should be sustained as valid, whenever the
consent of the parties and the intention to enter into the state of
matrimony, and to assume its duties and obligations, is clearly
shown. 6
The Court did not deign to mention Nichols, which was seemingly
direct authority to the contrary,87 and it expressly declined to go
into the details of Mexican marriage law. It stated, however, that
the formalities of marriages in Catholic countries "usually con-
formed to the decrees and usages of the church."88 As shown by
the above-quoted passage, these Roman Catholic "decrees and
usages" were simply assumed to require a ceremonial marriage in
facie ecclesiae.
That assumption was questioned, at long last, in Rice v. Rice,8 9
which was an appeal from a judgment denying a decree of divorce
and separation of property. The respondent (Clinton) had gone
through a marriage ceremony with Wife One before an alcalde in
1830 or 1831, but about two years later, the parties separated. In
1834, Clinton went through a second marriage ceremony with
Wife Two (Jane), the appellant in the instant action, again before
an alcalde. Clinton and Jane cohabited as husband and wife for
some twenty-three years, until 1857, when Clinton left Jane and
went through yet another ceremonial marriage with another wom-
an; he was living with her at the time of this action.
The trial court denied this decree, apparently on the ground
s' 27 Tex. at 539.
I- See generally Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Riglts (pts. 1-2), 5 TEXAS L. REv. 231,
246 & n.99 (1927), 6 TEXAS L. REv. 409, 423-27 (1928),
8r 27 Tex. at 540-41.
17 15 Tex. at 233-34.
88 27 Tex. at 540.
89 31 Tex. 174 (1868).
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that Clinton's marriage to Wife One had been validated by the
1841 Act, so that his marriage to Jane was bigamous and void. Its
decision on this point was reversed by the Supreme Court, which
held, sensibly enough, that the Texas Congress had intended to
legalize irregular marriages where the parties were then living
together in a marital relationship, and not to validate "every act of
consturpation which took place in the province anterior to the
revolution."9 0 A modem Texas lawyer would no doubt add that
the marriage between Clinton and Jane was validated in any event
when they continued to cohabit as husband and wife after the
impediment was removed through the death of Wife One in 1840
or 1841, but that point had not then been settled.
The distinguishing aspect of Rice is not its obviously sound
result, but a remarkable dictum by Judge Lindsay:
Whether the civil authority of Mexico, under the dominion
of which these marriages were consummated, has ever changed
or altered the law of marriage from the canon of the Partidas, as
it existed before the Council of Trent, does not appear from any
evidence or authority adduced on the trial of the cause; and we
might very rationally infer, from the usage in Louisiana, which
was once a Spanish colony, as was Mexico, that a similar usage
obtained in Mexico, for a like reason-that is, that the canon of
the Partidas still prevailed in Mexico-because the decrees of the
council of Trent upon the subject of marriage had never been
adopted and engrafted into the civil and religious system of its
government.91
The Partidas, he added, stood for the rule that " 'all that was
necessary to establish a valid marriage was that there should be
consent, joined with the will to marry,' without ceremonies, legal or
ecclesiastical, but with the obligation of perpetual union, unless
some of the canonical causes for separation supervened.192 But, he
remarked, "a different rule has been judicially acknowledged by
our predecessors in this court to have obtained in Mexico, and it
has been assumed that the ceremonials of the Roman Catholic
religion must be superadded to give validity to the civil contract
under the Mexican laws."93 On this question, Judge Lindsay
thought that the court was now bound by prior Texas authority.94
90 Id. at 180.
91 Id. at 178. The term "canon of the Partidas" was seemingly intended as a reference to
LAs SITrE PARTIDAS, pt. IV, tit. 2, 1. 5, which restates the general pre-Tridentine canon law
rule that consent alone constitutes marriage. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
92 31 Tex. at 178.
9 Id.
94 Id., citing Smith v. Smith, I Tex. 621 (1846), and Nichols v. Stewart, 15 Tex. 230
(1855), "besides other cases."
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To sum up: Settlers in colonial Texas had to be Roman
Catholics, and were willing to be treated on that assumption. They
themselves believed, and Texas legislative and judicial authorities
accepted without question until 1868, that under the Spanish and
Mexican law prevailing until Independence or, perhaps, the Con-
sultation decree, the only valid form of marriage in Texas was that
prescribed by the Council of Trent, i.e., a ceremonial marriage in
facie ecclesiae with the assistance of a Roman Catholic cleric of the
requisite rank and authority. Nevertheless, mainly because priests
were not readily accessible, the practice of "marriage by bond"
developed, and the Congress of the Republic of Texas eventually
validated, or at least undertook to validate, marriages entered into
in colonial Texas either in bond or before unauthorized public
officials.
95
The Supreme Court of Texas accepted this basic frame of
reference. It consistently held that under Spanish and Mexican
law, as applicable in Texas before Independence, a ceremony in
Tridentine form was a legal prerequisite for the formal validity of
marriages. It coped with the social problems created-by this im-
practical rule by giving generous effect to validating legislation
enacted by the Republic. Only when the issue of unconstitutional
retroactivity appeared did the Supreme Court of Texas develop an
alternative rule of validation, based on contemporary Texas public
policy.
Until the Rice case it was assumed that the marriage legislation
of the Council of Trent had been in effect in Texas in its pristine
form until 1836. Everything else turned on that assumption, which
was questioned at long last by judge Lindsay in the Rice case. To
what extent, if any, were his misgivings justified? That is the
subject to be discussed in the next sections.
II
THE CANON LAW BACKGROUND
A. The General Framework
The rules of the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church
pertaining to the formal validity of marriages underwent four
distinct changes in the course of approximately one millennium.
The following is a brief summary of these rules in historical
sequence. It should be noted at the outset that our discussion is




limited to formal validity: the absence of impediments is presumed,
and their nature and effect is not examined. One need hardly add
that what is thus left out is-although not material for present
purposes-the very essence of the history of the canon law of
marriage.9
6
In the initial period, which extended until 1563, there were no
formal requirements other than the mutual expression of consent.
As Pope Nicholas put it in 866, in a rescript addressed to the
Bulgarians: "Sufficiat solus secundum leges consensus eorum, de
quorum quarumque coniunctionibus agitur. '9 7 In due course, both
the Church and some states, (including Spain) enacted increasingly
severe penalties against so-called clandestine marriages, a some-
what indefinite category that came to include not only marriages in
secret, but also nonceremonial marriages generally and even cere-
monial marriages without the publication of banns.98 Despite these
prohibitions, "clandestine" marriages continued to be accepted as
valid if the requisite intent existed. This proposition was expressly
approved, for the past, in the first clause of the marriage decree
adopted by the Council of Trent in 1563, which starts with the
word Tametsi.99
That decree marked the beginning of the second of the four
eras here discussed. It prescribed, pro futuro, the assistance of a
priest and the presence of two or three witnesses at all marriages of
the Faithful, and decreed the invalidity of marriages not celebrated
in what has come to be called Tridentine form.'00
96 The classic work on the general subject is still A. ESMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN .DROIT
CANONIQUE (2 vols. 1891) (Burt Franklin reprint 1968).
97 "Under the laws, the consent of those whose marital union is at issue is sufficient by
itself" C. XXVII, q. 2, c. 2 (trans. by author). For variants, see Decretum Magistri Gratiani, in
CORPUS IURIS CANONICI 1063 (E. Friedberg ed. 1879). The method of citation here used,
which is commonly accepted, is explained in T. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLIS & F. KORTH, CAION
LAW 12-14 (4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BouscAPEN]. See also 1 A. ESMEIN, supta note
96, at 95-98.
98 2 P. MURRILLO VELARDE, CURSUS Juss CANONICI HISPANI ET INDICI 31 (3d ed. 1791)
[hereinafter cited as VELARDE]; PARTIDAS, IV, 3, 1.
99 33 J. MANSI, SACRORUM CONCILIORUM NOVA ET AMPLISSIMA COLLECTIO 1, at col. 152
(1902) (reprint 1961) [hereinafter cited as MANSI].
100 Qui aliter, quam praesente parocho, vel alio sacerdote de ipsius parochi seu
ordinarii licentia, et duobus vel tribus testibus matrimonium contrahere attentab-
unt, eos sancta synodus ad sic contrahendum omnino inhabiles reddit, et huiusmodi
contractus irritos et nullos esse decernit, prout eos praesenti decreto irritos facit et
annullat.
This may be translated as follows:
As for those who attempt to contract marriage otherwise than in the presence of the
parish priest or of another priest delegated by him or the Ordinary [bishop] and
two or three witnesses, the Holy Synod renders such persons totally incapable of
contracting in that manner, and declares such contracts to be invalid and null, just
as by the present decree it invalidates and annuls them.
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The adoption of the decree de reformatione matrimonii (refor-
mation of marriage) was one of the last acts of the Council of
Trent, which was, of course, the great Council of the Counter-
Reformation. Less than a decade earlier, at the peace of Augsburg,
the principle of cuius regio eius religio (compulsory adherence to
the sovereign's faith) had been adopted. 10' There was no inclina-
tion at that time to permit exceptions for Christians who were not
in communion with Rome. Tametsi, in other words, was intended
to govern all baptized persons, even if they were not Roman
Catholics.
In time, as religious toleration gained acceptance in major
political units, this extreme position had to be relaxed. On
November 4, 1741, Pope Benedict XIV issued a declaration, now
commonly termed the Benedictine Declaration (or Privilege, or
Dispensation),'10 2 which rendered the decree Tametsi inapplicable
to marriages between non-Roman Catholics, and even to "mixed"
marriages, i.e., marriages between Roman Catholics and baptized
persons not in communion with Rome. Tametsi, as modified by the
Benedictine Dispensation, marks the third epoch of the Roman
Catholic law in the formal validity of marriages, which lasted from
1741 until the first decade of the twentieth century.
The fourth and present era of Catholic marriage validity law is
of no immediate interest for the purposes of the present study. So
far as the United States is concerned, it is relevant only as a matter
of conscience, not in (secular) courts of law. It is summarized here
merely for the sake of completeness. Pursuant to the decree ne
temere of 1908103 as incorporated, with modifications, in the Codex
luris Canonici of 1918, the Tridentine form is now prescribed for
all marriages by Roman Catholics, including their "mixed" mar-
riages with non-Roman Catholics. Marriages concluded in violation
of this presci-iption are fundamentally and radically invalid. 0 4 On
the other hand, the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church no
longer undertakes to regulate the formal validity of marriages by
or between baptized persons where neither party is a Roman
C. Trident., Sess. XXIV, de reformatione matrimonii c. 1, § 5, MANSI col. 152 (trans. by author).
The text of the decree is reprinted in E. FRIEDBERG, LEHRBUCH DES KATHOLISCHEN TJND
EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS 350-51 (2d ed. 1884).
101 For more background on Augsburg, see H. HOLBORN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN
GERMANY, THE REFORMATION 243-46 (1964).
102 2 A. ESMEIN, supra note 96, at 231-35.
103 BOUSCAREN 585.
104 CODEX IURIS CANONICt can. 1094 & 1099 § 1 (Gasparri ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited
as CIC], lists the historical derivations in the annotations. Id. at 312 n.1, 314 n.2.
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Catholic (although it continues to assert jurisdiction as to other
aspects of such marriages). 0 5
To summarize: Until 1563, the consent of the parties was
sufficient for the formal validity of marriages-consensus facit nup-
tias.10 Between 1563 and 1741 (the Tridentine period) marriages
of baptized persons had to be celebrated, on pain of absolute
invalidity, infacie ecclesiae with the assistance of a Roman Catholic
cleric of the requisite rank and authority. Between 1741 and 1907,
non-Roman Catholics were exempted from this rule, so that their
marriages, including their marriages with Roman Catholics, were
formally valid if in compliance with pre-Tridentine canon law or
subsequent secular law. Since 1908, the Roman Catholic Church
has undertaken to regulate only the form of marriages by Roman
Catholics, including their marriages with non-Roman Catholics;
under pain of absolute invalidity, these must be celebrated in
Tridentine form as currently defined.
American courts have surmised with some frequency that the
requirement of a ceremonial marriage infacie ecclesiae, which has
been the basic rule since the Council of Trent, is in some way connected
with the fundamental notion of the Roman Catholic faith that
marriage is a sacrament. 10 7 This view of the matter almostseemed to be
inherent in the logic of history, for the Tridentine form was decreed at
exactly the same time when Protestant and Roman Catholic theology
parted ways over the sacramental character of marriage, with the
former taking the negative and the latter the affirmative position. Even
in secular societies, such as the United States and the Republic of
Texas, this basic fact of Reformation and Counter-Reformation
history was familiar to the judiciary, especially to those of its members
who were prominent laymen.
0 8
105 CIC can. 1099, § 2, as amended; GIG can. 1016. See generally BOUSCAREN 584-86,
595-96, 471-73.
106 This was also the traditional rule of the civil law and of the Partidas, see supra note
91. See, e.g., DIGEST 50.17.30 (Ulpian): "Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus facit" ("not
cohabitation but consent makes a marriage") (trans. by author).
107 See, e.g., Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Pa.) 158, 161-62, 168 (1840), discussed in notes
302-323 and accompanying text infra; Sapp v. Newsom, 27 Tex. 537 (1864), discussed in
notes 82-88 and accompanying text supra.
108 Judge Lipscomb, the author of the opinions in Blair v. Odin, 3 Tex. 288 (1849), and
Nichols v. Stewart, 15 Tex. 226 (1855), has been described as an outstanding biblical scholar.
J. LYNCH, THE BENCH AND BAR OF TEXAS 89-90 (1885). Justice Grier, the author of the
opinion in Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1851), discussed in notes 192-95, 353-79
and accompanying text infra, who was also the trial judge in Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Pa.)
158 (1840), was the son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers and a leading Presbyterian
layman. Goble, Grier, Robert Cooper, 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY Pt. 1, 612 (A.
Johnson & D. Malone eds. 1960).
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This assumption of a direct causal connection between mar-
riage as a sacrament and the requirement of Tridentine formalities
is, however, quite unjustified. Indeed, the absence of such a con-
nection appears quite clearly from the very clause of the Triden-
tine decree de rqformatione matrimonii which starts with the words
by which that decree is cited. The Council expressly confirmed the
validity and the sacramental character of clandestine marriages
theretofore celebrated between baptized. persons, and it declared
this proposition to be one of dogma, sanctioned by excommunica-
tion. 109 The Tridentine form of marriage, prescribed by the same
decree for subsequent marriages of baptized persons was there-
fore, in the terminology of canon law, a rule of ecclesiastical rather
than divine law. 110
As will appear below, 1 ' this point is of crucial significance for
present purposes. It is perhaps best illustrated when the require-
ment of marriage in Roman Catholic form is compared with
another rule of canon law at least similarly familiar to laymen-the
indissolubility of valid marriages. It is dogma that marriage be-
tween baptized persons is a sacrament, and it is also dogma, based
on divine law, that a valid and consummated sacramental marriage
may not be dissolved by any human authority. These propositions
cannot be changed by ecclesiastical law, nor-at least in the eyes of
the Church-by secular law.11 2 On the other hand, a marriage
109 Tametsi dubitandum non est, clandestina matrimonia, libero contrahentium
consensu facta, rata et vera esse matrimonia, quamdiu ecclesia ea irrita non fecit, et
proinde iure damnandi sunt iii, ut eos sancta synodus anathemate damnat, qui ea
vera ac rata esse negant ....
This may be translated as follows:
It is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages concluded with the full consent of
the contracting parties are sacramental and true marriages; and so long as the
church does not invalidate them, those who deny such marriages to be sacramental
and true are to be condemned by the law, so that the Holy Synod damns them with
anathema.
C. Trident., Sess. XXIV, de reformatione matrimonii c. 1, MANSi col. 152 (trans. by author).
The basic, proposition itself is stated in C. Trident., Sess. XXIV, de sacramento matrimaonii
c. 1, as follows:
Si quis dixerit, matrimonium non esse vere et proprium unum ex septem legis
evangelicae sacramentis a Christo Domino institutum sed ab hominibus in ecclesia
inventum, neque gratiam conferre: anathema sit.
This may be translated as follows:
If anyone says that marriage is not truly and properly one of the seven evangelical
sacraments instituted by the Lord Christ, but is invented by men in the church, and
that it confers no grace, let him be anathema.
Id. col. 150 (trans. by author). The matter is described accurately in Patton v. Philadelphia
and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 102-104 (1846), discussed in notes 324-52 and accompany-
ing text infm.
110 BOUSCAREN 472; 2 VELARDE 34-35.
"I See notes 137-44 and accompanying text infra.
112 CIC can. 1118. See generally BOUSCAREN 473-74, 613.
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between baptized persons is only sacramental if it is valid, and it is
valid only if it was brought into being by a valid contract. The
contract, however, is subject to regulation by ecclesiastical law, and
by interposing the requirement of form as a precondition for the
validity of the indispensable agreement of the parties to marry, the
Church simply prevents the sacrament from arising without it."13
This explains why the canon law rules governing formal valid-
ity could be subjected to such frequent change. It also explains,
more fundamentally, how there could be different rules for the
formal Validity of Roman Catholic, Protestant, and "mixed" mar-
riages although all three of these were sacramental. Even more
importantly for present purposes, the classification of the Triden-
tine rule as one of "mere" ecclesiastical rather than divine or
natural law meant that, like other norms of ecclesiastical law, it was
subject to the general rules of canon law governing territorial
applicability, modification by custom, and supplementation by secu-
lar legislation. As will be seen presently, 114 these three factors,
alone or in combination, are at the base of the subject of the
present study,
B. Territorial Scope
In the penultimate clause of the decree Tametsi, the Council of
Trent exhorted the bishops to implement that decree in their
respective dioceses as soon as prudently advisable. The final clause
then specified that the decree was to become- effective in each
parish thirty days after its original publication." 5 These two rules
drastically limited the territorial applicability of Tridentine mar-
riage legislation. The decree itself was not published in several
important countries, most notably Scotland, England, and France;
in some others, it was published only in selected localities. The
Benedictine Declaration, 1 6 too, was of limited territorial scope. It
was, of course, enacted only where the decree Tametsi was in effect,
but the territorial scopes of these two sources are not identical. The
Declaration was first enacted for Belgium and the Netherlands, and
then extended, in time, to most religiously mixed communities where
Tametsi was already in effect. Most significantly, for present purposes,
the Benedictine Declaration was never extended to Spain, or to any
part of the Spanish Empire then under Spanish rule.117
113 BOUSCAREN 472-73; 2 VELA"tDE 34-35.
114 See notes 115-44 and accompanying text infra.
115 C. Trident, Sess. XXIV, de reformatione matrimonii c. 1, §§ 12, 13, MANSr COl. 152.
116 See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
1'7 See, e.g., W. SHIELS, KING AND CHURCH, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PATRONATO REAL
[Vol. 6 1:1
MARRIAGE IN SPANISHt NORTH AMERICA
Qt~ite apart from these fundamental geographic limits upon
the applicability of Tridentine marriage legislation and its Benedic-
tine modification, the requirement of publication in each parish
seemed to contain the germs of an at least equally restrictive
principle. Much of Spanish North America remained unsettled or
very sparsely settled until the end of Spanish or Mexican rule, and
due to sparsity of settlement and the initially all-important role of
the missionary or "regular" clergy, the Tridentine notions of parish
and parish priest could be transplanted to the Indies only with
substantial modifications.'"I As will be seen, this potential gap in
territorial coverage was filled by a curious but internally consistent
amalgam of secular legislation, customary law, and curial practice.
That process was not, however, complete as a matter of canon law
until long after this question ceased to be of significance for
American secular marriage law. 119
C. Reception or Desuetude by Custom
The relationship of custom (consuetudo) to statute (lex) is one of
the most fascinating topics in canon law. Like its parallels in the
civil-law and common-law worlds, it goes to the very heart of the
constitutional system, and again not unlike these two parallels, it
reflects, in the main, shifts in the locus of political and constitu-
tional power.'20 In the present context, however, there is no need
to explore this subject comprehensively. We are here concerned
solely with the relationship of lex to consuetudo in canon law, as a
self-contained system, between the mid-sixteenth and the early
nineteenth centuries, and even then only with the relationship of
two rules of ecclesiastical statute law (the decree Tametsi and the
Benedictine Dispensation) to relevant ecclesiastical custom.
The ground rules are soon stated. The decree Tametsi could be
received by custom where it was not enacted by ecclesiastical
legislation; it could also be abrogated by cohtrary custom where so
189-90 (1961). For criticism of the explanation given there, see notes 437-40 and accom-
panying text infra. The Declaration itself was initially issued for formerly Spanish territory.
See also text accompanying notes 129, 235 infra.
116 The matter is well described in R. Gosz HoyOs, LA IoiESIA D AMtRICA EN LAS
LEYES DE AMtiucA EN LAS LEYES DE INDIAS 155-75 (1961). See also RECOPILIACI6N DE LEYES
DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS, bk. I, tit. 14, 1. 47 [hereinafter cited as in], (confirming the
Brieve Exponi Nobis, of Mar. 24, 1567, of Pope Pius V); id. I, 14, 18 (declaring the Religious in
charge of Doctrinas (missionary parishes) to be legitimate Parrocos (parish priests) With
respect to Spaniards locally resident).
119 See note 124 infra.




enacted.' 2' The basic ingredients of customary law were then, as
they are now, a rational custom and tacit approval by the legislator,
i.e., the Holy See. There were,, however, different periods pre-
scribed before the custom could become established, depending on
whether it was an extension of preexisting law (praeter legem) or an
abrogation of preexisting statute (contra legem). In the former case,
the durational requirement for tacitly tolerated practice was ten
years. Customary law contra legem, on, the other hand, came into
being only after forty years' practice if based on a claim of right, or
practice for time immemorial in the absence of such a claim. 12 2
There is solid and uncontradicted evidence indicating that the
decree Tametsi was regarded as being in effect in all settled parts of
Spanish North America, regardless of the date or the nature of the
acquisition of sovereignty, and also regardless of diocesan organi-
zation.123 There appear to have been doubts, however, as to the
applicability of that decree in areas thai were not inhabited under
Spanish rule. It was only in 1882, long after the termination of
Spanish or Mexican rule, that this question was answered in the
affirmative by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office.
2 4
It is doubtful, however, if this extension of the decree Tametsi
to Spanish North America without publication in individual
parishes as provided in the decree itself, and to areas where there
were no parishes and even no inhabitants, was the result of
customary law praeter legem. A more likely explanation is that the
decree was thus extended not by custom but through legislation by
secular authority. Before examining that process, it seems appro-
priate to discuss the possibility of the local abrogation, or modifica-
tion, of the decree Tametsi by contrary custom or by pertinent
general principles of law.
There are really two issues involved here. The first arises from
the general principle, recognized by canon law, that "nemo potest ad
impossibile obligari.' 25 As Murillo Velarde stated in his leading
121 A. LEINZ, DER EHEVORSCHRIFr DES CONCILS VON TRIENT, AUSDEHNUNG UND HEUTIGE
GELTUNG 57-71, 83-91 (1888); 2 VELARDE 35.
122 1 VELARDE 37-39. Cf CIC can. 25-30. The derivations can be traced through
GASPARRI, supra note 104, annotations at 5-6.
123 See text accompanying notes 180-214, 233-257 infra.
124 The Vicar Apostolic of Arizona inquired whether the decree must be deemed to
have been promulgated for the entire region formerly under Spanish rule, or solely for that
part of those regions that then had inhabitants. This inquiry was answered by the Holy
Office in the former sense on January 23, 1882. Z. ZITFLLI, APPARATus IuPS ECCLESIAS-
TIC! 430 (2d ed. 1888).
11 "Nobody can obligate himself to do the impossible." Liber Sextus V, 12, 6 in 2 E.
FRIEDBERG, supra note 97, at 1122 (trans. by author).
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canon law treatise which was written with special reference to the
Indies and which went through three editions in the eighteenth
century, the decree Tametsi need not be complied with in Holland
(although it had been published there) if a priest could not be
found or was not "safely accessible."' 126 Subsequent practice, includ-
ing practice in those areas of the United States where Tametsi was
in effect, supports the proposition that as little as one month's
absence of a parish priest or other competent cleric would suffice
to excuse noncompliance with Tametsi.127 It would thus appear
that but for Spanish Royal legislation and contrary custom de-
scribed below, the marriages celebrated by bond in Texas would
have been canonically valid.
This exception, which is based on general principle, applies to
marriages of Roman Catholics as well as mixed or non-Cathblic
marriages. A similar but related question is whether a case could be
made for the tacit reception of a variant of the principle expressed
in the Benedictine Declaration in Spanish America. That Declara-
126 2 VEI.ARDE 36. The towering importance of Pedro Murillo Velarde may be gleaned
from Comp. LAws, N.M., ch. 2, § 1 (1865), which reads as follow:
The laws heretofore in force concerning descents, distributions, wills and
testaments, as contained in the treatise on these subjects, written by Pedro Murillo
[Velarde] De Lorde, shall remain in force so far as they are in conformity with the
Constitution of the United States and the state laws in force for the time being.
1 N.M. STAT. ANN., Kearny Code § 1 (1954). This section was construed in Bent v.
Thompson, 5 N.M. 408, 418-21, 23 P. 234, 236-37 (1890), and in Gildersleeve v. New
Mexico Mining Co., 6 N.M. 27, 27 P. 318 (1891). The reference is to P. MURILLO VELARDE,
PaACTICA DE TESTAMENTOS, EN QUE SE RESUELVEN LOS CASOS MAS FREQUENTES QUE SE
OFERECEN EN LA DISPOSICI6N DE LAS ULT7MAS VOLUNTADES. (Practice of testaments in which
are resolved the cases that arise most frequently in the disposition of last wills). This little
booklet, # + 95 pages in Pott-octavo, with draft forms of a seven-witness will at pages 79-89
and a nuncupative will at pages 90-95, went through several printings in Spain and in
Mexico in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The copy used is a Mexican reimpres-
sion, dated 1790, available at the New York Public Library. See also A. POLDERVAART,
MANUAL FOR EFFECTIVE NEW MEXIco LEGAL RESEARCH 16 n.18 (1955). It seems likely that
the Practica was carried by priests, as occasion demanded, along with their breviaries, and
that the wills drafted in Spanish North America followed, by and large, Murillo Velarde's
precedents.
127 A. LEINZ, supra note 121, at 117. See also Bishop Odin's instruction as to the
activities of two impostors in clerical garb in the Brownsville area:
Tous les mariages qu'ils ont cflebrfs dans les lieux o6i 'on pouvait recourir
facilement au pr&re, ligitime pasteur, sont nulles. Dans les lieux trop 6loignfs de Ia
residence du pasteur ils peuvent Ztre considfrfs comme mariages c~lebrfs devant
un juge civile, valides f la vfrit6, mais non mariages ecclisiastiques.
This may be translated as follows:
All the marriages which they have celebrated in those places where one could
readily have recourse to the priest, the legitimate pastor, they may be considered as
marriages celebrated before a civil magistrate, valid indeed, but not ecclesiastical
marriages.
Letter from Bishop Odin to Father Verdet, Sept. 16, 1852, Odin Transcripts, supra note 29
(trans. by author).
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tion was to some extent a confirmation of prior custom; and it was
regarded as such by some contemporary authorities. Indeed, such
a view of the matter seems to have been taken, or at least enter-
tained, by the Bishop of Havana in 1791 as regards Spanish East
Florida, and expressly adopted by the Bishop of Quebec for the
formerly French portions of Illinois territory.'48
While it is now settled that the territorial applicability of the
Benedictine Declaration as legislation was contingent upon papal
action, 129 the action of the Bishop of Quebec was probably
sufficient to constitute custom praeter or possibly even contra legem,
and it seems highly likely that this is the basis for the applicability
of the Benedictine Declaration in non-Spanish territories east of
the Mississippi.' 30 As discussed in greater detail below,13 - the
possibility of the application of the Benedictine Declaration in
Spanish North America was expressly rejected in 1792 by the
competent Spanish secular and ecclesiastical authorities, which held
that Tametsi had to be strictly complied with even by tolerated
Protestants.
It thus seems clear that the reception of Tametsi in the mission-
ary territories and the unsettled areas of Spanish North America
through customary law praeter legem is a distinct possibility (al-
though as will be seen presently, 132 not a very important one). On
the other hand, it is clear that the Tridentine decree was not
abrogated or modified under Spanish rule by customary law contra
legem.
D. Adoption and Extension by Secular Legislation
As noted in a standard source-book of canon law, the decree
Tametsi was enacted in the Spanish kingdoms "Philippo II im-
128 See note 235 infra; Letter from Bishop Briand to Father Meurin, Aug. 7, 1767,
reprinted in 11 ILL. HisT. COLL. 587, 588-89 (C. Alvord ed. 1916). See also F. WALKER, THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE MEETING OF Two FRONTIERS: THE SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COUNTRY
(1763-1793), at 44-46 (1935). It is now clear that the Benedictine Declaration was extended
to Canada by decree of Pope Clement XIII, dated November 29, 1764. H. TiTU & C.
GAGNON, MANDEMENTS, LETTREs PASTORALES ET CIRCULAIRES DES EVkQUES DE QUiBEC 360 n.
a (1888). It seems likely, however, that this decree was communicated to Canada only after
some delay, since the position of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Quebec, his right to
comrhunicate with Rome, and Rome's power to enact ecclesiastical legislation in respect of
Canada remained doubtful so long as the Church of England credibly claimed to be the only
state church in Canada under British rule. See, e.g., Morrisey, The Juridical Situation of the
Catholic Church in Lower and Upper Canada from 1791 to 1840, 5 STUDIA CANONICA, CAN.
CANON L. REv. 279, 284-85 (1971).
129 A. LEINZ, supra note 121, at 50-52.
130 See note 173 infra.
M11 See text accompanying notes 238-41 infra.
132 See text accompanying notes 180-214 infra.
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perante" (by the order of King Philipp).133 The legislation of the
Council of Trent received its ecclesiastical sanction by a papal bull
on January 22, 1564, but that bull did not as such become legally
effective in Spain as a matter of secular or even ecclesiastical law.
The explanation is simple: pursuant to the rules governing the
relationship between the Vatican and the Spanish monarchs, which
are collectively denominated Patronato Real, papal acts became
effective in Spain only after they received royal approval, the
so-called pase regio.1
34
On July 12, 1564, Philipp II signed a cedula which "accepted
and received" the entire body of the legislation of the Council of
Trent, and ordered the execution of that legislation throughout his
kingdoms.135 That cedula is the source of the authority of the
decree Tametsi in the Spanish realms. Its impact upon the Spanish
law of the Indies will receive special attention below, 136 but first a
somewhat more basic, but more limited question, will be discussed:
How could the King of Spain enact a rule of canon law?
The answer seems disarmingly simple. As Dr. Bruno puts it in
his definitive canonist study of the public law of the Church of the
Indies: "Puede la ley civil corroborar, con sanci6n propia, lo que es
conforme al derecho can6nico vigente o a privilegios ciertamente
concedidos.' ' 137 Indeed his prime example for the exercise of such
power secundum legem by the secular arm is the cedula just men-
tioned. 3
8
It might be contended that the delay of Philipp II in giving
effect to the legislation of the Council of Trent within his realms
was contrary to canon law. This argument goes to the ultimate
validity of the Patronato Real and one of its most powerful tools,
the pase regio, ' 39 but it need not be pursued here, since for present
purposes, it was overtaken by events in 1564. A second objection is,
however, more troublesome. As will be seen, the intended scope of
133 Z. ZrrELLI, supra note 124, at 428.
134 See generally RI I, 9. Section 2 reproduces a cedula dated Sept. 6, 1538. The pase
regio is discussed in W. SHIELS, supra note 117, at 169-94, and (with more moderation) in C.
BRUNO, EL DERECHO PIIBLICO DE LA IGLESIA EN INDIAS 192-206 (1967).
135 NovisimA RECOPiLACx6N, bk. I, tit. 1, law 13 [hereinafter cited as NovisiMA] quoted
and discussed in notes 178-80 and accompanying text infra.
13' See text accompanying notes 181-214 infra.
137 "The secular law could reinforce, with appropriate sanction, that which is in
conformity with canon law or with privileges clearly conceded." C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at
169 (emphasis in original) (trans. by author).
138 Id. at 169.
139 See note 134 and accompanying text supra. A prime purpose of the pase regio was of
course the protection of zealous Regalists from excommunication. I J. LYNCH, SPAIN UNDER
THE HAPSBURGS 258 (1964).
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the territorial applicability of the 'cedula was considerably wider
than that built into the decree Tametsi. Could the King of Spain, by
secular legislation, extend norms of canon law bey9 nd their canon-
ically designated sphere?
Again, it seems that even contemporary legalists and canonists
could have agreed on an answer without committing treason or
lapsing into heresy, respectively. Legislation was then, as it is now,
part of potestas iurisdictionis, supposedly conferred upon the Pope
by divine law but delegable by him to others.140 In principle, that
power could be delegated only to clerics, but the rule thus limiting
the delegation of potestas iurisdictionis was one of ecclesiastical
rather than divine or natural law. It was thus subject to modifica-
tion both by legislation and by custom.' 4 1 It was beyond dispute
that such delegation had occurred through the famous fifteenth
and sixteenth-century papal bulls of the reconquest of the penin-
sula and settlement of the Indies,142 and that it had been enhanced
by custom at least tolerated by papal authority. The extent of this
delegation was controversial, but there could be no dispute over
the existence of royal power to extend the sphere of the applicabil-
ity of norms of mere ecclesiastical law, such as the marriage
legislation of the decree Tametsi.
143
It follows that within the Spanish realms, the sphere of the
applicability of that decree was subject to determination, even as a
matter of canon law, by royal legislation. In particular, the cedula
of 1564 could extend the effect of that decree beyond what was
provided in the decree itself (or, it should be added, in other rules
of canon law governing the personal and territorial scope of norms
of ecclesiastical law). To what extent such an extension did indeed
occur in the Spanish Indies will be examined in the next section.
144
Before turning to that crucial question, however, it seems appro-
priate to put the matter into sharper geographic focus.
140 GIG can. 219, 199, §§ 1-2, 118; derivations in GASPARRI, supra note 104, at 27-28 n.
4, 50 nn.3 & 4, 56 n.2.
141 C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at 151-54.
142 Especially pertinent are the bulls Orthodoxe fidei propagationem, of Innocent VIII,
of Dec. 13, 1486; Inter caetera (or Donation), of Alexander VI, of May 3, 1493; Universalis
ecclesiae, of Julius II, ofJuly 28, 1507; an Omnimoda, of Adrian VI, of May 9, 1552. These
are discussed in C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at 99-129, and W. SHIELS, supra note 117, at
66-70, 78-81, 212-14, with extensive translation. The latter reproduces the originals at
277-82, 283-87, 310-13, but omits the Omnimoda.
143 See, e.g., C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at 169.
144 See text accompanying notes 180-214 infra.
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E. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Spanish North America
In the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, the
United States acquired four major territories that were at the time,
or had been until recently, Spanish possessions. In historical se-
quence and in then current terms of geographical description, these
were Louisiana (1803); the Floridas (1819); Texas (1846); New
Mexico (1848); and California (1848). Today, the area of the
Louisiana Purchase includes Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa,
North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and parts of Col-
orado, Wyoming, Montana, and Minnesota.
The acquisition of Florida included parts of what are now
Alabama and Mississippi. Texas has actually decreased in size
when compared to its initial borders as defined by Texas law. 145 It
should also be noted that although the date of the establishment of
United States sovereignty over Texas, as acknowledged by Texas, is
1846 (or, according to United States authorities, 1845),146 the
145 The Act of Dec. 19, 1836, 1 GAMMEL 1193-94, defined the boundaries of the Re-
public of Texas as
beginning at the mouth of the Sabine River, and running west along the Gulf of
Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande, thence up the
principal stream of said river to its source, thence due north to the forty-second
degree of north latitude, thence along the boundary line as defined in the treaty
between the United States and Spain to thd beginning ....
Id. This included not only the controversial strip between the Nueces and the Rio Grande,
see note 279 infra, but also most of the present state of New Mexico, as well as portions of the
present states of Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming. See maps in C. PAULLIN,
ATLAS OF THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES pl. 46c (J. Wright ed. 1932),
and W. BINLEY, THE EXPANSIONIST MOVEMENT IN TEXAS, map 2, at 24-25 (1925). The
present boundaries of Texas were proposed by the United States in the Act of Sept. 9, 1850,
ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446, and accepted by Texas through the Act of Nov. 25, 1850, ch. 2, 3
GAMMEL 832. See also the Presidential Proclamation of Dec. 13, 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 1005.
The United States undertook to pay $10 million consideration for this settlement, and some
of the bonds issued in payment later figured in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868),
and subsequent cases. For details, see 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 pt. 1, 628-76 (1971).
146 The official position of Texas was that the Republic came to an end, as provided in
§ 12 of the 1845 Constitution, with organization of the state government, which was
achieved on February 16, 1846. Cocke v. Calkin & Co., 1 Tex. 541 (1847), rev'd, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 227 (1852). As there stated, the position of the United States is that Texas became a
state when it was admitted to the Union byJoint Resolution of Dec. 29, 1845, 9 Stat. 108. Act
of Dec. 29, 1845, ch. 1, 9 Stat. 1, extended "all the laws of the United States" to Texas,
effective immediately. In Lee v. King, 21 Tex. 577 (1858), the following remarks were
addressed. to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Calkin:
The government of Texas having employed counsel to sustain the defense in that
cause and having manifested no special purpose to contest further the positions
assumed in support of the Federal authority, this Court, though not assenting to
these assumptions, or that they arise fairly upon the acts of the parties resulting in
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displacement of Spanish and Mexican law in the Republic com-
menced with its independence in 1836.147 The 1848 acquisitions
include Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Oklahoma, Colorado,
Kansas, and Wyoming, in addition to New Mexico and Califor-
nia.
1 4 8
There were also some relatively minor territorial adjustments
involving territories then or previously under Spanish rule. Several
boundaries, including some international ones, were controversial.
The most important among the controversial boundaries was the
boundary between Texas (or, after 1845, of the United States) and
Mexico, which Mexico would draw (if at all) along the Nueces, and
which Texas and the United States would draw along the Rio
Grande. 1
49
The present study does not attempt to cover all of these states.
Many of them had no permanent settlements while under Spanish
rule; in others, Spanish influence was ephemeral, unrecorded, or
both. This applies especially to the central and northern portions
of the Louisiana Purchase territory,15 0 and seems to be more
generally the case outside the so-called Spanish borderlands. In the
following, attention will focus on these areas, and more particularly
on Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Spanish Florida. The
inclusion of the Floridas is justified because despite the ephemeral
character of Spanish rule in that area, there is solid documentation
on the questions discussed here. California should perhaps receive
more attention, but does not appear to afford different insights.
A brief historical sketch of Roman Catholic ecclesiastical juris-
diction, or diocesan geography, within these areas from the first
assertion of such jurisdiction to the severance of ecclesiastical ties
with the hierarchies of Spain or Mexico seems useful. The area west
of the Sabine River, encompassing Texas, New Mexico, and Califor-
nia, was part of the ecclesiastical province of Mexico, which became
annexation, felt under no obligation to continue the controversy, and has felt none
to renew it as often as occasion might present itself.
Id. at 582.
147 See text accompanying notes 39-48 supra.
148 See C. PAULLIN, supra note 145, pl. 46c. This description accepts the 1850 settlement
of the northern and western boundaries of Texas as reflecting the status quo ante.
149 See W. BINKLEY, supra note 145, at 43-67, 123-94; D. FLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF
ANNEXATION: TEXAS, OREGON, AND THE MEXICAN WAR 352-92 (1973); note 279 and
accompanying text infra.
1"' See, e.g., Bannon, The Spaniards in the Mississippi Valley-and Introduction, in THE
SPANISH IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 1762-1804, at 3, 11 (J. McDermott ed. 1974); THE
SPANISH REGIME IN MISSOURI (L. Houck ed. 1909) (2 vols.), especially the report of Zenon
Trudeau of Jan. 15, 1798, 2 id. at 247-58.
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independent of Seville in 1545. All of the northern borderlands of
that province were initially part of the diocese of Guadalajara, which
was established in 1560. It seems that the Bishop of Guadalajara
actually exercised jurisdiction in the three borderlands in inverse
proportion to their 'distance from his See: contacts were ample with
Texas, less ample with New Mexico, and virtually nonexistent with
California. 1 1 Nevertheless, when Texas was transferred in 1777 to
the newly created diocese of Linares (Monterrey, Nuevo Leon), the
cedula delimiting the boundaries of the new diocese expressly
mentioned the inconvenience of the distance between Guadalajara
and Texas as a reason for this reorganization.1 5 2 In 1620, New
Mexico became part of the diocese of Durango, and in 1779,
California was transferred to the diocese of Arizpe (Sonora). This
arrangement, which seems quite logical, prevailed until the
changes in sovereignty in the first half of the nineteenth century.
There were vast differences in the actual exercise of ecclesias-
tical authority. Contacts with Texas existed in fact as well as in law.
The Bishop of Linares made a visitation of that area in 1805,
inspecting the cities of Goliad, Nacogdoches, and, of course, San
Antonio. 153 Contacts between Durango and New Mexico were too
intense for the orderly administration of the latter; after repeated
efforts in that direction, Santa Fe was designated a diocese by
decree of the Cadiz Cortes in 181 3.154 Due to military and political
events, however, that decree never took effect, and New Mexico
was still part of the diocese of Durango when Santa Fe was
occupied by the United States in 1846.155 In California, on the
other hand, there is little evidence of the assertion of ecclesiastical
authority by the Bishop of Sonora. In 1840, a new diocese of both
Californias was established, but that diocese was destined to be
ephemeral so far as present United States territory is concerned. 56
The system just outlined was severely weakened and ultimately
destroyed by three nineteenth-century developments. First, the
Mexican War of Independence caused severe losses in lives and
property in the borderlands, and destroyed much that had been
151 See Ryan, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in the Spanish Colonies, 5 CATH. HIsT. REv. 3, 4-18
(1919).
152 Quoted in W. SHIELS, supra note 117, at 191.
153 Benson, Bishop Marin de Porras and Texas, 51 S.W. HIsT. Q. 16, 19-30 (1947).
154 Decree No. 217, Jan. 26, 1813. An English translation is in H. CARROLL & J.
HAGGARD, THREE NEW MEXICO CHRONICLES 188 n.281 (1942).
155 Ryan, supra note 151, at 9-11.
156 See Geary, Transfer of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Calfornia (1840-1853), 22 HIST.
RECORDS STUD. 101, 112-36 (1932); Ryan, supra note 151, at 16-18.
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accomplished by colonization.5 7 Second, independence, once
achieved; led to a suspension of Episcopal authority. The bishops
selected by the King by virtue of the Patronato Real 58 were, as a
rule, loyal to the Crown; new appointments could only be made
after the Vatican decided to disregard Spanish pretensions to
Mexico. That step was taken in 1831; the independence of Mexico
was not recognized by Spain and the Holy See until 1835 and 1836,
respectively. 159 The See of Linares, for instance, was vacant from
1815 until 1831, which were critical years for Stephen Austin's
colony in Texas.'
60
The third development, and ultimately the most decisive one,
was the change of territorial sovereignty that brought secular
government and disestablishment to Texas in 1836 and to
California and New Mexico in 1848. The Vatican generally reacted
to these changes by separating the areas lost to Mexico from their
Mexican diocesan connections and by incorporating them into the
Roman Catholic hierarchy of the United States.' 6 ' There are, of
course, differences between the respective changes in sovereignty
and papal reactions thereto. These are usually explained by delays
in communication, uncertainty as to geographic details, and, par-
ticularly in the case of Texas, political uncertainty. (Mexico never
recognized the independence of the Republic of Texas; San Anto-
nio was twice briefly occupied by Mexican troops before 1846.162)
Nevertheless, there is one significant divergence from this
pattern of the more or less automatic adaptation of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction to international boundaries. Mexico went to some
trouble to assure the continued freedom of access of Roman
Catholics in New Mexico to their religious superiors in Mexico. A
treaty provision expressly guaranteeing that right was included in
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo as submitted to the United States
Senate which, however, rejected it. Mexico accepted the treaty with
this deletion, among others, and the United States made some
assurances of a more general nature as to the freedom of reli-
157 For a detailed account of the Mexican War of Independence, see 6 C. CASTAfiEDA,
OUR CATHOLIC HERITAGE IN TEXAS: THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 1810-1836, at 1-175 (1970).
156 See text accompanying notes 201-04 infra.
159 For a detailed account of the relations between church and state in the first decade
of Mexican Independence, see Shiels, Church and State in the First Decade of Mexican
Independence, 28 CATH. HIST. REv. 206 (1942).
16o See text accompanying notes 16-33 supra.
161 See R. BAYARD, LONE-STAR VANGUARD, THE CATHOLIC RE-OcCuPATION OF TEXAS
(1838-1848), at 19 passim (1945); Geary, supra note 156, at 148-63.
162 See S. SIEGEL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE TEXAS REPUBLIC 1836-1845, at 192-94,
203-04 (1956).
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gion. 63 No doubt, encouraged by these assurances, the Bishop of
Durango continued to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction over New
Mexico after its cession to the United States, and he even made a
formal visitation of Santa Fe in 1850.164 The continued connection
of the Roman Catholic clergy and the population of New Mexico
with the Mexican Bishop of Durango had far-reaching conse-
quences for the canon law of marriage in the ecclesiastical province of
Santa Fe, and even for the secular marriage law of New Mexico.1 65
East of the Sabine River, Spain was the territorial sovereign of
the Louisiana territory from 1763 to 1803, and of the Floridas
from 1783 to 18 19.166 These territories were part of the ecclesiasti-
cal province of San Domingo, which, like that of Mexico,'was
created in 1545. Until 1795, the Floridas and Louisiana were part
of the diocese of Havana. There was, however, an auxiliary bishop
in residence in Louisiana. Between 1795 and 1803, Louisiana was a
diocese within the province of San Domingo, but the relations
between that diocese and the Floridas were uncertain for some
time. 67 In any event, Havana exercised ecclesiastical jurisdiction
over the Floridas until their cession to the United States in 18 19.168
Although the transfer of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not without
163 As originally submitted to the United States Senate, the last paragraph of Article IX
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided:
Finally, the relations and communication between the Catholics living in the
territories aforesaid, and their respective ecclesiastical authorities, shall be open,
free and exempt from all hinderance whatever, even although such authorities
should reside within the limits of the Mexican Republic, as defined by this treaty;
and this freedom shall continue, so long as a new demarcation of ecclesiastical
districts shall not have been made, conformably with the laws of the Roman
Catholic Church.
5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs oF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 242 (H.
Miller ed. 1937). The Senate eliminated this provision and the treaty was concluded without
it. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2,
1848, art. IX, 9 Stat. 930 (1854), T.S. No. 207. Mexico was assured, however, that the
Constitution of the United States guaranteed freedom of worship, that the Catholic Church
had found this guarantee sufficient, and that no difficulties had arisen in this connection
when Louisiana and the Floridas were incorporated into the United States. Letter from
James Buchanan to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican Republic, Mar. 18,
1848, 5 TREATIES, supra, at 253, 255.
164 Ryan, supra note 151, at 10. The establishment of the Diocese of Santa Fe and the
termination of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the .Bishop of Durango over New Mexico are
now fully discussed and documented in P. HORGAN, LAMY OF SANTA FE 61-183 (1975). See
especially id. at 141-42.
165 See text accompanying notes 390-413 infra.
166 Spain was also the territorial sovereign of the Floridas from 1565 to 1763. For an
account of that period, see Ryan, Diocesan Organization in the Spanish Colonies, 4 CATH. HIST.
REV. 170, 170-76 (1918).
167 See Curley, Church and State in the Spanish Floridas (1783-1822), at 63-64, 249-84, in
30 CATH. Hrs. STUD. (1940) [hereinafter cited as Curley].
166 Ryan, supra note 166, at 178-80.
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difficulty, it seems clear that the end of Spanish sovereignty both in
Louisiana and in the Floridas was perceived as implying, more or
less automatically, the termination of the jurisdiction of the
Spanish hierarchy. 169
In summary, Spanish North America east of the Sabine River
was part of the ecclesiastical province of San Domingo, while the
Spanish and Mexican Southwest and West belonged to the
ecclesiastical province of Mexico. Spanish rule in Louisiana and in
the Floridas ended in 1803 and 1819, respectively; except for some
minor problems of transition, these dates also signify the end of
Spanish ecclesiastical jurisdiction in what is now the Southeastern
United States. Texas, New Mexico, and California, as parts of the
dioceses of Linares, Durango, and Sonora, passed into the Mexican
hierarchy after 1821, and were severed from that hierarchy as a
result of the independence of Texas (1836), and the cession of
New Mexico and California (1848). Again, the change in political
sovereignty brought with it a realignment of ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion along national lines, but the process of transition was slower
and more confused in the Southwest. There was one remarkable
exception: New Mexico continued to be subject to the jurisdiction
of the Mexican Bishop of Durango until 1850.
At this point, it should be recalled that until the beginning of
the present century, there was no uniform rule of Roman Catholic
canon law on the formal validity of marriages. In some areas, the
Tridentine form was prescribed for all baptized persons; in others,
only for intermarriages of Roman Catholics.' 70 Where neither the
decree Tametsi nor its Benedictine modification had been enacted,
the pre-Tridentine rule of marriage by consent alone prevailed.'
7 '
A brief look at the geographical incidence of these three systems
in the United States will reveal some remarkable parallels with the
history of diocesan geography sketched above. As reported by the
Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884, the decree Tametsi
was at that time not in force in the ecclesiastical provinces of
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Oregon, Milwaukee,
and (subject to exceptions to be mentioned presently) Cincinnati,
St. Louis, and Chicago.' 7 2 Tametsi, it will be recalled, had never
been enacted in England or in Scotland, and these nine Roman
Catholic ecclesiastical provinces cover, in essence, the area of origi-
'6' See Curley 282-83, 333-34.
170 See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
171 See text accompanying notes 96-106 supra.
172 AcTA ET DECRETA CONCILII PLENARII BALTIMORENSIS TERTUi cvii (1886) (letter of
Card. Gibbons).
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nal English colonization plus those parts of the Midwest and the
West that were originally occupied by settlers from the United
States.
The decree Tametsi was in effect, on the other hand, in the
ecclesiastical provinces of New Orleans, San Francisco, and Santa
Fe, plus the diocese of Vincennes (Indiana), the city and some of
the environs of St. Louis, and four named places in the diocese of
Alton (Illinois). These three ecclesiastical provinces are virtually
congruent with present mainland United States territories previ-
ously subject to Spanish rule, to Mexican rule, or to both of these.
The nature of the exceptions seems apparent from their names,
such as St. Louis, Vincennes, Prairie du Rocher, or French Village.
These are surviving islands of French settlement in the northern
Louisiana territory.
17 3
By 1884, the Benedictine Declaration had been extended to
most areas subject to Tametsi. There were, however, two excep-
tions. First, the Benedictine Declaration was not in effect in the
ecclesiastical province of Santa Fe. Second, as Cardinal Gibbons
put it: "Quoad dioceses vero S. Antonii, Galvestonensem, Browns-
villensem, quae pertinent ad provinciam Neo-Aurelianensem, res
est dubia, utrum necne declaratio Benedictina extensa fuerit.'
11
7 4
The ecclesiastical province of Santa Fe has been described as
including, at the time, "the archdiocese of Santa Fe in New Mexico;
the diocese of Gallup, including parts of New Mexico and Arizona;
the diocese of El Paso in its New Mexican section; the present
diocese of Tucson; and the large province of Los Angeles."'
75
The Roman Catholic hierarchy of the United States rep-
resented at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore requested that
the Benedictine Declaration be extended to those parts of the
United States where it was not yet in effect or where its status was
doubtful, i.e., to the province of Santa Fe and to Texas, respec-
173 See generally F. WALKER, supra note 128. It should be noted, however, that the French
settlements on the left bank of the Mississippi (e.g., St. Louis and St. Genevieve) were under
Spanish rule in the last three decades of the 18th century. This probably meant that the
Benedictine Declaration was not permanently received there in the manner suggested at
note 128 supra. Trudeau noted in 1798 that Protestants in Spanish territories were "obliged
to celebrate their marriages and baptisms by means of our Catholic priests." L. HoucK, supra
note 150, at 256. The Benedictine Declaration was expressly extended to the Diocese of St.
Louis by papal decree in 1824. See text accompanying note 255 infra.
174 "As for San Antonio, Galveston, and Brownsville, which belonged to the Province of
New Orleans, it is doubtful whether the Benedictine Declaration was extended there."
Gibbons, supra note 172, at 108 (trans. by author). The author is endeavoring to resolve
these doubts. That issue is, however, only of interest to historians of canon law and will be
treated separately.
175 W. SHIELS, supra note 117, at 190.
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tively. After study and affirmative recommendation by the Holy
Office, Pope Leo XIII granted both of these requests on November
25, 1885.176
This brief glimpse into the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury seems irrelevant and almost constitutionally suspect to modern
lawyers. The Roman Catholic canon law of marriage was of course
not at that time in effect as, or in lieu of,' secular marriage law
anywhere in the United States (although, as will be seen further
below, 177 that development was then of much more recent origin
than might be assumed). Nevertheless, especially in the context of
the present study, the situation in 1884, even seen through the eyes
of the Holy See, provides some useful insights. First, it strongly
reinforces the natural assumption that Tametsi came to North
America from Spain, and that its traces in the South and the
Southwest were Spanish and Mexican legacies. Second, the rec-
ommendation of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore and the
prompt reaction of the Pope provide a tentative answer to the
question posed at the beginning of this Article: the Spanish law as
to the form of marriage did not survive because even those who
were not out of sympathy with it deemed it to be fundamentally
incompatible with the constitutional commitment of the United
States and its people to secularism and pluralism.
III
THE CEDULA OF 1564 IN SPANISH NORTH AMERICA
On July 12, 1564, King Philipp II signed a cedula in Madrid
on the subject of the Council of Trent. The cedula begins by
describing, as certain and notorious, the obligation of kings and
ecclesiastical princes to obey, defend, and observe, in their respec-
tive kingdoms, estates, and seigneuries, the decrees and com-
mands of the holy Mother Church, and to assist, aid, and favor the
implementation and observation of these decrees- and commands.
This obligation, flowing from the position of kings and ecclesiasti-
cal princes'as obedient sons, protectors, and defenders of the
Church, is then expressly stated to include the duty to observe and
to implement the decisions of the universal Councils with the
176 Response of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office to the letter of Card.
Gibbons, supra note 172, at 107-08. Heneghan, The Decree "Tametsi" in the United States, 3 THE
JuRisr 318, 322 (1943), inexplicably fails to note that the Benedictine Declaration was thus
extended to the Province of Santa Fe, and W. SHIELS, supra note 117, at 190, repeats the
error.
177 See text accompanying notes 390-413 infra.
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authority of the Holy See. The cedula then briefly recites the history
of the most recent of these Councils, held at the Italian city of Trent,
making special mention of the participation of Spanish prelates from
the Spanish kingdoms in the work of that Council. 7 8 The recitals end
with the statement that a printed and authentic text of the decrees of
the Council of Trent had been received from the Pope. The King
then provides as follows:
We as the Catholic King, and as an obedient and true son of
the Church, wishing to satisfy and fulfill the obligation which we
carry, and following the example of our Royal predecessors of
illustrious memory, have accepted and received, and do accept
and receive, the said holy Council. It is our will that it be
defended, observed, and implemented in these our kingdoms.
For the purpose of such implementation and observance,
and for the protection and defense of that which the Council
ordains, we give and lend our aid and favor, interceding with
our Royal Power when necessary and convenient.
Furthermore, we charge and direct the Archbishops and
Bishops and other Prelates, and the Generals, Provincials and
Priors, Guardians of the Orders, and all others affected, to see to
the publication of the said holy Council in their Churches,
districts, or dioceses, and in other convenient locations.
Furthermore, we order our Council, Presidents and our
Audiencias, and the Governors, Corregidores and other courts
of whatever kind, to give and lend the favor and aid required for
the implementation and observance of the said Council and of
what is 'ordained by it.179
This is followed by an expression of special royal concern for
compliance with the orders just quoted, which are declared to be of
great importance to the welfare of the Church.
A. Transmission, to Mexico
A provision of the Royal Council, dated December 6, 1564,
instructed the Justicias (tribunals) to accord to ecclesiastical prel-
ates the favor and aid required for the implementation and
observance of all the decrees of the Council of Trent.1
8 0
178 Cf J. LYNCH, supra note 139, at 243-45. Note, incidentally, that Philipp II went to
some trouble to prevent the participation of clergy residing in the Indies in the Council of
Trent. See de Leturia, PerchU la Nascente Chiesa Ispano-Americana Nonfu Rappresentata a Trento,
1 IL CONCILIO Di TEwro 35 (Rome 1942), in 1 P. DE LETURIA, RELACIONES ENTRE LA SANTA
SEDE E HISPANOAMARICA 495 (A. de Egafia ed. 1959). The Crown was motivated by the
desire to prevent long absences of bishops from missionary territory, the wish to assert royal
authority, and the fear of contamination with "Lutheran" heresy. RI I, 7, 36, which prohibits
the return of archbishops or bishops from the Indies to Spain without royal permit, was a
product of this policy. P. DE LETURIA, supra, at 505.
179 NOVISIMA I, 1, 13.
180 7 Los C6DIGos EsPro.Es CONCORDADOS Y ANOTADOs 5 n.10 (1850).
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The cedula itself could not have arrived in the New World in
1564, for the armada of 1564 had sailed in March or April, several
months before the King had acted. It now seems certain, however,
that both the cedula and the text of the Tridentine legislation
reached Mexico with the next fleet, which left Spain on June 6,
1565, and arrived in Vera Cruz on September 20.181 On October
11 of that year, the Archbishop and the Bishops of Mexico submit-
ted a petition to the Audiencia of New Spain concerning the
observation of the provisions of the Council of Trent, and on other
matters pertaining to the ecclesiastical and civil government of
those parts. The petition referred to the familiarity of the Presi-
dent of the Audiencia with the message from the King, ordering
the observation and implementation of the decrees of the Council
of Trent in all of his kingdoms, seigneuries, and territories.
The petition then recited that the "very extensive" text of these
decrees had been given to the bishops by a secretary of the Audiencia,
and that the bishops had been directed by the visitor, de Valdemarra,
to gather in Mexico in order to discuss, and decide upon, current
issues. After reciting some eighteen items of requests for legal
sanction not relevant here, the petition concluded by requesting the
granting of royal assistance where necessary, to which assistance the
bishops felt entitled by virtue of session 25, chapter 22, of the
Tridentine decrees, 182 which they cited as authority. It appears from
the copy of this petition made by the scribe of the Audiencia of New
Spain on October 15, 1565, and from the scribe's annotation thereto,
that the petition was accepted in its entirety by the Audiencia.
183
The Second Provincial Council of Mexico was convened by the
Archbishop Montufar at approximately the same time, primarily
for the purpose of implementing the work of the Council of
Trent.184 This was achieved through the adoption, on November
181 The 1564 and 1565 sailings are exhaustively documented in 3 H. & P. CHAUNU,
SVILLE Er L'ATLANTiQUE 60, 68 (1955).
182 The correct citation should have been to C.Trident. Sess. XXV, c. 20, MANsi col. 170.
'83 The petition of Oct. 11, 1565, and the scribe's annotation of Oct. 15 of that year, are
reprinted in 13 CoLacc16N DE DocuMF tTOs INEDrros DEL ARCHIVO DE INDIAS 283-93
(1870) (1st series). See also 2 E. SCHAEFER, INDICE DE LA COLECCr6N DE DocUMENTOs
INinrros DE INDIAS 407 No. 2.925 (R. Konetzke ed. 1947). The key to these sources was
graciously supplied by Professor G. Floris Margadant of the Faculty of Law, National
Autonomous University of Mexico. A. CARREFiO, UN DEsCONOCIDO CEDULAIuO DEL SIGLO
XVI (1944), reproduces several sixteenth-century cedulas on the implementation of the
disciplinary decrees of the Council of Trent in New Spain. The first of these, id. at 290-91, is
dated Mar. 24, 1566; it is addressed to the Archbishop of Mexico and to the dean and chapter
of the cathedral there. This source was brought to the author's attention by Dr. I. Rubio
MafiE, Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico City.
184 CoNcsuos PROVINCIALES DE MixxCO 187-88 (introd. No. 13) (F. Lorenzana ed.
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11 of that year, of a canon which received the work of the
Tridentine Council in its entirety and which specified to be "cas-
tigando, y corrigiendo por-todo rigor de Derecho, si (lo que Dios
no quiera) hubiese alguno, que de palabra, o hecho contradixese lo
assi ordenado, y establecido por el dicho Santo Concilio Triden-
tino."' 85 In a place where the Spanish Inquisition was in operation,
that was hardly an idle threat. 186 At its final meeting in December,
1565, the Provincial Council issued instructions which gave notice
to the synodals that Tridentine legislation on, among other mat-
ters, clandestine marriages, took precedence over the acts adopted
by the First Mexican Provincial Council.
187
The Third Mexican Provincial Council, which met in 1585,
enacted a detailed code of ecclesiastical legislation, including,
among other matters, the subject of marriage. After restating, with
appropriate citation, the rule laid down in the decree Tametsi that
marriages celebrated without the assistance of a priest and two or
three witnesses are void, the Provincial Council increased penal
sanctions for those who should nevertheless attempt to contract
invalid clandestine marriages. 88 This legislation by the Third
Mexican Provincial Council was approved by a papal bull and, after
examination by the Council of the Indies, by cedula on February 9,
1621.189
In view of what has been reported above, there can be no
doubt that the decree Tametsi was in effect in New Spain, and that
the scope of its applicability was determined by the cedula of 1564,
with the result that the territorial sphere of its applicability was
coextensive with Spanish sovereignty. One example (although no
doubt a significant one) is that in a report dated March 6, 1762, on
the activities of the missions in Texas, it is stated that at these
missions, "los cristianos se casan . . . por la Yglecia, y conforme al
1769). The papal bull Benedictus Deus, approving the work of the Council of Trent, was
printed and published in Mexico in 1565 under the authority of the Archbishop of Mexico.
A copy is on file in the University of Texas library at Austin.
185 The canon specified to be "castigated, and disciplined by the full rigor of the law,
anyone who by word or deed contradicts what is here ordered and established by the said
holy Council of Trent." 1 Decrees of the Second Council, c. 1, Id. at 188 (trans. by author).
186 See text accompanying notes 208-14 infra.
187 F. LORENZANA, supra note 184, at 207-08. Canoh 38 of the First Mexican Provincial
Council, held in 1555, enacted severe penalties against clandestine marriages. Id. at 98-100. A
note at 98 (*) states that the marriages thus prohibited had later been declared null by C.
Trident. Sess. XXIV, de reformatione matrimonii c. 1, MANSI col. 152.
18P CONCILIUM MEXICANUM PROVINCIALE III, Lib. IV, tit. 1, § 3, 270-71 (F. Lorenzana
ed. 1769).
189 That act of royal approval is duly reported in RI 1, 8, 7. Note that this fragment
expressly refers to the Council of Trent.
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Santo Concilio de Trento" ("Christians are married in church and
in conformity with the holy Council of Trent"). 90 Spanish and
Mexican authors have never assumed otherwise. 191 Yet in Hallett v.
Collins,' 92 the Supreme Court of the United States reached a
contrary conclusion. Speaking through Justice Grier, the Court
said:
In Spain Ilametsil was received and promulgated by Philip the
Second in his European dominions. But the laws applicable to
the colonies consisted of a code issued by the Council of the
Indies antecedent to the Council of Trent, and are to be found in
the code or treatise called Las Siete Partidas and the Laws of
Toro. The law of marriage as contained in the Partidas is the
same as that which we have stated to be the general law of
Europe antecedent to the council; namely, "that consent alone,
joined with the will to marry, constitutes marriage." We have no
evidence, historical or traditional, that any portion of this code
was ever authoritatively changed in any of the American
colonies; nor has it been shown, that in the "Recopilacion de los
Indies," digested for the government of the colonies by the order
of Philip the Fourth, and published in 1661, nearly a century
after the Council of Trent, any change was made in the doctrine
of the Partidas on the subject of marriage, in order to ac-
commodate it to that of the council. It may be supposed, that, as
a matter of conscience and subjection to ecclesiastical su-
periors, a Catholic population would in general conform to the
usages of the Church. But such conformity would be no evidence
of the change of the law by the civil power. 193
It seems that the Court did not then have the benefit of the
exact text of the cedula and of Mexican provincial ecclesiastical
legislation, and consequently could not determine the significance
of the cedula of February 9, 1621. Justice Grier was nevertheless
correct in his assertion that the act of King Philipp II sanctioning,
1901 Relaci6n del Estado en que se hallan todas y cada una de las Misiones, en el Afio de
1762., dirigido al Muy Reverendo Padre Guardian Fray Francisco Xavier Ortiz, in
DocUMENTOS PARA LA"HISTORIA ECLEsiAsTICA Y CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIA DE TEXAS o NUEVAS
PHILIPINAS 1720-1779, at 245, 262 (1961) (trans. by author). This was a report on the status
of each and every one of the missions in Texas in the year 1762.
191 See, e.g., C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at 178-79; J. OTs Y CAPDEQUi, MANUAL DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHo ESPAROL EN LAS INDIAS 92 (1945); 1 M. GALVk.N RIVERA, supra note
35, at 36 & n.1; most recently G. MARGADANT, INTRODUcCION A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
MEXICANO 126 (1971). Llorca, Aceptaci6n en Espafia de los decretos del concilio de Trento, 39
ESTUDIOS ECLESIASTncos 341, 459 (1964) (Madrid), concludes that there can be no doubt
whatever that the Tridentine decrees were received and implemented in their entirety in all
Spanish territories, not only in the peninsula but also in the Netherlands and in America. Id. at
358.
192 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1850).
193 Id. at 181-82. This case is discussed extensively at notes 353-79 and accompanying
text infra.
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for his realms, the work of the Council of Trent, is not textually
reflected in the Recopilaci6n of the Indies or, for that matter, as
might have been added, in theNueva Recopilaci6n.194 The full text
of the cedula of 1564 does, however, appear as book one, title one,
law thirteen of the Novisima Recopilaci6n of 1805. Despite the late
date of its publication, the Novisima was in effect in Mexico,
including Texas,195 so that the holding in Hallett is manifestly
irrelevant for Spanish North America west of the Sabine River, at
least for the time of Anglophonic settlement under Spanish
Floridas after 1805. Hallett arose in the Floridas, but the marriage
there at issue was celebrated in 1805. Thus the question remains:
Is there any merit to-the contention that the decree Tametsi was not
extended to the Indies by or by virtue of the cedula of 1564, within
the terms provided by that act itself?
The answer follows quite readily from the three basic constitu-
tional rules of the Spanish colonial empire prevailing at the times
here material: royal absolutism in Castile and its appendage, the
Indies; the Patronato Real and through it, the domination of the
Church by the Crown; and last but certainly not least, the position
of the Roman Catholic Church as the established church of the
Spanish realms.
Since the King was the absolute ruler of the Kingdom of
Castile, and since the Indies were part of that Kingdom,1
96 it
follows that the question of the applicability of the cedula in the
Indies is purely one of royal intent. It is true that the Recopilaci6n
of the Indies laid down the rule that cedulas, provisiones and
pragmdticas did not take effect in the Indies unless approved by the
Council of the Indies and dispatched pursuant to royal authority;
but that rule was established, at the earliest, by a cedula dated
December 14, 1614.197 The cedula of 1564 was promulgated a half
century earlier, and its language, as reproduced above, leads to the
conclusion that all realms subject to royal fiat were intended to be
covered. The reality of that intent is amply corroborated by im-
plementing acts, both ecclesiastical and royal, in or with respect to
194 See note 189 supra.
9' See, e.g., 1 NovisiMo SALA MEXICANO 15-16, 22-23 (M. Dublan & L. Mendez eds.
1870); Babb v. Carroll, 21 Tex. 765, 771 (1858). But cf. note 297 and accompanying text
infra.
196 See Manzano Manzano, Adquisici6n de las Indias por los Reyes Cat6licos y su
Incorporaci6n a los Reinos Castellanos, 21 ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ESPAR1OL 5
(1951); Garcia Gallo, La uni6n politica de los Reyes Cat6licos y la incorporaci6n de las Indias,
30 REVISTA DE ESTtJDIOS POLITICOS 179 (1950).
197 RI II, 1, 39 & 40. See Garcia Gallo, La ley como Fuente del Derecho en Indias en el
Siglo XVI, 21 ANUARIO DE HISTOrIA DEL DERECHO ESPAROL 607, 614-15 n.15 (1951).
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New Spain. 198 In addition to the acts already noted, the latter
include almost innumerable references to the Council of Trent in
the Recopilaci6n of the Indies. For example, book one, title
fourteen, law seventy-two' 99 provided that in executing sanctions
imposed upon the religious by their superiors, the Audiencias were
to be guided by the general law,,the canon law, and the Council of
Trent, and law seventy-four 200 directed the archbishops and the
bishops to supervise the disciplining of the religious by their
superiors pursuant to the rules of the Council of Trent.
This reading of the cedula as encompassing the Indies is
further supported, if need be, by a consideration of the nature and
purposes of the Patronato Real. The King regarded himself as the
crusading champion of the Roman Catholic faith, especially in the
Indies.2 0 1 Under the Patronato Real, he had powers ranging'from
the nominating and exiling of archbishops to the constructing of
churches, and even more importantly, he had the power to ap-
prove or to veto ecclesiastical legislation'.202 It seems difficult to
believe that in a matter which, according to the very words of the
cedula, was of the greatest significance for the Roman Catholic
faith and the Church, he did not intend to use his powers to the
utmost. As to the extent of these powers, Judge Lipscomb observed,
in Blair v. Odin:
2 13
"Pope Alexander the VI. granted to the crown of Spain the tithes
in all the newly discovered countries, on condition that provision
should be made for the religious instruction of the natives." Soon
after this, Julius II. conferred on Ferdinand and his successors
the right of patronage, and the absolute disposal of all
ecclesiastical benefices .... In consequence of those grants, the
Spanish monarchs became, in effect, the heads of the Catholic church
in their American possessions. In them, the administration of the
revenues was vested. Their nominations of persons to supply
vacant benefices was instantly supplied by the pope. Thus, in all
Spanish America, authority of every species vested in the crown.
Then, no collision was known between spiritual and temporal
jurisdiction.
20 4
Finally, it must be remembered that, at the time, the Roman
Catholic Church was the established church of the Spanish Empire.
198 See text accompanying notes 184-89 supra.
199 RI I, 14, 72.
200 RI I, 14, 74.
201 See, e.g., C. BRUNO, supra note 134, at 131.
202 See authorities cited in note 134 supra.
203 3 Tex. 288 (1849).
204 3 Tex. at 294, quoting Antones v. Heirs of Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527, 543-44 (1839).
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Family law, so far as status was concerned, was administered by
ecclesiastical tribunals. These exercised jurisdiction in Mexico until
1857, and also in Louisiana under Spanish rule.20 5 In Castile itself,
after the expulsion of the Jews (coinciding with the discovery of
America), there was no place for non-Catholics: Moors and Jews
accepting baptism (conversos) could remain, but heresy and apos-
tasy were treason, punishable by death at the stake. 20 6 In the
Indies, the rules were, if anything, much more strict: neither
Moorish nor Jewish conversos, nor their children, could. enter the
Indies without special permissidn. A like prohibition applied to
those convicted of heresy and reconciled, and to the children and
even the grandchildren of those convicted of heresy or apostasy. °7
In New Spain, these prohibitions were rigorously enforced by
the Inquisition. 208 Officially at least, there were no atheists, Protes-
tants, or Jews in Mexico until well into the nineteenth century.
When Stephen Austin visited Mexico City in 1822, he described it
as "a City where untill [sic] very recently foreigners were prescribed
[sic] by the Laws and Discountenanced by the people from prej-
udice." 20 9 He attributed the latter to the power of the clergy and
to religious fanaticism.
In Mexico as in Texas,210 the formal texts of the law did not
entirely reflect reality, and there were those whose public adher-
ence to the Roman Catholic faith was merely a cover for other
religious practices at home. There were even some marriage
customs among Mexican dissidents that bore some similarity to
205 As to Mexico, see text accompanying note 285 infra; as to Louisiana, see Meilleur v. La
Coste (Miro, Gov., La. 1783), abstracted in Porteous, Index to the Spanish Judicial Records of
Louisiana, LIII, 20 LA. HIsT. Q. 518, 526, 536, accepting the validity of "the sentence of
separation pronounced by Reverend Father Friar Cirilo de Barcelona, Ecclesiastical Judge of
this Province and the actual Auxiliar Bishop of the Island of Cuba." Id. at 536. In Patton v.
Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 104 (1846), it is stated that ecclesiastical courts
were never established under Spanish rule in Louisiana. This error might be attributable in part
to the efforts ofthe Spanish authorities to avoid publicity in thatrespect.See Letter from Uzanga
to Bishop of Havana, 1772, in 1 L. HoucK,supra note 150, at 114, 119-20. See also note 254infra.
206 3 M. MENENDEZ PELAYO, HISTORIA DE LOS HETERODOXOS EsPAF4OLES: EpASMISTAS Y
PROTESTANTES, in OBRAS vols. 37-40 (Nacional ed. 1947-48) (completed 1882), discusses the
trials and tribulations of heretics in Spain rather approvingly. See especially 38 OBRAs, supra,
at 410-22. For a brief account, see J. LYNCH, supra note 139, at 20-28.
207 RI IX, 26, 15 & 16.
"' See generally J. JIMi-NEZ RUEDA, HEREJIAS Y SUPERsrIcIONES EN LA NUEVA ESPAFJA
(Los HETERODOXOS EN MEXICO) passim (1946); S. LIEaMAN, THE JEWS IN NEW SPAIN: FAITH,
FLAME, AND THE INQUISITION 113-285 (1970).
209 Address by Stephen Austin to Colonists, June 5, 1824, AUSTIN PAPERS 1919, at 811,
815; Letter from Stephen Austin to "Amigos Mfos," May 28, 1823, id. at 652, 656; Letter
from Stephen Austin to J.E.B. Austin, June 13, 1823, id. at 670, 671.
210 See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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marriage by bond in Texas. The following is a description of the
marriage custom among secret adherents of the Mosaic faith in
colonial Mexico:
When no rabbi was in New Spain, the couple would solem-
nize their marriage by a written contract in the presence of their
families and friends. This contract was in accordance with Jewish
law. The couple would then have a Catholic ceremony. Later,
when a rabbi was available, he would repeat the marriage cere-
mony and add his prayers for blessings for the couple.
21 1
It should be noted, however, that there were, two essential differ-
ences between such marriages and marriages contracted by bond in
Texas. The latter were known to the authorities but legally invalid.
The former were valid because they were formally celebrated in
facie ecclesiae, but their private aspects were carefully kept secret.
The penalty for secretly practicing Judaism was death at the
stake. 12
This serves to underline the essential point where the Su-
preme Court went astray in Hallett.213 The Kings of Spain inter-
ceded with their "brazo Real" (royal arm) wherever this was neces-
sary to secure compliance with those laws of the Church which they
had accepted. 21 4 Within the ambit thus circumscribed, the distinc-
tion between civil power and ecclesiastical legislation was quite
immaterial. By virtue of its approval, adoption, and if need be,
enforcement by royal authority, the legislation of the Council of
Trent simply was the law of the land in Spanish North America.
B. Louisiana and the Floridas
The Spanish North American territories east of the Sabine
River differed in several important respects from New Spain and
the ecclesiastical province of Mexico. First, they were not, or at
least not entirely, original Spanish settlements. The Louisiana
territory was acquired from France; the Spanish regime in the
Floridas was interrupted by two decades of British rule.2 1 5 Second,
211 S. LIEBMAN, supra note 208, at 75. It seems that the subsequent religious ceremony
in the presence of a rabbi was not essential to the validity of the marriage under Jewish law.
Z. FALK, JEWISH MATRIMONIAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 42, 81-82 (1966).
212 See e.g., S. LIEBMAN, supra note 208, at 245-50. The penalties imposed by the
Inquisition were executed by the "secular arm" pursuant to RI I, 19, 18; cf. RI I, 19, 1.
213 51 U.S. at 181-82, discussed in notes 192-93 supra and notes 353-79 infra.
214 See the cedula of 1564, quoted at text accompanying note 179 supra; RI I, 14, 72 &
74, text accompanying notes 199-200 supra; RI 1, 19, 1 & 18, note 212 supra; Antones v. Heirs
of Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527, 543-44 (1839); Blair v. Odin, 3 Tex. 288, 294 (1849).
215 See generally C. MOWAT, EAST FLORIDA AS A BRITISH PROVINCE 1763-1784 (1943).
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Spanish rule in this part of North America was comparatively
brief; the important developments were mainly concentrated be-
tween approximately 1769 and 1820. Third, for much of this
period, a mighty shadow was cast over much of this area by the
United States, a secular and predominantly Protestant republic
with a footloose and land-hungry population.
These geographic, historical, and political realities had a sub-
stantial impact on Spanish ecclesiastical law and policy in Louisiana
and the Floridas. The Inquisition was not introduced to these
areas; 216 the Enlightenment combined with political necessity to
bring the beginnings of toleration. There were a number of
Protestant families-Swiss, German, and perhaps French-who
lived in and around New Orleans under French rule;21 7 they were
apparently not disturbed when Spain assumed control. More
importantly, tolerance was granted in 1785 to British settlers who
elected to remain in the Floridas, and to selected new settlers from
the United States after 1787.218 As then understood, tolerance
consisted, in the main, of the right to practice one's heterodox faith
in private on condition of taking an oath of allegiance to Spain. It
was thought at the time that both the British loyalists and the
immigrants from the United States could be peacefully converted
to Catholicism through the work of Irish missionaries trained in
Spain, and that once converted, they would form a powerful
population barrier against further incursions from the United
States. 219
This presence of a tolerated Protestant population on Spanish
soil was bound to raise the question of the local and personal
effects of the Tridentine marriage legislation as sharply as it ever
had to be faced in a Spanish colonial possession. Before discussing
that issue, however, some mention must be made of the French
law on the formal validity of marriages prevailing in the Louisiana
territory at the time of the transfer of sovereignty to Spain.
The charter granted by Louis XIV to Antoine Crozat on
September 14, 1712, provided that "Nos tdits, Ordonnances Et
Coutumes Et les usages de la Prevost6 et Vicomt6 de Paris seront
216 Curley, supra note 167, at 121-22, 126-28.
1'7 See C. O'NEILL, CHURCH AND STATE IN FRENCH COLONIAL LOUISIANA 256-82 (1966).
Professor Charles E. O'Neill, S.J., of the Department of History, Loyola University, New
Orleans, has given very valuable assistance to the author in the preparation of this study.
218 See generally Din, The Immigration Policy of Governor Esteban Mir6 in Spanish Louisiana,
73 S.W. HisT. Q. 155, 156-65 (1969).
219 Id- at 157, 159; Curley, supra note 167, at 90, 164-211.
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observes pour Loix et Coutumes dans le d. Pays de la Lou-
isiane. '220 This is the basic source of Louisiana law both in the
company period and in the royal period which started in 1733. In
both of these periods, the law was administered by a Superior
Council which had the same status as a Conseil Superieur in France
itself.2
2'
The formula just cited closely resembles those employed in
like grants half a century earlier with respect to Canada. 2  In the
absence of reliable Louisiana authority in point, it seems permissi-
ble to rely on Canadian authority for the construction of the
reception clause for Louisiana.2 23 On that basis, the clause carried
with it (1) the Custom of Paris and other customs there prevailing in
1712, and (2) the royal edicts and ordinances that were effective in
Paris in 1712 by virtue of being registered with the Parlement of
Paris as required by French law. The Superior Council being, in
essence, a local Parlement, French royal legislation enacted after
1712 did not become effective in Louisiana unless and until regis-
tered with the Superior Council of that colony.
22 4
Although the decrees of the Council of Trent were not offi-
dally enacted in France, 2  French canon law texts routinely report
that the substance of Trent was either received in France by
ecclesiastical custom or through enactment into secular law. 2 6 The
culmination of the former process was a resolution of the clerics of
France in Assembly, dated July 7, 1615, that they "received the
Council by their seals and their oaths.22 7 This declaration was
communicated to King Louis XIII soon afterwards and received by
220 "Our edict, ordinances, and customs and the usages of the viscounty of Paris shall be
observed as laws and customs in the said country of Louisiana." The text of the charter is in
4 PUB. LA. HisT. Soc. 17 (1908) (trans. by author).
221 See generally Dart, The Legal Institutions of Louisiana, 3 SOUTHERN L.Q. 247 (1918).
222 Commission of the Intendant for Canada, June 1675, reprinted in J. CASTEL, THE
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 12-13 (1962); Edict of Creation of the
Sovereign [Superior] Council of New France, id. at 9-10.
223 Symes v. Cuvillier, 5 App. Cas. 138, 149-50 (P.C. 1880); Les Soeurs Dames
Hospitalires v. Middlemiss, 3 App. Cas. 1102, 1117-19 (P.C. 1878); Hutchinson v. Gillespie,
13 Eng. Rep. 349, 351-52 (1844). This proposition has, however, been challenged. See
Inverness Ry. & Coal Co. v. Jones, 40 Can. S. Ct. 45, 50-55 (1907) (Girouard, J., dissenting).
No relevant Louisiana authority on this rather basic question could be located.
224 One example is the so-called Black Code of 1724, which was "formally registered by
the Superior Council and then published." C. O'NEILL, supra note 217, at 269.
222 See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
226 See, e.g., F. WALTER, MANUAL DEL DERECHO ECLESiASTIco UNIVERSAL § 118, at 165
(2d ed. 1852) (Spanish translation of the French original). The Holy See appears to take the
position that despite royal opposition, the disciplinary decrees of the Council of Trent
became immediately effective in France. See Z. ZrrELLI, supra note 124, at 428.
227 P. BLET, LE CLERGE DE FRANCE ET LA MONARCHIE 131 (1959) (trans. by author).
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him without sign of objection or approval; it was never sanctioned
by royal edict.228
The substance of the decree Tametsi was enacted into French
law by the Ordinance of Blois, in 1579,229 and by subsequent
royal ordinances and decrees, the last of which was adopted in
1697.23 ° Since this was well before the creation of the Superior
Council of Louisiana, it follows that the substance of Tametsi was in
effect in French Louisiana territory in the form of a secular
enactment. In administering the sacrament of marriage withiti the
ambit of that legislation, however, the clergy were acting directly
pursuant to the disciplinary decrees of the Council of Trent, which
had been "received" by the Assembly of the Clergy in France in
1615. Was this sufficient for the reception of Tametsi by custom? It
seems reasonably clear that eighteenth-century authors on canon
law such as Murillo Velarde, primarily had France in mind when
they wrote of the reception of the decree in this manner. When last
raised in 1822, however, this question was left unanswered by the
Holy See and, as will be seen presently, 23 ' it seems to be of
theoretical concern only.
Legal historians still disagree about the extent of the displace-
ment of French law by Spanish law in Louisiana between 1769 and
1803;232 the re-introduction of Spanish law in the Floridas after
1783 does not appear to have been studied in detail. The present
inquiry, however, is limited to the much narrower question: To
what extent, if any, was the decree Tametsi in effect in the Floridas
and in Louisiana under Spanish rule?
The problem is quickly put into focus by the following passage
in a leading historical study on church and state in Spanish Florida:
228 Id. at 131-33.
229 Articles 40, 44, and 181 of the Ordinance of Blois, 1579, 14 ISAMBERT, RECUEIL
GEN RAL DES ANCIENNES Lois FRANCAISES 380, 391-92 (1829).
230 The Ordinance of Jan. 1629, arts. 39 & 40, 16 id. at 223, 234-35; the Declaration of
Nov. 26, 1639, art. 1, 16 id. at 520, 521-22; the Edict of Mar. 1697, arts. 1-3, 20 id. at 287,
288-90. These enactments are discussed in 2 A. ESMEIN, supra note 96, at 201-07.
"' See text accompanying notes 238-41 infra.
232 This issue is debated at the present mainly in the context of the legislative history of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. See Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual
Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TULANE L. REV. 4 (1971); Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808:
A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TULANE L. REv. 603 (1972); Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of
1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TULANE L. REV. 628 (1972). The Spanish period
as such has not been examined exhaustively, but Col. John H. Tucker, Jr., the President of
the Louisiana Law Institute, has recently completed a detailed investigation into this phase
of Louisiana legal history. He has graciously made available his manuscript draft, and has
made a number of other valuable suggestions, which are gratefully acknowledged here. See
J. TUCKER, EFFECT ON THE CIVIL LAW OF LOUISIANA BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE CHANGES IN ITS
SOVEREIGNTY 2-42 (Society of Bartolus, Juridical Studies, No. 1 (1975)).
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Spanish law apparently made no provision for non-Catholics
desirous of marrying before a minister of their religion or before
a civil official. Since many non-Catholics remained in East
Florida, some of them, particularly in the northern districts
bordering on the State of Georgia, contracted marriages by
calling in neighbors, in default of clergymen, to act as witnesses
to this ceremony. After signifying their intention of taking the
man or woman of their choice as a life partner, they simply
recorded the ceremony in a book. Others crossed the border and
were married before non-Catholic clergymen in the United
States.
2 33
This situation, which prevailed in Florida in 1790, bears consider-
able resemblance to that existing in Texas three decades later.
There are, however, three significant differences between these
otherwise quite similar settings: 234 the non-Catholics in Florida
were not required by law to embrace the Roman Catholic religion;
the possibility of a ceremony in another country was not a realistic
alternative for Texans in Austin's colony; and perhaps most impor-
tantly, a priest was readily available in Florida.
Indeed, it was this priest (Father Hassett, the vicario at St.
Augustine) who raised the issue with Havana. The first response by
Bishop Trespalacios was hardly very enlightening: the Bishop
reminded Father Hassett in general terms of the Benedictine
Declaration2 3 5 and furnished him with a copy of the constitution of
the Synod of Havana which required the rectification, in Tridentine
form, even of marriages of "Englishmen, or other heretics of
whatever sect ' 236 moving to that ecclesiastical province.
A second inquiry in connection with a runaway Georgia mar-
riage, however, proved ultimately more productive. This time,
Father Hassett referred the matter to the Governor, who sought a
ruling from the Council of the Indies. After considerable discussion,
which included a consultation with the Grand Inquisitor 2 37 the
Council of the Indies drew up regulations which were issued on
December 16, 1792, in the form of a Royal Order to the Bishop of
Havana, the governor of East Florida, and the governor of New
Orleans.
238
233 Curley, supra note 167, at 224 (footnote omitted).
234 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra; Curley, supra note 167, at 90, 214-31.
235 Letter from Bishop Trespalacios of Havana to Hassett, July 16, 1791, Curley, supra
note 167, at 225. The Declaration is discussed in the text accompanying note 102 supra.
236 Constitution on marriages, Diocesan Synod of Cuba, Const. 8, 1680, in 4 J. ZAMORA
Y CORONADO, BIBLIOTECA DE LEGISLACI6N ULTRAMARINA 241, 243-44 (1845).
237 Curley, supra note 167, at 227-29.
238 Royal Order of Dec. 16, 1792, inJ. ZAMORA Y CORONADO, sura note 236, at 244-46;
Curley, supra note 167, at 229-30.
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This Royal Order is styled "Instruction to the vicars, priests,
and other ecclesiastics who exercise the care of souls in the prov-
inces of Louisiana and the Floridas, for the celebration of mar-
riages of the English, Anglo-American, and other foreign Protes-
tant settlers. '239 It ordered these settlers to obey, and the gover-
nors and Justicias to enforce, the following rule:
Protestants of whatever sect, when intermarrying among them-
selves or when marrying a Catholic, must celebrate their mar-
riages in the presence of a Catholic priest, and of two or three
witnesses, pursuant to the form established by the sacred Council
of Trent in its 24th session de reformat., chap. 1., and in obser-
vance of the repeated declarations of the sacred congregation of
that Council holding the same to apply without distinction, to
marriages of Catholics and Protestants, or heretics domiciled in
Catholic countries where it has been received and published,
and, in accordance with those resolutions and the laws of the
monarchy, marriages celebrated in the future by settlers in
Spanish territory before ministers, or before foreign protestant
magistrates, or'in any form other than that here prescribed, are
null and void, and subject those acting in such manner to the
confiscation of their goods and to permanent banishment from
the Spanish domains.2
40
The Royal Order then specified the rites to be followed by the
Roman Catholic clergy in assisting at the celebration of marriages
here regulated, and gave instructions for the recordation of such
marriages. It also prescribed that marriages celebrated elsewhere
in non-Tridentine form had to be ratified in Tridentine form. The
penal sanctions of the Royal Order were waived for those who did
so ratify their marriages, including spouses who, before the local
publication of the Order, had entered into runaway marriages in
non-Tridentine territory. A final clause instructed the Royal Gov-
ernors to exercise to the fullest their powers under the Patronato
Real to secure compliance with all of the provisions of the instant
Royal Order.2
4 1
In the face of the Royal Order, it seems pointless to question
the applicability of the Tridentine form requirement under
Spanish law as prevailing in the Floridas and in Louisiana. The
effectiveness of that order in actual practice, however, was another
matter. Sometime later, in Hallett v. Collins,2 42 the Supreme Court
239 Royal Order of Dec. 16, 1792, in J. ZAMORA Y CORONADO, supra note 236, at 244
(trans. by author).
240 Id. at 245 (trans. by author).
241 Id. at 245-46, arts. 2-6.
242 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1851).
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observed that it was "a matter of history, that many marriages were
contracted in the presence of civil magistrates, and without the
sanction of a priest, in the Spanish colonies which have since been
ceded to the United States. 243
How accurate was that observation? Considerable light is
thrown on that question by some recent research into the genealog-
ical history of Fort Miro (the present city of Monroe, Louisiana),
which was the military post of the Ouachita District and a pioneer
settlement under Spanish rule. Between 1790 and 1799, the com-
mandant of that post, Juan Filhiol, officiated at the conclusion of
some twenty marriage contracts, duly registered in the post ar-
chives. 244 There will be occasion below2 45 to consider one of these
contracts in greater detail. These "Filhiol marriages" recited, in
language quite similar to that to be found four decades later in
Texas marriage bonds, that there was no priest in the area, and
that the parties agreed to have the marriage solemnized sub-
sequently "before our Mother, the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church,
as soon as possible, as long as one party shall request this of the
other. 1 46 This standard clause occurred in the marriage contracts
of Protestants as well, but Protestants were a decided minority in
Fort Miro under Spanish rule.
Filhiol did not officiate at any of these marriage contracts after
the arrival of the parish priest, Father Juan Brady, in Fort Miro in
1800. However, his past activities soon came to the attention of the
Bishop of Louisiana and the Floridas, Luis de Pefialver y Cardenas,
in connection with inquiries by Father Brady, and with matrimo-
nial proceedings instituted before Father Brady's arrival. The most
important of the latter was the d'Anemours-White nullity action,
243 Id. at 180.
244 Eighteen of these contracts are listed in Gianelloni, Genealogical Data from the
Records of the Diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas Pt. 2, 18 LA. GENEALOGICAL REG. 302,
306-07 (1971) (cal. date Mar. 2, 1802). This list is based on microfilms of these records,
presently on file at the University of Notre Dame. For a general description of the Notre
Dame collection, see T. McAvoy & L. BRADLEY, GUIDE TO THE MICROFILM EDITION OF THE
RECORDS OF THE DIOCESE OF LOUISIANA AND THE FLORIDAS 1576-1803 (1967). The docu-
ments are cited here according to the calendar date in the Notre Dame collection. Xerox
copies of these documents, and of others relating to the Ouachita District, were made
available to the author by the historian of the Ouachita settlement, Professor Russ Williams
of Northeast Louisiana University.
One marriage contract not contained in Gianelloni's list, the Morehouse-Hook contract
of September 19, 1799, is discussed at notes 326-52 infra. The Ouachita Parish records
indicate that another such contract, between Pedro Olivo and Julia Etier, was recorded by
Filhiol on October 20, 1798. The Gianelloni Index, supra, at 305, shows that Filhiol officiated
at another marriage contract, between Jose Farar and Isabel OIivo, on March 13, 1799.
24 See text accompanying notes 326-52 infra.
246 Morehouse-Hook contract, quoted in text accompanying note 326 infra.
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which dealt with the allegation, inter alia, that the Chevalier
d'Anemours had purported to go through a "Filhiol marriage"
with Lucile White (or LeBlanc) while still married to another.
2 47
In a communication in this matter from Bishop Pefialver to
Father Brady, dated May 27, 1800, it was indicated that the
d'Anemours-White marriage contracted before Filhiol was "clan-
destine and null." Father Brady was instructed to obtain all of
the Ouachita marriage contracts from the archives, to revalidate
in canonical form the marriages thus purportedly contracted, to
inform Filhiol that he was to authorize no more such marriages,
which (the Bishop wrote) were "detested by the Church and
prohibited by the King for all of his dominions,' 248 and to prepare
a report on the matter for submission to the Spanish political
authorities. The d'Anemours-White nullity case was concluded by
the Bishop's judgment of October 26, 1801, which, among other
things, declared the Fort Miro marriage contract to be "clandestino
y nulo, no habiendo intervenido Pfrroco" ("clandestine and void,
no priest having attended").249 In response to other inquiries by
Father Brady, Bishop Pefialver also made similar rulings on some
other Fort Miro marriage contracts, which were handled less for-
mally.2
50
In the meantime, proceedings were pending against Juan
Filhiol, the Commandant of the Ouachita District.2 5' Father Brady
transmitted a file containing eighteen marriage contracts to Bishop
Pefialver in February 1801, and the latter referred these to the
Promotor Fiscal (public prosecutor in matters ecclesiastical) in New
Orleans. From the file forwarded by Father Brady, it appears that
he had, in accordance with the Bishop's instructions of May 1800,
revalidated the marriages contracted before Filhiol, using the ca-
nonical form for Roman Catholics and the special Protestant
form252 of the Royal Order of 1792 for Protestants. Filhiol filed a
number of defenses in these proceedings, among them the conten-
tion that his official acts were simple witnessings of mere civil
247 The d'Anemours-White nullity action is calendared under Aug. 29, 1801. See
Gianelloni, supra note 244, at 302. The text accompanying notes 247-49 is based on a
photocopy of the file of this action.
248 d'Anemours-White nullity action note 247 supra, entry for May 27, 1800 (trans. by
author).
249 Id., entry for Oct. 26, 1801 (trans. by author).
250 The Olivo-Etier and the Farar-Olivo cases, supra note 244, are examples of similar
rulings. These rlings of Bishop Pefialver are dated July 15, 1800, and May 23, 1800,
respectively.
2"1 Filhiol proceedings, calendared under Aug. 29, 1801. See note 244 supra.
25'2 See notes 238-41 and accompanying text supra.
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contracts embodying the promise to marry in the future. A report
of the Promotor Fiscal, dated February 22, 1801,253 accepted this
defense on the basis of an examination of the Spanish translation
of the Fort Miro marriage contracts (which were in French), and
recommended that Filhiol be acquitted of the charge of having
violated the provisions of the Council of Trent and the Royal
Order of 1792. This recommendation was accepted, and the pro-
ceedings were thereupon terminated. a
These episodes in the Ouachita District are powerful evidence
of the efficacy of the decree Tametsi and of the Royal Order of
1792 in Louisiana and in the Floridas under Spanish rule. On the
other hand, the history of Fort Miro between 1790 and 1800 also
shows that where parochial facilities were lacking, civil marriage
contracts were not unusual.
Remarkably enough, irregular marriage practices seem to have
prevailed at some time even in New Orleans, where the matter had
been additionally covered by regulations to the clergy, issued in
1795.254 Again, an extrapolation from subsequent Roman Catholic
ecclesiastical history seems necessary. By decree dated September
9, 1824, Pope Leo XII extended the Benedictine Declaration to the
diocese of New Orleans, which then included Louisiana, the
Floridas, and "other parts previously subject to French or Spanish
rule. '' 255 This action was taken in response to a letter from the
Bishop of New Orleans which reported that although the older
local clerics were of the view that the Council of Trent had never
been solemnly proclaimed, the instructions of the previous bishop
were based on the view that the Tridentine legislation was locally
applicable. The Bishop also pointed out that, given the uncertainty
of the situation, many persons had purported to contract marriages
in non-Tridentine form.
The Pope, as already mentioned, extended the Benedictine
253 Filhiol proceedings, note 251 supra, entry for Feb. 22, 1801.
254 Curley, supra note 167, at 260-61. These Instructions are reprinted in Instruccibn
para el gobierno de los pirrocos de la Di6cesi de la Luisiana, Dec. 21, 1795, Bishop Louis
Peiialver y Cardenas, 1 U.S. CATH. HisT. MAG. 418 (1887). Instructions XXIX-XXXVII deal
with marriage. Id. at 428-32. Instruction XXXVI expressly refers to, and implements, the
Royal Order of Dec. 16, 1792. Id. at 430. Instruction XV refers to ecclesiastical tribunals. Id.
at 422.
255 Decretum, De Matrimoniis Clandestinis, Sept. 9, 1824 (trans. by author). The text of
this decree, and of the instruction cited in note 256 infra, was supplied by the Archives of
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New Orleans. The First Synod of St. Louis, held in
1839, concluded on the strength of the passage quoted in the text that the Declaration
thereby became applicable to the diocese of St. Louis, which was at the time (as Upper
Louisiana) part of the diocese of New Orleans. Cap. XIV (2), page 12, of the typescript was
graciously supplied by the Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis.
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Declaration profuturo, but he also resorted to the unusual device of
sanatio in radice, i.e., retroactive validation of prior marriages that
were invalid as to form.256 Both of these actions are of course
premised on the applicability of Tametsi in Louisiana and the
Floridas under Spanish rule. This episode powerfully dem-
onstrates the contemporary uncertainty even of the higher clergy




Two subsequent events in Mexico deserve mention here. One
is a curious diplomatic incident with the United States; although
ephemeral and hardly noticed, 25 it sheds additional light not only
on past events, but also on their potential implications as then
perceived. The second development is the complete reorientation
of church-state relations in the family law area in consequence of
the Juarez reforms.259
The diplomatic incident is best described in the succinct lan-
guage of Daniel Webster, the then Secretary of State of the United
States. In a communication dated January 29, 1851, to Robert P.
Letcher, Minister to Mexico, he reported the plight of Dr. Grayson
M. Prevost (apparently a citizen of the United States), who faced
"forcible separation ... from his wife, a Mexican lady to whom he
was married at Brownsville, in Texas, and with whom he is now
residing at Zacatecas, in Mexico. ''2 60 It was presumed, Mr. Webster
'5' Instruction, dated Apr. 24, 1878, by the Archbishop of New Orleans, relating a
communication from Rome in response to an inquiry from New Orleans dated Apr. 4, 1822.
The latter inquiry prompted the decree cited at note 255 supra.
257 Professor Charles E. O'Neill, S.J., of Loyola University in New Orleans, would add
the following observation: "The New Orleans inquiry is less powerful when we realize that
the region had passed from France to Spain to France to the U.S.A. in a 37-year period. No
priest in the area in 1822 had been there under the French in pre-1766. Moreover, there
were just 5(?) priests in the diocese in 1822 who had been there under the first-and-last
Spanish Ordinary in Louisiana." Letter from Charles E. O'Neill to the author, May 2, 1975.
2I The only two references that could be located are A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 n.26 (1943), and Stevenson, The Relationship of Private
International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLuJm. L. REv. 561, 582 (1952).
259 See text accompanying notes 284-90 infra.
260 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Robert P. Letcher, Minister to
Mexico, Jan. 29, 1851, in 14 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 424
(National ed. 1903). The letter is also reproduced in 2 J. MOORE, INT'L L. DIG. 484-85. The
citation to Sanchez, not reproduced there, is reproduced in D. WEBSTER, supra, at 424, 425
n.*. It was taken from the then current edition of J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 113 (3d ed.
1846). From the note, one gathers that the learned Secretary of State derived his information
on Pope Clement's regard for Sanchez from an article called Sanchez by Bayle, presumably





the Mexican ecclesiastical authorities found their proceedings
upon the fact that the clergyman to whom the parties applied at
Matamoras refused to perform .the ceremony, and that, as they
repaired to Brownsville and were married there in consequence
of that refusal, the marriage was illegal according to the Mexican
laws, and therefore that the church authorities have a right and
are under the obligation to annul it and separate the parties. 26'
While conceding the possibility that the Mexican clergymen
concerned had "proceeded in conformity to the laws of the Repub-
lic and the rules of the Catholic Church as established in Mexico"
so that any official interposition with the Mexican government
might be "premature, if not improper," the Secretary of State
stated that the matter was nevertheless of some urgency, as "the
execution by the priests at Zacatecas of their threats would so
certainly excite bad feeling in the United States. ' 262 The Minister
to Mexico was instructed to hold direct communication on the
subject with the "head of the Church" in Mexico City:
You will... request him to instruct the subordinate clergymen in
Zacatecas to suspend -and if possible discontinue their proceed-
ings, and express a hope that the rules of the church may be so
altered as to prevent a recurrence of such cases. From the
proximity of the two countries the intercourse between them,
and the likelihood of frequent intermarriages between their
respective citizens, it is desirable that the rule upon this subject
should be uniform in the United States and in Mexico. In this
country, in England, and in most nations on the continent of
Europe, a marriage is valid if it has been contracted according to
the laws of the place where the ceremony was performed. This
may be said to be the almost universal rule.
263
This rule, Mr. Webster went on to state, had been established
in an English case where "the opinion of the celebrated Spanish
jurist Sanchez, in favor of the rule, seems to have been much relied
upon. 2 64 The United States Minister was further instructed to tell
the Archbishop that Sanchez had been favorably mentioned by
Pope Clement VIII, and "ought certainly to be respected by the
Mexican church.1
265
The Secretary of State then referred to the situation prevailing
in the United States, stating it to be an "unquestionable fact . . .
261 D. WEBSTER, supra note 260, at 424.
262 Id.
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that many marriages take place between Catholics and Protestants
in which the ceremony is performed by clergymen of both denomi-
nations." 266 All Christian sects were equal before the law in the
United States; offices of honor or trust were open to Roman
Catholics on an equal basis although a "large majority" of the
population was Protestant. If the Mexican clergy or government
and the people of that country should not be prepared to adopt
the system of religious toleration then prevailing in the United
States, Mr. Webster continued, it was nevertheless hoped that they
would "relax the rule which forbids a priest from marrying a
Protestant to a Catholic and makes it obligatory upon the clerical
and other authorities to disavow and annul such marriage when it
has taken place in the United States. '2 67 For if that rule were to be
rigidly enforced in Mexico, the Secretary of State concluded, it
would "tend to produce an excitement in this country hazardous to
its peace and perhaps prejudicial to the interests of Catholics in the
United States. 26 8
When Buckingham Smith, the charg6 d'affaires ad interim,
acknowledged receipt of Mr. Webster's communication on March
19, 1851, he was able to include substantial amounts of further
information of the Prevost case, for Dr. Prevost had already
contacted the Legation in Mexico City in December, 1850, and Mr.
Letcher had brought the matter to the attention of the Mexican
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 69
In a communication to the Foreign Minister, dated December
26, 1851, Mr. Letcher had stated the facts of the Prevost case so far
as these were known to him, adding that while "not advised what
control or power the Government can exercise in the matter," he
was "most entirely satisfied that Mr. Lacunza, prompted by a high
sense of justice, of benevolence, of gallantry, will do all that can be
done, to prevent the forcible separation of man and wife by the fiat
of the Bishop, ventures to submit the case to the consideration of
his Excellency. '27 0 Mr. Letcher also had a personal interview with
the Foreign Minister at that date. As he reported to Dr. Prevost,
Mr. Lacunza "manifested a good deal of interest upon the subject
266 Id. at 426.
267 ld.
268
269 The account in the text accompanying notes 270-83 is based on the following 1851
dispatches of the United States Legation in Mexico, and their respective enclosures: No. 48,
Mar. 19; No. 51, Apr. 10; No. 55, Apr. 24; and No. 62, June 5. These dispatches are
recorded on Microcopy, No. M-97, roll 15, United States National Archives.
270 Communication from Minister Letcher to Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec.
26, 1850, included in Dispatch No. 48, supra note 269.
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and said he would do everything he could to prevent any violent
means on the part of the Bishop to separate man and wife." He
would, so Mr. Letcher felt, write the Bishop "immediately, in very
strong and decided terms."
'27 1
As regards the merits of the controversy, however, Mr.
Letcher did not entirely share Dr. Prevost's views, which were
identical with those of Mr. Webster. 272 The Prevost marriage, he
wrote the husband, was "undoubtedly a valid one according to the
laws of the U. States . . .[but t]he civil law, in relation to marriages
prevails in this country, and it is quite different from ours.1
273
If "civil law" as here used is read to designate Tridentine
canon law as then prevailing in Mexico, Mr. Letcher's legal views
were more accurate on this occasion than were those of his Secre-
tary of State. Daniel Webster hardly shone as a curial advocate in
the Prevost case. Runaway marriages in non-Tridentine territory
had been held to be invalid by the Congregation of Cardinals,
charged with the interpretation of the Council of Trent, in a
decision in 1627 which was approved by Pope Urban VIII. 274 The
instructions for the Floridas and Louisiana took the same position
on this issue, as did the Havana Synod. 27 5 Even more to the point,
in 1835, the Holy See had held runaway non-Tridentine marriages
of Quebec domiciliaries in the United States to be void, a decision
readily accessible through a standard text.
27 6
Almost as importantly, as a matter of canon law, the decree
271 Letter from Minister Letcher to Dr. Prevost, Dec. 26, 1850, included in Dispatch No.
48, supra note 269.
272 Letter from Dr. Prevost to U.S. Legation, Dec. 13, 1850, included in Dispatch No.
48, supra note 269. Daniel Webster's views are set out in the text accompanying notes 260-68
sup ra.
273 Letter from Minister Letcher to Dr. Prevost, Dec. 26, 1850, included in Dispatch No.
48, supra note 269. The Minister also said, with refreshing candor, that it seemed to him "for
the sake of peace, and to avoid all possible difficulties, and most especially for the comfort of
my wife, had I been in your condition I rather think I should have married according to the
Mexican ceremonies, every night for a month, if it were required." Id.
274 The Congregation of Cardinals had to decide three questions: (1) Could parties
domiciled in Tridentine areas marry in non-Tridentine form in a non-Tridentine area while
maintaining their domiciles? (2) What if they did this solely to avoid Tametsi, and did not
change their place of abode? (3) What if both changed their place of abode for the sole
purpose of marrying in non-Tridentine form? The Cardinals replied, as to (1) and (2), that
marriages thus celebrated were void, but as to (3), that if domicile really had been
transferred, the marriage would be valid. This decision was approved by Pope Urban VIII
by a brieve expone nobis on August 14, 1627. The text may be found in A. LEINZ, supra note
121, at 112-13. See also 2 VELARDE 35-36, who reports that this decision rejected the view of
Sanchez to the contrary.
27' See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
276 Instruction of Nov. 17, 1835, reported in 3 F. KENRICK, THEOLOGIAE MORALIS
CONCINNATAE 354 (1843).
[Vol. 6 1:1
MARRIAGE IN SPANISH NORTH AMERICA
Tametsi was in effect in Brownsville at the time of the Prevost
marriage.2 77 The only conceivable question for a Roman Catholic
ecclesiastical tribunal would have been whether the Benedictine
Declaration had been extended to the location of the ceremony at
the critical date. As already noted, that question was still doubtful
even for Galveston and San Antonio as late as 1884.278
Brownsville was in the contested Nueces-Rio Grande strip over
which Mexico had exercised sovereignty more often than not
between 1836 and 1845;279 this area did not pass under United
States sovereignty until 1848. The date of the transfer of ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction over this territory from Linares to Galveston must
have been difficult to ascertain at the time; even today, this was
possible only by consulting unpublished archival materials.
28 0
Seemingly with these considerations in mind, the Mexican
Foreign Ministry informed the United States charg6 on February
21, 1851,281 that on the basis of information then before it, the
Prevost case was by its nature subject exclusively to ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, and that Dr. Prevost would have to resort to all the
remedies available under ecclesiastical law. The Mexican govern-
ment stated that it would take the matter into further consideration
only if there were to be a denial of justice on the part of the
ecclesiastical authorities.
As a practical matter, things looked a good deal better for Dr.
Prevost. He was able to inform Buckingham Smith on April 13,
185 1,282 that the President of Mexico had instructed the state
government not to lend assistance by the civil power to the Bishop
of Guadalajara if the latter should attempt to force the separation
of the couple, and this was the end of the case. Nevertheless, the
United States charg6 wrote Mr. Webster on April 24, 1851, that he
would "not... lose sight of the suit, and hope[d], sooner or later,
to have a favourable decision on marriages with Mexicans con-
277 See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
278 See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
279 State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307, 309-10 (1877); Trevino v. Fernandez, 13 Tex. 630, 662-63
(1855); W. BINKLEY, supra note 145, at 43-56, 96-106.
280 Bishop Odin requested the transfer in 1848, but the affirmative action of the Holy
See was not communicated until some time in 1849. Letter from Bishop Odin to Bishop
Blanc, Jan. 18, 1849; Letter from Bishop Odin to Cardinal Barnabo, Sept. 18, 1851. Odin
Transcripts, supra note 29. The Prevost marriage was celebrated in Brownsville early in
1850, safely after the transfer by a few months. Letter from Dr. Prevost to U.S. Legation,
Dec. 13, 1851, included in Dispatch No. 48, supra note 269.
281 Letter from M. Gomez to Buckingham Smith, Feb. 21, 1851, included in Dispatch
No. 48, supra note 269.
282 Letter from Dr. Prevost to Buckingham Smith, Apr. 13, 1851, i&
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tracted abroad, or to produce an act of Congress legalizing
them."
28 3
It seems unlikely that this project was pursued with great
energy, and in any event, exertions in that direction by foreign
diplomats were soon to become unnecessary. The antipathy exhib-
ited by Daniel Webster towards the assertion of ecclesiastical
authority over what were, to him, secular matters, was soon to find
a powerful echo in Mexico as well.
A bare outline of the pertinent Juarez Reforms must suffice
here.284 The Mexican Constitution of 1857 abolished special
courts, including ecclesiastical jurisdiction;28 5 the Civil Marriage
Act of 1859 defined marriage as a civil contract subject to civil
authority.28 6 In 1873, by constitutional amendment, these rules
were written into the Federal Constitution itself,2 7 and the clause
then adopted was enacted as article 130 of the Constitution of
1917, which is in effect today. that provision reads as follows:
Marriage is a civil contract. Marriage and any other acts of a
person's civil status are in the exclusive competence of the
officials and authorities of the civil government in the terms
provided by the laws, and they shall have the force and validity
that the same attribute to them.
2 8 8
The fundamental character of the change brought about by
the enactments of the reform is best illustrated by the decision of
the Supreme Court of Mexico in Reyes Vda. de Hinojosa Virgin-
ia,289 which involved the constitutionality of a provision of the
Tamaulipas Civil Code that recognized informal monogamous
unions as civilly effective. In Mexico, as in the United States, family
law is within the legislative competence of the states, but there as
here, state legislation has to observe specific federal constitutional
constraints. The Supreme Court of Mexico held this attempt to
validate what may be loosely called "common law marriages" to be
in violation of article 130 of the Mexican Constitution. The court
said:
2I Letter from Buckingham Smith to Daniel Webster, Apr. 24, 1851, included in
Dispatch No. 55, supra note 269.
284 See generally Borah & Cook, Marriage and Legitimacy in Mexican Culture: Mexico and
California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 946, 966-71 (1966).
28 CONST. tit. 1, § 1, art. 13 (Mexico, 1857), in F. TENA RAMiREZ, LEYES FJNDAMEN-
TALES DE M9xIco 1808-1967, at 606, 608 (3d ed. 1967).
286 Act of July 23, 1859, art. 1, id, at 642.
287 Amendments of Sept. 25, 1873, art. 2, id. at 697-98.
288 CONST. tit. 1, art. 130 (Mexico, 1917), id. at 817, 875 (trans. by author). See also
Baade, Marriage and Divorce in Amerffan Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and the
Restatement (Second), 72 COLuM. L. REV. 329, 371-72 (1972).
288 121 Semanario 38 (5th series 1954).
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The purpose of the Reform legislation was to remove questions
of the validity and the legal incidents of marriage from being
regulated by laws of the Church, and to submit them to the laws
enacted by civil authority. Article 130 of the Constitution has to
be interpreted in accordance with that intention. The effective-
ness of that provision requires the express celebration of mar-
riages before public officials, for if the demonstration of the
existence of a meeting of the minds to create the bonds of
matrimony were sufficient for that purpose, the celebration of a
religious marriage would satisfy that requirement, and the pur-
poses of the Constitution would be frustrated.29 0
IV
JUDICIAL REACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The findings of this study as to Spanish, Mexican, and canon
law may be summarized readily. The disciplinary legislation of the
Council of Trent, including the decree Tametsi, was accepted and
received in the Spanish kingdoms by a cedula dated July 12, 1564.
This process of reception was effected by the Second Diocesan
Council of Mexico, and further implemented by the Third Mexi-
can Council, which latter was confirmed by a cedula published in
the Recopilaci6n of the Indies.29 '
The effectiveness of Tametsi at all times here material within
all areas of North America subject to Spanish or to Mexican rule
has never been doubted by Spanish or Mexican authority. Its
effectiveness in Louisiana and the Floridas was expressly confirmed
by Royal Order on December 16, 1792.292 Pursuant to that decree,
marriages between baptized persons are formally valid only if
celebrated with the assistance of two or three witnesses. 93 The
Benedictine Declaration, 94 which dispenses with this requirement
in favor of mixed and Protestant marriages, was never in effect in
Spanish North America or in Mexico at any time here material.
Tametsi was not merely a matter of faith addressed to the con-
science; it was ecclesiastical legislation enacted with secular ap-
proval and enforced by secular authority as well.295
It follows that all marriages contracted between baptized per-
sons in non-Tridentine form in Spanish or Mexican territory at any
290 Id. at 50 (trans. by author).
291 See text accompanying notes 178-89 supra.
2192 See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
293 See text accompanying note 240 supra.
294 See text accompanying note 102 supra.
29- See text accompanying notes 178-214 supra.
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time here material were absolutely invalid under the then prevail-
ing lex loci celebrationis. This conclusion is supported so over-
whelmingly by Spanish and Mexican authority that one is tempted
to attribute assertions to the contrary to ignorance, spite, or
perhaps a combination of both. Both of these epithets, however,
have more polite variants. The former may be paraphrased as
obscurity of the law; the latter could readily stand for a strong
public policy stemming from a deep-seated judicial hostility to the
features of Spanish and Mexican law here at issue. As will be seen,
the reaction of some judges in the United States to Tametsi in the
last century is readily explained in these terms. Fairness, however,
requires the prefatory observation that even the record compiled
thus far makes obscurity and public policy rather attractive alterna-
tive explanations to the harsh terms just suggested.
First, concerning ignorance or obscurity of the law, the cedula
of 1564 seemingly was not reprinted until the Novisima Recopila-
ci6n, published in 1805.296 The Novisima was therefore not in
effect as such in the Louisiana territory. It could perhaps even be
argued that such of the provisions of the Novisima as had not been
expedited by the Council of the Indies did not apply in North
America. 29 7 This was a dubious assumption, and a factually incor-
rect one, but the connection between synodal councils and the
Recopilacibn of the Indies was not necessarily apparent even to
United States lawyers who had access to both of these texts. The
Royal Order of 1792, which is of critical evidentiary value for
Louisiana and the Floridas, appeared in print in 1845 at the
latest,29 8 but this is more than two decades after Spanish
sovereignty had terminated in any part of the North American
continent that passed to the United States. Furthermore, that order
settled a matter that had caused controversy at the highest level.
299
Finally, even the Roman Catholic bishop in New Orleans was
unclear as to the legal situation in 1822, and could not entirely
296 NOViSIMA 1, 1, 13.
297 This argument is made by F. HALL, THE LAWS OF MEXICO iii (1885), but is not
supported by the case there cited. Manuel Z. de la Garza, 5 Seminario I (2d Series 1882). In
1 SALA MXICANO 10-11 (M. Galvan Rivera ed. 1845), Galvan Rivera states that on this
question the authorities are divided and, in the main, he limits himself to summarizing the
opposing views. There can be little doubt now that the Novisina was applicable throughout
Hispanic America. See most recently Roca, La Vigincia de la Novisima Recopilaci6n en Indias,
[1964-I] J.A., Secci6n Doctrina 17.
298 J. ZAMORA, supra note 236. Earlier printed references to this Royal Order could not
be traced.
299 See text accompanying notes 232-41 supra.
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clarify it from his archives or by questioning older members of the
clergy.3
00
In the face of this obscurity of the law, including uncertainty
as to the most basic legal data even among those most immediately
concerned, spite may now seem to have been almost a virtue. For
United States judges, the issue was the validity of marriages con-
tracted in good faith (or, in any event, without wicked predisposi-
tion) by their own people in uncertain border and pioneer condi-
tions. The foreign legal system that was prima facie applicable
seemed to derive satisfaction from resolving doubts against the
validity of marriages-quite contrary, seemingly, to the strongest
presumption known to the law. This unusual inclination could
readily be attributed to a religious fervor that was bound to touch
raw nerves-even those of Daniel Webster.301 Finally, as the exam-
ples of Texas and those of the Ouachita district show, the East
Florida situation, with a priest in ready attendance, was not neces-
sarily the typical one; indeed, it is ludicrous to suppose it was so for
the entire Louisiana territory or even for the upper parts of
Louisiana and the Floridas. Given these circumstances, there must
have been a strong gravitational pull in the direction of a validating
rule based on considerations of public policy. It might even have
been that spitefulness was at the time more readily attributed to
those who sought to invalidate marital unions contracted in for-
merly Spanish territory by relying on the obscure law of a former
foreign sovereign than to those who pretended (or perhaps even
prided themselves with) ignorance when called upon to consider
Spanish law judicially.
Attitudes such as the ones just alluded to are readily manifest
in Phillips v. Gregg,302 which is apparently the first published
decision in point by a court in the United States. This was a suit to
establish title to land in Pennsylvania, and part of plaintiff's cause
depended on the legitimacy of a predecessor in title whose parents
had been, it was alleged, "married by Justice King, who was duly
authorized to do so by the Spanish government, and who was in
the habit at that time of marrying a great number of persons. 30 3
These events had taken place sometime before 1791 in what was
then called the Natchez country. That area was at the time under
300 See notes 255-56 and accompanying text supra.
301 See text accompanying note 268 supra.
302 10 Watts (Pa.) 158 (1840).
303 Id. at 160.
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Spanish rule, although in the view of the trial court, this was due to
a "mistake of the true boundary line. 30 4 The couple had cohabited
as husband and wife for some three years, during which period
plaintiffs predecessor in title was born. Later, the mother of the
latter had left the father and had entered into a marriage with
another man, apparently feeling free to do so on the basis of advice
received from a Roman Catholic priest.305 In related proceedings,
a brother of the first husband had disclosed that "he commiuni-
cated to his brother his joy at hearing that his wife had got a
divorce from a Catholic priest, and got married again .... -306
The defendant requested instructions to the effect that the
plaintiff had the burden of proving, through expert testimony or
by producing pertinent statutory sources, that the marriage at issue
was performed in conformity with Spanish law. The trial court
refused to give such instructions, stating that given the "absolute"
political powers, both legislative and executive, of the Spanish
governors, it would be "useless to ransack the musty records of San
Ildefonso for the appointment and powers of the governor, or seek
for records of his temporary edicts, or to expect a modern
Louisiana lawyer to testify to the fleeting customs and changing
laws of a government defunct half a century ago."307 The applica-
tion of the traditional common law rule on proof of foreign law in
cases such as this, the trial court went on to observe, "would be
hard and unjust, and would be establishing a rule which would
bastardize one-half the descendants of the early settlers on the
Mississippi." 30 8 The trial judge accordingly instructed the jury to
find the Natchez marriage valid if the local marriage customs had
been as alleged, and if the parties had had the requisite intent
to enter into a valid marriage relationship. In this connection, the
304 Id. at 160-61. This was also the view of Chief Justice Marshall in Henderson v.
Poindexter, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 530, 534-36 (1827). About a century later, a detailed
historical analysis arrived at the opposite conclusion. S. BEMIS, PINCKNEY'S TREATY: AMERI-
CA'S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE's DISTRESS 1783-1800, at 4-6 (rev. ed. 1960). To the same
effect, see Carter, Some Aspects of British Administration in West Florida, 1 MISS. VALLEY
HIsr. REv. 364, 365-66 (1914). The crucial point, conclusively established by the latter study,
is that the Privy Council did order a change in the boundaries in West Florida in 1764. The
Pennsylvania courts cannot, of course, be faulted with sharing the then current views of the
United States Supreme Court as expressed by its eminent Chief Justice, who denied the
existence of any such royal sanction for the change of West Florida boundaries. See
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526 (1827). It is a different matter, however,
to assume that because of Spain's apparently defective title to the Natchez district, Spanish
law was not (or not fully) in effect there. See notes 315, 319 infra.
30- 10 Watts (Pa.) at 162.
306 Id. at 166.
307 Id. at 161.
308 Id.
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President of the District Court of Allegheny County, Judge Grier,
is reported as having said to the jury:
[I]f they believe the witnesses, that it was customary for protes-
tants to be married by a justice of the peace, that such a
regulation had been made by the governor (who was the gov-
ernment), at the request of the protestant immigrants, and that
such marriages were held valid by the political power of the state,
it matters little what opinion the catholic priests might have of the
matter. It is not probable that ecclesiastics who hold marriage to
be a sacrament, or religious ordinance, and therefore, wholly
within their control, would be disposed to uphold customs and
laws so contrary to their prejudices and interests, although such
marriages among protestants are sanctioned by the comity and
laws of almost every catholic government in Europe, and repro-
bated by few, save the ignorant and fanatical rabble of Mexico.30 9
The author of the passage just quoted will be encountered
once more further below, 310 this time as the author of the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hallett v. Collins,
31'
which concerned a similar question. Comments of a more general
nature are best deferred until then. In connection with the factual
setting of the Phillips case, however, a few additional observations
seem in order. First, the original permit for the settlement of the
Natchez area was procured by one Bryan Bruin from the Spanish
governor in 1788 on the representation that the settlers whom he
intended to bring with him, being Roman Catholics, could not
practice their religion freely in the United States.312 Second, the
obvious reliance of the mother on a Roman Catholic priest, which
is repeatedly mentioned in the opinion, even further undercuts the
gratuitous assumption that the parties to the pre-1791 ceremony
were Protestants.1 3 Third, the territorial courts had held, and the
309 Id.
310 See notes 353-79 and accompanying text infra.
"1 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1851).
312 Letter from Bryan Bruin to Gov. Miro, Mar. 31, 1787, summarized in Coker, The
Bruins and the Formulation of Spanish Immigration Policy in the Old Southwest, 1787-88, in
THE SPANISH IN THE MIssIssIPPI VALLEY, 1762-1804, at 61, 64 (J. McDermott ed. 1974).
Professor Coker earnestly discusses the possible merits of that assertion. He concludes that it
was without foundation, but adds: "That such a reason would appeal to His Catholic Majesty
had obviously occurred to Bruin." Id. at 66-67. Both Bruin's representation as to his and his
proposed settlers'. religion, and the materiality of this representation in the eyes of the
Spanish governor, are documented in 17 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 2 PUBLIC LANDS 749,
No. 5 (1834). This source was available at least to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See
note 319 infra.
'13 See text accompanying note 305 supra. Judge Grier also observed that the priest
"may have acted as her conscience keeper." 10 Watts (Pa.) at 162. She also had a daughter
named Mary. The religious affiliation of her alleged first spouse, John Ormsby, could not be
determined. He arrived in Natchez on July 5, 1788, on the same day as Peter Bruin of
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Supreme Court of Mississippi continued to hold, in opinions then
readily available in print, that despite the rectification of the border
by treaty in 1795,314 Spanish law applied in the Natchez area until
it was evacuated by the Spanish authorities in 1798.
315
The jury found for the plaintiffs; a judgment in their favor
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. That court
accepted, as a general premise, the rule that a marriage invalid
where celebrated was invalid everywhere, but stated this rule to be
subject to certain qualifications, including an exception as to "mar-
riages celebrated in foreign countries by citizens entitling them-
selves, under certain circumstances, to the benefit of the laws of
their own country. 31 6 That exception, it said, applied where com-
pliance with the lex loci was not possible "on account of legal or
religious difficulties."3 17 In such cases, the court seems to have
suggested, marriages celebrated in the form recognized as valid
and binding in the spouses' own country would be recognized
there, adding that the common law, "under which we live, consid-
ers marriage as in no other light than a civil contract. '318 It then
pointed out that a marriage such as that celebrated between the
parties in the instant case would clearly be good under the lexfori.
Applying the test thus developed to the case at hand, the court
said, somewhat more cautiously:
Now supposing that the colonial laws of Spain viewed marriage
as a sacrament to be celebrated only according to the forms
prescribed by the Catholic church (of which, by the by, we have
not a shadow of evidence,) still it may admit of a very serious
doubt, whether, under the very peculiar circumstances of this
case, the marriage would be held bad by the courts of this
country, so as to bastardize the issue. The marriage took place
Virginia (Bryan Bruin's son), 3 SPAIN IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, 1765-1794, at 257-58 (L.
Kinnaird ed. 1946), but Ormsby was from Cumberland (or Tennessee). It appears, however,
that the immigration of non-Catholics was not permitted until December 1788-almost half
a year after Ormsby's arrival. Coker, supra note 312, at 67 n.19.
314 Treaty of San Lorenzo, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138, T.S. No. 325.
315 Stark's Heirs v. Mather, 1 Miss. 181 (1825); Winn v. Cole's Heirs, 1 Miss. 119 (1823);
Griffing v. Hopkins & Elliott, 1 Miss. 49 (1819); Davis' Heirs v. Foley, 1 Miss. 43 (1818);
Chew v. Calvert, 1 Miss. 54 (1819); W. HAMILTON, ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW ON THE FRON-
TIER: THOMAS RODNEY AND HIS TERRITORIAL CASES 132-36 (1953). The first volume of the
Mississippi Reports was published in 1834. The reporter, R. J. Walker, disagreed with the
decisions of the state supreme court as to the effect of Spanish law in the Natchez district.
Reporter's notes, I Miss. at 52-54, 63-64, 193-94.
316 10 Watts (Pa.) at 168.
317 Id.
318 Id. In Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 405, 408 (1814), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had approved a lower court instruction to the effect that marriages could be
contracted validly without regard to form.
[Vol. 6 1:1
1975] MARRIAGE IN SPANISH NORTH AMERICA
between persons who were subjects of Spain de facto only, in a
country the boundaries of which were unsettled, and in dispute
between Spain and the United States, both parties claiming it,
and which was subsequently found, on accurate survey, to be in
truth within our limits.
3 19
But, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded, that ques-
tion need not be resolved, as the only point to be decided was the
manner of proof of Spanish law. On this issue, the court agreed
with Judge Grier largely in terms of an expanded but bowdlerized
version of the latter's charge to the jury. Nothing much is gained
here by repetition, although one sentence stands out: It was, the
Supreme Court said, "a matter of no inconsiderable weight, that
the adoption of the strict rule [i.e., as to proof of foreign law], in its
application to the early settlers on the Mississippi, may jeopard [sic]
the rights, and bastardize the issue of many of our citizens.
'320
319 10 Watts (Pa.) at 168. The court also said:
[I]n the documents collected by order of Congress, we are informed, that the
superintendent of the province of Louisiana was authorized to permit intermar-
riages between new settlers, and Spaniards of both sexes, with a view to the more
easy incorporation with the natives. In that instance the laws of marriage were
relaxed, and it is very likely that the conscientious scruples of protestant settlers
were respected by the colonial government. The witnesses distinctly prove that it
was customary for protestants to be married by a justice of the peace, that such a
regulation had been made by the governor or superintendent, to whom the power
was intrusted at the request of protestant emigrants, and that such marriages so
celebrated were held valid by the political power of the state.
Id. at 170. This corn-cob pipe dream version of early Natchez history might be suitably
checked against the recollections of a long-time resident of that city:
When the town begun [sic] to be built on the hill, the Spaniards settled in this part,
and other persons generally built east of the presnt [sic] Commerce Street. These
being mostly Irish, this part of the town was called Irish town, whilst the other part
was known as Spanish town. The Governor was Don Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, an
intelligent and liberal man, educated in England, at Westminster, and speaking
English as fluently as a native. The mild, paternal rule of the good Governor makes
an old man revere with pleasure to the scenes of his youth, and even at times to
regret the change of government.
The Catholic religion was the only one publicly tolerated in the country. The
priests exercised much influence, and were very generally loved. They had great
power, but used it very mildly. Irish priests were usually selected for Natchez,
because there were so many English-speaking people ...
Attempts were made by several protestant ministers to preach, but were not
encouraged. The only sermon I remember to have heard during the Spanish rule
was preached by an Episcopalian named Cloud. Governor Gayoso was present and
walked home with my father after the service. He expressed himself in their
conversation as being individually in favor of religious toleration, "but," he added,
"you know I have a master." The next day Cloud was notified that he must not
preach again, but he, persisting in doing so, was shortly arrested and sent out of the
country.
Willey, Natchez in the Older Times, in J. CLAIBORNE, MISSISSIPPI AS A PROVINCE, TERRITORY
AND STATE 527, 527-28 (1880) (reprint 1964). The auth6r of that work adds: "It was
gratifying to find that this intelligent and truthful witness cherished a grateful remembrance
of the kind and paternal rule of the Spanish provincial authorities." Id. at 527 n.*
320 10 Watts (Pa.) at 169.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the court did not pause to ask how Missis-
sippi had dealt with this question; for surely, the subsequent
territorial sovereign had the greatest concern in these Natchez
marriages.3 2 1 That dereliction, however, is relatively minor when
compared with the odd notion that citizens of the United States
who swore allegiance to the King of Spain so that they could settle
in the Spanish domains somehow managed to remain citizens of
the United States, and even more remarkably, to take the common
law with them. As already noted, the latter assumption, at least,
had at the time been rejected in Mississippi. 3 22 With respect to the
former, we may quote from an almost contemporaneous note of
the United States to Mexico, stating that "it has ever been one of
the most cherished articles of the political creed of the American
people, that every citizen has the absolute and uncontrollable right
to divest himself of his allegiance, and to seek, if he think proper,
the advancement of his fortunes, in foreign lands. ''323
The next case to be considered is Patton'v. Philadelphia and
New Orleans,324 a well-known decision of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana involving both the Girard estate and the Bastrop conces-
sion in Louisiana. The facts are unusually complicated, since the
marriage at issue was unquestionably bigamous and hence ulti-
mately void. Under applicable Spanish law, however, innocent
parties to putative marriages were entitled to what would be their
share of community property in a valid marriage. The threshold
requirement for putative marriages covered by that rule was that
the second "marriage" be "valid" as to form.3 25
The second marital union in question was contracted between
the bigamous husband and his trusting second spouse by notarial
act passed by the Spanish commandant of Fort Miro (now Monroe)
in the Ouachita district of Louisiana, on September 19, 1799. The
notarial act starts with the recital that Jean Filhiol, self-described as
321 See text accompanying notes 314-15 supra. No Mississippi statute or decision directly
in point could be located. Hargroves v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211 (1856), held that the
Mississippi marriage statute then in effect had not outlawed marriages contracted informal-
ly, and in Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357 (1873), it was stated that "[tihe right of parties in
this State to contract marriage, without formal or ceremonial solemnization is understood to
be settled beyond question." Id. at 375. There is, however, no connection between these
cases and Spanish rule in Mississippi, and in any event, they were decided long after Phillips.
322 See text accompanying note 315 supra.
323 Letter from U.S. Minister to Mexico to Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mar.
17, 1846, 8 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, INTER-AMERICAN
AFFAIRS 1831-1860, at 824, 825 (W. Manning ed. 1937). The reference is to Texas
immigrants from the United States who later fought in the Texas War of Independence.
3214 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
325 Id. at 104-05, citing PARTIDAS, IV, 13, 1.
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Captain of the Armies of His Majesties and Civil and Military
Commandant at Fort Miro, Settlement of Ouachita, in the Province
of Louisiana, was here acting "in lieu of a Notary Public or Scribe,
there being none in these parts." The key passage reads that the
Chevalier d'Anemours gives his charge, Eleanor Hook, in marriage
to Abraham Morehouse, the latter having promised, and promis-
ing
by these presents, to take her for his legitimate spouse, and to
have the marriage solemnized, first according to the manner and
usage provided by Ecclesiastical Authority in such cases, with the
knowledge of the Government in this province, where it has been
agreed that marriages shall be contracted in the presence of the
Commandants of the Posts, or other officers of administration,
and, later, be solemnized before our Mother, the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Roman Church, as soon as possible, and as long as one
party shall request this of the other.3 26
The marriage contract contained stipulations as to the inheritance
rights of the issue of Morehouse as "children of the second mar-
riage." These provisions, it was spelled out, were to apply "whether
the children of the second marriage be born after the celebration
will have been solemnized before our Holy Mother the Church, as
was said hereinabove, or whether born before, or whether, due to
circumstances beyond the control of the parties, the said solemniza-
tion may not have taken place. ' 27 The court also had the unusual
advantage of the testimony of the daughter of that Spanish com-
mandant. As summarized in Judge Rost's elegant and learned
opinion, she testified "that there was no priest at that time in the
District of Ouachita; that she was present at the celebration of the
marriage before her father; that the usual formalities were com-
plied with; and that immediate cohabitation followed, as was then
the custom in the colony. 328
The custom thus recorded and described is almost certainly
the origin of marriage by bond in Texas.3 29 The promoter of the
Ouachita settlement was the "Baron" of Bastrop. 330 Later, as the
326 An English translation of the marriage contract is reproduced in Mitchell &
Calhoun, The Marquis de Maison Rouge, the Baron de Bastrop, and Colonel Abraham
Morhouse-Three Ouchita Valley Soldiers of Fortune, 20 LA. HIsT. Q. 289, 454-56 (1937).
327 Id. at 456.
328 1 La. Ann. at 101.
32' See text accompanying notes 16-95 supra.
330 See Mitchell & Calhoun, supra note 326, at 369-405. See generally Barcisse, Baron de
Bastrop, 58 S.W. Hisr. Q. 319, 330 (1955). That latter study conclusively identifies the
"Baron" as Philip Hendrik Nering B~gel, born in Paramaribo, Netherlands Guiana, on
November 23, 1759. Id. at 320-22.
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Second Alcalde of Bexar (San Antonio) and as a member of the
legislative assembly of Coahuila and Texas, he advised the Austins
(especially Stephen Austin) in connection with the administration
of Austin's colony.3 31 One of the witnesses signing the Morehouse-
Hook marriage contract was Jose de la Baume, who was Bastrop's
best friend, frequent host, and residuary legatee, and also a resi-
dent of Bexar in the Spanish-Mexican period.332 Unlike the Texas
marriage bonds of a later date, 333 the Morehouse-Hook contract
contained no penalty clause, but this, too, seems readily explained.
The contemplated ceremony in facie ecclesiae did not in fact take
place, and it is reported that "much criticism on the part of the
Catholic population of the little community grew out of the fact
that there had been only a civil ceremony. ' 33 4 It thus seems likely
that the Texas penalty clauses were inspired by the wisdom of
hindsight in order to compel full compliance wherever possible.
3 3 5
331 Moore, The Role of the Baron de Bastrop in the Anglo-American Settlement of the
Spanish Southwest, 31 LA. Hisr. Q. 606, 639-72 (1948). See generally Hatcher, The Louisiana
Background of the Colonization of Texas 1763-1803, 24 S.W. HisT. Q. 169 (1921).
332 Moore, supra note 331, at 672-76. The will is reproduced in THE AUSTIN PAPERS
1919, at 1578. A well-known early Texas succession case, Erskine v. De Ia Baume, 3 Tex. 406
(1849), concerns de la Baume's real estate in San Antonio.
333 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
334 Mitchell & Calhoun, supra note 326, at 425. There was testimony to the effect that
Col. Morehouse had "refused, subsequently, to solemnize his marriage before the priest." 1
La. Ann. at 104.
3" The wording of the Texas penalty clause may have been inspired by section three of
the North Carolina Marriage Act of 1741, (also in effect in Tennessee), which required
applicants for marriage licenses to file a marriage bond of £50 (later £500), payable to
public authority if any impediment to the marriage subsequently came to light. See 1 SCOTT,
LAWS OF TENNESSEE 46 (1821); Semonche, Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina: A
Study in Legal History, 9 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 320, 334-35 (1965). As Professor Semonche
reports, some 2,500 North Carolina marriage bonds made between 1741 and 1778 have
been preserved. Id. at 335 n.60. Substantially the same requirement existed in Virginia. An
Act concerning Marriages, 22 Geo. II, ch. 32, § 2 (Va. 1748), in 6 HENING, STATUTES AT
LARGE 81, 82 (1819). Prominent marriage bonds still on record include those of Thomas
Jefferson's father and Thomas Jefferson himself. Marriage Bonds in Goochland County, 7 WM.
& MARY COLLEGE Q. 98 (1899); D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 159 (1948). A typical
Virginia marriage bond is reproduced in Hamphill & Dollers, Marriages in Albermarle County,
6 ALBERMARLE COUNTY HIST. SOC. PAPERS 41, 42 (1946). Prof. Joseph W. McKnight of
Southern Methodist University has called this Virginia statute to our attention. The
following bond, dated Jan. 7, 1794, is probably the most famous such instrument executed in
Tennessee:
Know all men by these presents that we, Andrew Jackson, Robert Hays and
John Overton, of the County Davidson and Territory of the United States of
America South of the River Ohio, are held and firmly bound ... in the sum of one
thousand pounds to be paid ... if there shall... hereafter appear any lawful cause
why Andrew Jackson and Rachel Donelson, alias Rachel Roberts should not be
joined together in, holy matrimony.
M. JAMES, ANDREW JACKSON: THE BORDER CAPTAIN 77 (1933). It seems highly likely that
many Texans were familiar with bonds of this type either because their own roots lay in
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To return to the Patton case: The Supreme Court of Louisiana
interpreted the actions of the spouses and of the Spanish comman-
dant as described above as evidencing the intent to enter into
marriage per verba de praesenti (by agreement to marry then and
there) adding, however, that this point was not material here
because of the alternative availability of the device of marriage per
verba de futuro cum copula (agreement to marry in the future
followed by cohabitation). The former interpretation was pre-
ferred partly because the commandant was "no civilian;" and
because it was seemingly common for "civil acts" authenticated by
such officers to be passed in notarial form.
336
The marriage here celebrated, the court observed, was clan-
destine in terms of Tridentine legislation. Nevertheless, the Coun-
cil of Trent did not invalidate clandestine marriages previously
concluded, and even after Tametsi, the assistance of a priest was not
invariably a prerequisite of a sacramental marriage.3 7 The decisive
question was if, and under what modifications, the disciplinary
legislation of the Council of Trent had been enacted at the locus
celebrationis.
The court knew of the existence of the cedula of 1564,
although the text of that instrument was apparently not con-
sulted.338 While Louisiana had not been settled at the time, Judge
Rost was willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that the kings
of Spain "intended that their adoption of general councils should
extend to all countries which they might subsequently discover or
acquire. '339 Nevertheless, he said, the adoption of the Tridentine
legislation at the solicitation of Rome did not entail a commitment
to enforce all of its provisions at all times and places, subject only to
papal dispensation. Judge Rost put the basic proposition as follows:
The avowed object of the Council of Trent was, to reassert
and embody the orthodox doctrines of the apostolic church, and
to unite the christian sovereigns in their support, against the
reformers of Germany. The authority of Rome had, for the first
time, been successfully resisted, and the question of the adop-
Virginia, North Carolina or in Tennessee, or because they were familiar with the marital
difficulties of their favorite American statesman.
336 1 La. Ann. at 101-02. Civilian is here used in its literal meaning; civil act, on the
other hand, stands for legal transaction affecting status.
337 Id. at 102-04.
338 Judge Rost assigns the date of Aug. 12, 1564, to the cedula. Id. at 103. This is, of
course, exactly one month too late (see text accompanying note 178 supra). The source given
for the reference in Patton is 'Trompta Bibliotheca, verbo Condlium" ("under the heading
of condlium")-apparently an encyclopedic reference. Id. at 103.
339 1 La. Ann. at 103.
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tion, throughout christendom, of this Council, though, no doubt,
in the eyes of the Church, a question of right, was also a question
of power. The Church conceived it necessary to its existence and
usefulness, that its supremacy in all spiritual and some temporal
matters should be acknowledged; but when submission was se-
cured, that great institution was too wise to bring into disrepute
the moral power it possessed over the masses, by- requiring the
enforcement of the provisions of the Council, when they might
be productive of hardship and oppression, or shock the common
sense, the habits and customs of nations.3 40
He then mentioned the Netherlands as an example of areas where
considerations such as these had led to a relaxation of the reign of
Tametsi. This led to the conclusion that "after the adoption of the
Council of Trent, the kings of Spain retained the power to suspend
the operation of that portion of it which relates to the celebration
of marriages in the remote settlements of new colonies, yet
unprovided with either churches or priests."' 4 '
The final step in this line of reasoning, not unexpectedly, was
the determination that the marriage practices engaged in with
official participation in the Ouachita district constituted just such
an exercise of royal power. This ultimate holding was buttressed by
three further considerations. First, it was pointed out, "one of the
Spanish governors was married thus. ' 342 Second, reliance was
placed on a holding of the Supreme Court, in quite a different
context, that "when the commandant says he had authority and
exercised it, his authority will be presumed, and that no one can
question it but his superiors."3 43 Third, it was pointed out, there
had been other exercises of royal power in derogation of canon law
with respect to Louisiana: neither the Inquisition nor ecclesiastical
tribunals had ever been established there.
3 44
The opinion of Judge Rost in Patton is probably the most
erudite exposition of Spanish marriage law in North America in
the past century. Nevertheless, it has several flaws. The
court might have consulted the text of the cedula, which was then
340 Id.
341 Id. at 104.
342 Id.
343 Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana cited as authority United States v. Arredondo,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 729 (1832), which involved the validity of a Spanish land grant in
Florida. The statement in the text appears in quotation marks in the Louisiana court's
opinion, but it is a paraphrase rather than a literal quotation.
344 1 La. Ann. at 104. The supposition that ecclesiastical tribunals had not been
established in Louisiana under Spanish rule is erroneous, but this error is readily explained.
See note 205 supra. As to the Inquisition, see Greenleaf, The Inquisition in Spanish Louisiana,
1762-1800, 50 N.M. HIST. REv. 45 (1975).
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conveniently available; it might also have underlined its perceptive
discussion of royal power to limit Trent by reference to the
Patronato Real.3 4' Furthermore, there were ecclesiastical tribunals
in Louisiana under Spanish rule. The major defect of Patton,
however, is more fundamental: the Royal Order of 1792 had
confirmed the unqualified applicability of the Tridentine marriage
legislation in, among other places, Louisiana, and had directed the
governors to enforce that legislation through the imposition of
severe penalties for conduct of the kind here involved.346 That
Order clearly excluded the possibility of dispensations from Trent
in Louisiana through delegated legislation by colonial officials,
347
and indeed, Filhiol was actually prosecuted for having acted in
violation of that order and of the Tridentine marriage legisla-
tion.3
4 8
For the sake of completeness, it should also be added that the
Spanish governor whose clandestine marriage was mentioned by
Judge Rost as further proof of the legality of the custom discussed
is readily identified as Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, who was Gover-
nor of the Natchez District from 1789 to 1798, and thereafter
Governor-General of Louisiana and West Florida until his death in
1799.34 9 On January 14, 1796, Gayoso and Margaret Cyrilla Watts
signed a marriage intention contract in Natchez. That contract
stipulated that the parties promised "to celebrate their Nuptials
according to the Rites of the Church as soon as the Royal license is
obtained and by promise they now constitute the same as legitimate
and true Matrimony . . .-.
The obstacle, of course, was not the absence of a priest but the
lack of the permission to marry which Gayoso needed as a Royal
officer-an impedient rather than a diriment impediment under
canon law as it then stood.35 1 That permission was not granted by
the Council of War until March 11, 1797. Gayoso, understandably
anxious because of an impending happy event, had requested an
interim permission from his immediate superior, the Governor-
General of Louisiana, but that permission was denied. As Gayoso's
biographer reports the conclusion of this matter: "When the
Gayosos went to New Orleans later that year, an interesting reli-
'4' See text accompanying notes 201-04 supra.
346 See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
347 See text accompanying note 241 supra.
348 See text accompanying notes 248-53 supra.
349 See generally J. HOLMES, GAYOSO, THE LIFE OF A SPANISH GOVERNOR IN THE
MIssIssIPPI VALLEY 1789-1799 (1965).
350 Id. at 123.
351 2 VELARDE 92.
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
gious ceremony took place when the bishop, Luis Penalver y Cr-
denas, baptized young Fernando and married his parents on the
same Sunday, December 10, 1797.
"
1352
As Governor of Natchez, Gayoso was a local vice patron of the
Patronato Real, yet even he obviously lacked the power to validate
his own marriage under the circumstances described. It seems
reasonably clear that far from supporting Judge Rost's conclusion,
the Gayoso episode is solid authority for the rigorous applicability
of the decree Tametsi in Spanish Louisiana at the time.
This brings us to Hallett, which has been considered above in a
related connection.3 53 The marriage at issue there had been con-
tracted in 1805 in Pascagoula, a Mississippi Gulf city then in
Spanish West Florida. The relevant facts are summarized by Justice
Grier in the following terms:
A contract of marriage was entered into by Joseph Collins and
Elizabeth Wilson before Dr. White, who performed the marriage
ceremony. The parties continued to live together as man and
wife, and were so reputed, till the death of Collins. It is true that
some persons did not consider their marriage as valid, because it
was not celebrated in presence of a priest, while others enter-
tained a contrary opinion. It is in proof also, that Collins himself,
when he made his will, entertained doubts on the subject.
3 54
Dr. White was a "syndic" of Pascagoula. In urbanized portions
of New Spain, this would be about the equivalent of city attor-
ney,355 but under the special conditions prevailing in sparsely
settled Spanish West Florida, he was apparently, in the Courts
words, the "chief public officer" in loco. 356 (He was also apparently
the founder of Pascagoula, and its leading citizen, a staunch
Roman Catholic, and the grandfather of Edward Douglass White,
who was to become the Chief Justice of the United States in
1910.) 357
352 J. HOLMES, supra note 349, at 124.
353 See text accompanying notes 192-214 supra.
3-4 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 180.
355 M. SIMMONS, SPANISH GOVERNMENT IN NEW MEXICO 200-01 n.30 (1968).
356 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 180. A regulation by the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, dated
June 1, 1795, ordered the appointment of syndics, to be chosen from among "the most
notable & respectable Inhabitants of the District" in all localities three leagues apart. These
syndics were subordinate to the commandants; their main function was the investigation and
reporting of crimes in their respective localities. They had no powers over civil status and
seemingly no judicial powers other than those of inspection and reporting. The text is
reproduced in English translation in Padgett, A Decree for Louisiana Issued by the Baron of
Carondelet, June1, 1795, 20 LA. HIST. Q. 590, 593-605 (1937). It is likely that this regulation,
or one like it, applied in Spanish West Florida as well.
357 J. HIGGINBOTHAM, PASCAGOULA; SINGING RIVER CITY 11 (1967).
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Justice Grier stated the question before the Court to be
"whether an actual contract of marriage, made before a civil
magistrate, and followed by cohabitation and acknowledgment, but
without the presence of a priest, was valid, and the offspring
thereof legitimate, according to the laws in force in the Spanish
colonies previous to their cession. ' 358 This question, he said, was of
"4some importance, as it might affect the titles and legitimacy of
many of the descendants of the early settlers. 359
Prior to the Council of Trent, it was an "established principle
of the civil and canon law" that marriages could be validly con-
tracted by mutual promises alone.3 60 Whether a marriage could be
validly contracted under English common law prior to Lord
Hardwicke's Act had been "disputed of late years, in that country,
though never doubted here."
36 1
The Council of Trent had changed that rule pro futuro, by
invalidating marriages not celebrated in facie ecclesiae in the pres-
ence of two or three witnesses, but, said Justice Grier, it was "not
within the power of an ecclesiastical decree, proprio vigore [by its
own force], to affect the status or civil relations of persons." That
could only be done by the "supreme civil power."362 Philipp II had
received and promulgated the decree Tametsi "in his European
dominions," but at the time this was done, the Partidas were
already in effect in the Indies. The marriage law of the Partidas
was identical with pre-Tridentine civil and canon law,3 63 and there
was "no evidence, historical or traditional, that any portion of this
code was ever authoritatively changed in any of the American
colonies.
'364
This last statement seems surprising, coming as it does from
Justice Grier. When presiding over the district court of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, he stated expressly that the "ignorant and
fanatical rabble of Mexico" reprobated rather than sanctioned
marriages not celebrated infacie ecclesiae.36 5 Why should the rule
have been any different in Spanish West Florida in 1805?
The author of the Hallett opinion had evidently not forgotten
his presumably learned and dispassionate observations on Mexican
3-8 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 181.
359 Id. at 180-81.
360 Id. at 181.
361 Id., citing The Queen v. Millis, 10 Clark & Fin. 534, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L. 1843).
362 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 181.
363 See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra.
364 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 182.




law and society. At least in part to escape the criticism of inconsis-
tency, he now stated that "mere conformity" with the "usages" of
the Church would be no evidence of the adoption of the Triden-
tine decrees by secular authority, since such conformity might
show that as "a matter of conscience and subjection to ecclesiastical
superiors, a Catholic population would in general conform to the
usages of the Church. '36 6 Quite to the contrary, he concluded, the
Patton case has established "the fact that the civil magistrates of
Louisiana had always been accustomed to perform marriage cere-
monies, where the parties were Protestants, or where no priest was
within reach," and this was "conclusive evidence that the law of the
Partidas had never been changed, nor the decree of the Council of
Trent promulgated, so as to have the effect of law on this subject in
the colony.
367
Justice Grier's handiwork was to meet its deserved fate some
considerable time later, in what was surely the appropriate man-
ner. A law professor wrote a memorandum stating that despite the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Hallett, he could find "no doubt
whatever in the Spanish books as to the immediate and absolute
effect of the provisions of [the Council of Trent] in all the Spanish
dominions,'" 3 68 and a state supreme court elected to follow the
professor rather than the Supreme Court of the United States.
Substantive criticism of Hallett is best deferred until the discussion
of that case.369 Nevertheless, despite the unattractiveness of the
subject, a few observations ad personam seem unavoidable at this
point.
First, Justice Grier simply misstated Patton when he cited it as
authority for the proposition "that the civil magistrates of
Louisiana had always been accustomed to perform marriage cere-
monies, where the parties were Protestants, or where no priest was
within reach. '3 70 As is borne out by Judge Rost's reference in
Patton to the precedent set by the Spanish governor 3 7 1 he did not
have Protestants in mind; and even as summarized in the opinion,
the Morehouse-Hook contract contemplated that the marriage was
to be "solemnized before the church on the first opportunity.3 7 2
Even those who had no access to the text of the contract373 could
366 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 182.
367 Id.
368 In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 412-13, 34 P.2d 672, 685 (1934).
169 See notes 390-413 and accompanying text infra.
370 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 182.
"1 1 La. Ann. at 103-04.
372 Id. at 101.
373 See text accompanying notes 326-27 supra.
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hardly have been in doubt as to the church whereof a Louisiana
judge named Pierre Adolphe Rost was speaking. In any event,
Judge Rost made matters abundantly clear when he focused his
remarks on the possible royal suspension of Tridentine legislation
to "the remote settlements of new colonies, yet unprovided with
either churches or priests. 37 4 This might be a minor point, but it
reinforces the unfortunate impression that Justice Grier, the son
and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, 7 5 might have seen the
world in terms of Papists and Protestants pitted against each other,
much as the forces of darkness and light, with Spaniards and
Mexicans in the former role, and all "Americans" in the latter.
37 6
Second, Justice Grier did not follow the suggestion of his
former judicial superiors in Phillips that American citizens might
contract marriage in Spanish North American territory under their
own personal law, the latter being assumed to be the common law
as then understood by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.3 7 7 Nor
did he resort to the seemingly sensible solution to be adopted a few
years later by the Supreme Court of Texas which simply held,
when faced once again with conditions virtually identical with those
described as prevailing in West Florida in 1805, that it was "the
duty of the courts, upon the highest considerations of public
policy, to hold that the marriages contracted in those times should
be regarded as mere civil contracts, and should be sustained as
valid, whenever the consent of the parties and the intention to
enter into the state of matrimony, and to assume its duties and
obligations, is clearly shown. '378 The Collins-Wilson marriage was
not upheld on any extraterritorial or retroactive application of the
common law but on the theory that the Partidas, incorporating the
pre-Tridentine civil or canon law notion of marriage by consent
alone, still prevailed in Spanish West Florida at the critical time.
37 9
374 1 La. Ann. at 104. See also the quotation in note 334 supra. As to Judge Rost, see the
bibliographical note in 133 La. lxxxvi (1913), and Dart, The History of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, 133 La. xxx, xlii (1913).
375 See Goble, supra note 108.
376 Bigotry judges itself, but in the present context, it must be remembered additionally
that family names were no sure guide to national origin or religious affiliation in Louisiana
(including Natchez) and in the Floridas. Some settlers were Loyalists; many with English,
Scottish, or Anglo-Irish names were Roman Catholics. See text accompanying note 357 supra.
'77 Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Pa.) 158, 168 (1840); see text accompanying notes
316-23 supra.
378 Sapp v. Newsom, 27 Tex. 537, 540 (1864).
379 Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174, 181-82 (1850). The Court did not question
the "lawfulness" of Spanish rule in Pascagoula, which the United States asserted to have
been included in the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. In Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
305-09 (1829), Chief Justice Marshall discussed these territorial claims of the United States
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This matter could offer an alternative explanation to the
origins of the concept of so-called common law marriages in the
United States, which gained wide acceptance here almost exactly
when it was rejected in England.3 8 0 "Common law marriage," the
argument would run, is really pre-Tridentine civil and canon law
marriage; it gained a foothold in the United States through
Spanish law rather than English law. Even cursory further research
indicates, however, that this theory is untenable. The doctrine was
firmly established (though not universally accepted) in the United
States in the first three decades of the last century, before the
impact of Spanish marriage law was judicially registered.3 8 1 All that
can be said in this connection is that the uncertainties of Spanish
and Mexican marriage law combined with other frontier conditions
(including the polygamous proclivities of many male pioneers) to
make the common law marriage doctrine highly attractive to the
American judiciary in the mid-nineteenth century.
This interrelationship is well illustrated by Graham v. Ben-
net,38 2 an early decision of the Supreme Court of California that is
almost contemporaneous with Hallett. The defendant, who then
had a wife living in Tennessee, had held himself out to be single,
and had induced the plaintiff to enter into a marriage contract
with him in California. That contract was witnessed by an instru-
ment reading as follows:
Marriage in the year 1845. Isaac Graham, of Santa Cruz, and
Catharine Bennet, of San Francisco, were married at Lyant, by
banns, this 26th day of September, in the year 1845, by one who
was requested to read the ceremony, Henry Ford. This marriage
was solemnized between us, Isaac Graham, Catharine Bennet. In
presence of William Wern, Henry Ford.3 83
with little if any approval, but concluded by remarking: "If those departments which are
intrusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert and maintain its interests
against foreign powers, have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of
which it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on
the construction thus asserted, it is not in its own Courts that this construction is to be
denied." Id. at 308. The relevance of this conclusion in the present context was, however,
undercut by the following remark: "No practical application of the laivs of the United States
to this part of the territory was attempted, nor could be made, while the country remained
in the actual possession of a foreign power." Id. at 303. It seems difficult to square this
statement with the approach of the same learned Chief Justice to the validity of British and
Spanish land grants in the Natchez district. See note 304 supra.
380 The Queen v. Millis, 10 Clark & Fin. 534, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L. 1843); 0. KOEGEL,
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 79-104 (1922).
381 Id. at 79-91. The locus classicus is 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
75-78 (Ist ed. 1827).
"82 2 Cal. 503 (1852).
383 Id. at 503.
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The parties had cohabited for some time, and two children were
born of the union. Upon discovering that the defendant had a wife
living, however, the plaintiff left him, taking the children with her.
This was in essence an action in tort for the subsequent forceful
removal of the children by their father from their mother.
Under the law as it then stood, the defendant had a good
defense if he was the legitimate father of the children. His "mar-
riage" to Catharine Bennet was of course bigamous and invalid,
but California had a statute legitimating the children of marriages
"deemed null in law. ' 384 Was the marital union contracted by the
writing just quoted a marriage for this limited purpose?
The plaintiff argued to the contrary, contending that Mexican
law which was in force in 1845 "required (in common with" all
Catholic countries, since the Council of Trent,) that a marriage to
be valid, must be solemnized in presence of the parish priest."
385
This statement seemed to raise the issue here discussed in the
sharpest possible manner. The Supreme Court of California, how-
ever, simply sidestepped this question by issuing the following
lapidary ipse dixit:
Marriage is regarded as a civil contract, and no form is
necessary for its solemnization. If it takes place between parties
able to contract, an open avowal of the intention, and an assump-
tion of the relative duties which it imposes on each other, is
sufficient to render it valid and binding.3 86
Simply by applying that rule to the 1845 marriage contract, the
court held that the children were issue of a marriage "deemed null
in law" within the meaning of the California legitimation statute, so
that their father had acted lawfully when claiming them by
force. 8s
It seems difficult to determine now whether Clio was thus
raped or merely spurned by the Supreme Court of California;
surely, unlike poor Catharine Bennet, she was not artfully seduced
by cunning arguments and impressive legal prose. In any event, the
muse of history retired from the scene for almost a century, and
the concept of "common law marriage" spread apace through the
formerly Spanish and Mexican territories of the United States.
38 8
384 Descents and Distribution Act, § 2, Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 96, p. 220, § 2 (repealed
1869).
385 2 Cal. at 505-06.
386 Id. at 506.
387 Id.
388 Campbell's Adm'r v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57 (1869) (Alabama); Daniel v. Sams, 17 Fla.
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But at long last, the issue so rudely avoided in Graham38 9 was
squarely faced by a court of last resort. In re Gabaldon's Estate,390 a
1934 decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, dealt with the
matter so incisively that it may serve here conveniently as a
summary of the current section, perhaps even of the major part, of
the present study.
The question before the court was simply put: Could mar-
riages be validly contracted in New Mexico simply by mutual
consent followed by cohabitation? The territorial marriage act,
adopted in 1860 but still in effect at the date critical here, provided
that marriages might be solemnized by "any ordained clergyman
whatsoever, without regard to the sect to which he may belong, or
by means of any civil magistrate."'391
New Mexico had not been a previously uninhabited territory,
nor was it a territory colonized by English-speaking people who
carried the common law with them. At the time of its conquest by
the United States, it was inhabited by a civilized people living
under the Spanish civil law as it then prevailed in Mexico, and this
legal system was still in effect in 1860 when the marriage act was
adopted.392 Furthermore, at that time, the non-Catholic population
was inconsiderable, the edicts of the church were regarded as
"highly binding upon conscience," 393 and marriage was generally
regarded as a sacrament.
In the light of these historical facts, the court concluded that
the statute quoted above could not be read without gaining the
impression that "in the belief of those who . . . passed it, the only
valid marriage theretofore was one celebrated by a Roman Catholic
priest. '394 Since the field was thus occupied by statute before the
reception of the common law in New Mexico in 1876,395 there was
no room for the operation of the common law marriage rule.396
The court conceded that there was some disagreement as to
"whether the Council of Trent (1563) had been proclaimed by the
487 (1880) (Florida); Hargroves v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211 (1856) (Mississippi); see Pacific,
Common Law Marriage in Mississippi, 16 Miss. L.J. 40 (1943).
389 See text accompanying notes 382-87 supra.
390 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934).
391 N.M. Laws 1859-60, p. 120, now codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-2 (1953).
392 38 N.M. at 393, 34 P.2d at 673, citing Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780
(1919)-an exceptionally informative decision on the reception of the common law in New
Mexico.
"1 38 N.M. at 396, 34 P.2d at 675.
394 Id. at 394, 34 P.2d at 673.
3 See Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780 (1919).
, 38 N.M. at 394, 34 P.2d at 673-74.
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Spanish sovereign as effective in Mexico,' 397 but it refused to be
precluded on this point by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Hallett.398 The reasons there given by Justice
Grier for concluding that the Council had nothing but ecclesiastical
authority behind it were politely termed "not entirely convincing"
by the Gabaldon majority. 399 But this question was regarded as not
ultimately crucial, the decisive issue being the intent of the territo-
rial legislature in 1860, which controlled the construction of the
act. On this point, the majority said, speaking through Judge
Hudspeth:
These early legislators may have been mistaken on a fine point of
law, living as they did, remote from the centers of learning. But
they must have thought that some law, if not the Council of
Trent duly proclaimed, made a mere consent marriage invalid.
If they understood the law to be, as now contended, that no
solemnization was then necessary, it was pure supererogation to
give validity to the act of an ordained clergyman or a civil
magistrate.40 0
Why did the Supreme Court of New Mexico fail to be con-
vinced by Hallett? The majority opinion assigns three major
reasons for this remarkable show of independence. First, the doubt
as to the effect of the cedula was "not based upon any deficiency of
the language of the royal decree to give it effect in the colonies."40 '
(Although formally addressed to Patton, this point challenges a
major holding in Hallett.)40 2 Second, Louisiana and West Florida-
had not been settled in 1564, but at that time Mexico had been
settled and New Mexico had been explored and claimed. Third,
even conceding the power of the King of Spain to modify Tametsi
for Mexico, Judge Hudspeth said that "we have not the evidence of
his having done so that the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted.
40 3
Some of these remarks become considerably more precise
when read in conjunction with the dissenting opinion of Judge
Sadler. Professor James B. Thayer, who then taught Roman and
Civil Law at Harvard University, had submitted a memorandum
4°4
397 Id. at 394, 34 P.2d at 673.
398 See text accompanying notes 353-79 supra.
399 38 N.M. at 396, 34 P.2d at 674.
400 Id. at 394, 34 P.2d at 673.
401 Id. at 395, 34 P.2d at 674.
402 See text accompanying notes 362-64 supra.
403 38 N.M. at 395, 34 P.2d at 674.
404 Professor Thayer's memorandum is mentioned by Judge Sadler, specially concurring
in the dissent in In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 412-13, 34 P.2d 672, 685 (1934).
Unfortunately, this memorandum does not appear to have been published elsewhere, and
no references to it could be located.
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to the court on the subject, at long last citing the cedula of 1564 to
the Novisima40 5 and setting forth its text in so far as material. He
had also made the obvious point that "Spain was then the 'most
Catholic country' engaged in upholding the Papacy everywhere,
and the forms of marriage were then universally a question subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the church. 4 0 6 Professor Thayer
had further cited several relevant Spanish and other authorities,
and had concluded (as already noted) that despite the Hallett case,
he could "find no doubt whatever in the Spanish books as to the
immediate and absolute effect of the provisions of this council in
all the Spanish dominions.
40 7
Judge Sadler, who dissented on the narrow ground that Hal-
lett was binding in New Mexico before statehood, expressly stated
that nevertheless the authorities and sources cited and quoted by
Professor Thayer "quite satisfy my mind of the correctness of his
conclusion.
'4 08
Judge Buckley's lengthy dissent was based, in the main, on the
view that the territorial legislature had received common law
marriage along with the common law. He also made the point that
the territorial legislators "must be presumed to have had knowl-
edge of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
Hallett Case in 1850 to the effect that the Council of Trent was not
in force in Spanish dominions, and [that] they manifested no
inclination to incorporate its provisions relating to marriage into
their enactments.
'40 9
This is a curious argument, for surely even at that time, the
enactment of Tametsi into secular law would have violated the
territorial Organic Act and perhaps the Constitution of the United
States. 4 10 Nevertheless, Judge Buckley seems to have focused in-
405 Novisima I, 1, 13. See text accompanying notes 178-79 supra.
406 38 N.M. at 413, 34 P.2d at 685.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 408, 34 P.2d at 682.
410 Apparently the Supreme Court has never expressly held that the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution were directly applicable to what later came to be known as
"incorporated" territories, i.e., territories in the continental United States destined for
statehood. American Publishing Company v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1897) and cases
there cited; cf. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850). Nevertheless, it is of
course hornbook law that the "fundamental" guarantees of the Bill of Rights extend to the
territories, and that these include the first amendment. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,
217-18 (1903); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1336-43 (D.P.R. 1974). Embarrass-
ingly, the only express authority for the proposition that these radiations of fundamental
constitutional principles include the establishment of religion and its free exercise (U.S.
CONST. amend. I, § V) is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). As
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stinctively on the essential point. He expressed strong disagree-
ment with the majority's thesis that the social and legal history of
New Mexico was different from that of neighboring states, 411 and
it seems unlikely that he would have been swayed by the
peculiarities in the transition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction described
above. 412 The quintessence of his thinking on the issue before the
New Mexico Court may be summed up in the following sentence:
"Instead of striving to sustain a suggestion that the law of Mexico
was contrary to the 'common law of Christendom,' we ought to
assume that it was conformable thereto unless it is clearly shown to
have been to the contrary.
41 3
The answer is, of course, that there were two "common laws of
Christendom" after the Council of Trent, and that the Tridentine
variant had been in effect in New Mexico under Spanish and
Mexican rule. But even thus rebuffed, Judge Buckley would have
prevailed in the end. The Tridentine form of marriage as incorpo-
rated into the Spanish and Mexican law, he would have pointed
out, was incompatible with the constitutional and social order of
the secular and pluralistic republic that became the territorial
sovereign of New Mexico in 1848.
CONCLUSION
Three major conclusions emerge from the present study. They
concern the contents of the rule governing the formal validity of
marriage in Spanish North America; the reasons of the insig-
nificant or possible negative impact of that rule on marriage law in
the United States even in those regions that were once parts of
regards New Mexico, § 17 of the Organic Act of 1850 extended the Constitution and "all
laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable" to the Territory. Act of Sept. 9,
1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446, 452. It seems to have been generally assumed in New Mexico that
this clause incorporated the first eight amendments of the Constitution. See Torrez v. Board
of Comm'rs, 10 N.M. 670, 65 P. 181 (1901); Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415, 417-18 (1869).
Note, incidentally, that pursuant to § 7 of the Organic Act, Congress had power to veto
Territory legislation. That power was used in the Act of Feb. 3, 1879, ch. 41, 20 Stat. 280, to
veto the incorporation of the "Society of the Jesuit Fathers of New Mexico" by special act of
the New Mexico territorial legislature. Tametsi would hardly have fared better.
411 It is interesting to note that our neighboring jurisdictions of Texas, Louisiana,
Arizona, and California early held common law marriages valid, and that in these
localities the legal and social history was to a degree like ours. I take it that we are
chiefly concerned with the legal history because social history is usually reflected
therein.
38 N.M. at 401-02, 34 P.2d at 678. This statement appears to be in error as to Louisiana-an
error, incidentally, which might be of some consequence to students of judicial psychology.
412 See text accompanying notes 163-65 supra.
413 38 N.M. at 403, 34 P.2d at 679.
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Spain, Mexico, or both; and the impact of Spanish marriage
validity law on the curiously intractable American phenomenon of
'common law marriage."
As regards the form of marriage under Spanish and Mexican
law until the middle of the last century, the conclusion is clear and,
in the opinion of the author, beyond doubt. Spanish and Mexican
law incorporated, and gave civil effect to, the provisions of the
Tridentine decree commonly known as Tametsi.4 14 Pursuant to
that decree, marriages between baptized persons, including heretics
or schismatics, were valid only if celebrated with the assistance of a
Roman Catholic cleric of the requisite rank and authority in the
presence of at least two witnesses. This rule was applicable
throughout the Spanish realms, irrespective of parochial organiza-
tion or local publication, by virtue of the cedula of July 12, 1564.
4 15
Its applicability was neither relaxed in Spanish North America nor
in the northern portions of Mexico even when the private practice
of the Protestant faith was permitted for certain approved
settlers.4
1 6
Second, the Spanish and Mexican law as to the formal validity
of marriages failed to make any significant and lasting positive
contribution to secular American marriage law. This was so be-
cause Tametsi was, in essence, a tool of the Counter Reformation
which discriminated against those who were not in communion
with Rome. As such, it was simply incompatible with the constitu-
tional order of a secular republic and with the political aspirations
of a pluralist society in which non-Roman Catholics, although
divided into many creeds, nevertheless constituted a solid majority.
As a general rule, therefore, the Spanish or Mexican law governing
the formal validity of marriages was quickly replaced by the typi-
cally "American" system of alternative civil or ecclesiastical form,
the latter including all faiths equally.
417
The incompatibility of the Tridentine marriage legislation with
constitutional and political reality in the United States is even
reflected in Roman Catholic canon law as an ecclesiastical discipline
after this secularization of marriage law. The original territorial
scope of the applicability of Tametsi in the United States is a mirror
image of past Spanish or Mexican rule.418 In the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, it was a clearly discernible policy of the American
414 C. Trident., Sess. XXIV, de reformatione matrimonii c. 1, MANSI col. 152.
415 NOViSIMA I, 1, 13; text accompanying notes 178-214 supra.
416 See text accompanying notes 232-57 supra.
417 See text accompanying notes 39, 52 supra.
418 See notes 172-73 and accompanying text supra.
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hierarchy to seek the extension to these areas of the Benedictine
Declaration, which renders Tametsi inapplicable to marriages of, or
with, baptized non-Roman Catholics. That goal was achieved in a
general manner in 1885.4 19
Third, the Spanish and Mexican law as to the formal validity
of marriages had some impact on the so-called common law mar-
riage as that term is generally understood in American law, i.e.,
marriage without any ceremony, religious or civil, by the mere
consent of the parties (or perhaps by consent and cohabitation, or
all of these plus repute).420 At one extreme, some courts held or
merely assumed that Tametsi had not been in effect in Spanish
North America or in Mexico, so that nonceremonial marriages
were held valid under pre-Tridentine civil or canon law.42' At the
other extreme, at least one court correctly held that Tametsi had
been locally in effect, with the result that the reception of the
common law after the enactment of a secular marriage act requir-
ing a civil or a religious marriage ceremony could no longer carry
with it the common law marriage doctrine.4 22 Somewhere in be-
tween these two extremes, at least one state court simply validated
marriages contracted in excusable noncompliance with Tametsi by
recourse to public policy.
4 23
In more general terms, it can be argued that since common law
marriage prospered especially in territories that had previously been
under Spanish or Mexican rule,424 so-called common law marriage in
the United States is really pre-Tridentine nonceremonial civil or
canon law marriage. This argument is historically inaccurate in this
simplistic form. The recognition of common law marriage in America
antedates the adjudication of marriages contracted in those ter-
ritories by at least two decades, and common law marriages were
recognized as valid in areas that had never been subject to Spanish or
Mexican rule.425 Nevertheless, it seems plain that judicial confronta-
tion with Spanish and Mexican marriage law-an obscure law in a
foreign language-reinforced a natural tendency to validate marital
419 See text accompanying notes 174-76 supra.
420 See generally 0. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 105-60 (1922).
421 Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1851); Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts (Pa.) 158
(1840).
422 In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934).
423 Sapp v. Newsom, 27 Tex. 537, 540 (1864).
424 See cases cited in notes 388-89 supra.
425 New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were three such areas. See Fenton v. Reed, 4
Johns. (N.Y.) 52 (1809); Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126 (1875); Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn.
(Penn.) 405 (1814) (dictum).
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unions contracted without strict compliance with form requirements.
Additionally, the judicial consideration of the "general law of Christ-
endom" for the ostensible purpose of determining the contents of
Spanish and Mexican marriage law called to attention authorities,
especially pertaining to Scotland, that proved more acceptable for the
determination of English-derived common law rules than the more
recent English authorities.
426
On a more parochial level, it would seem that some new insights
have been gained into the origins of, and reasons for, the custom of
marriage by bond in Texas. In its specifically Texas manifestation,
that custom has been traced to the Bastrop settlement in what is now
Monroe, Louisiana.427 Although documented extensively only for
Texas, 428 marriage by bond was previously practiced in other Spanish
North American possessions as well.429 One might even call the
custom a Trojan horse of "manifest destiny" or of its precursors, for
all of the territories where marriage by bond was shown to have been
practiced were soon thereafter to be incorporated into the United
States. But that argument is rather like attributing the mortality rate
in a "sunset city" to its environment. Marriage by bond was a
symptom, not a cause. It demonstrated, for all to see, the inability or
the unwillingness of Spain and Mexico to enforce the law of the land
with respect to land-hungry settlers who had even more land-hungry
relatives and friends in a neighboring and powerful country.
There is, however, another point involved here. Marriage by
bond was conceived as a device to cope with the physical impossibility
of compliance with Tametsi due to the unavailability of priests, but it
was also, in distressingly many cases, abused as a means for creating
the semblance of a marital relationship where there was the more
formidable obstacle of an undissolved prior marriage.430 It seems
doubtful at this point, however, that these abuses were of sufficient
significance to threaten the transformation of a device designed for
securing marriage stability into its exact opposite. (The same ambiva-
lence is of course apparent in the use of the term "common law
marriage" in its diametrically opposed legal and popular connota-
tions.)
426 The decision most frequently relied on is Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep.
665 (P. 1811). This is an English decision applying Scottish law as the lex loci celebrationis. In
Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1851), Justice Grier remarked that "all the learning
on this subject is collected" in that decision. Id. at 181.
427 See text accompanying notes 329-35 supra.
428 B. SMITH, MARRIAGE By BOND IN COLONIAL TEXAS (1972); see generally Part I, supra.
429 See text accompanying notes 244-46 supra.
430 This is pointed out in Lewis v. Ames, 44 Tex. 319, 338-39 (1875).
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In conclusion, an attempt will be made to place the present
study and its findings into the more general contexts of United
States legal history, comparative law, and jurisprudence. As to legal
history, in a country as large as the United States, it is submitted
that the regional approach is very promising, that the formerly
Spanish and Mexican territories provide a fruitful area for further
research, and that any work in this area must necessarily rely in
good measure on the Spanish colonial archives. This source is now
conveniently accessible.431 An obvious area for detailed future
study is Spanish and Mexican land grant law and policy, and
especially its impact on general American public contract and
public land law. On a different but related level, Hallett4 3' has
severely shaken the present author's previously held assumption
that at least the federal courts applied Spanish or Mexican law in a
straightforward manner. It stands to reason that wherever else
doubts on this score should prove justified, new insights may be
gained into some of the causes of the development of American law in
the last century.
Regarding comparative law, there are several points. Why, for
instance, were Spanish or Mexican printed sources not judicially
used when they were readily available? How solid was the knowl-
edge of Spanish and Mexican law of American nineteenth cen-
tury jurists and authors who acquired reputations as experts in this
area? The present study does not lead one to assume that the
answers to questions such as these will always be reassuring. They
are, however, relatively minor points. As Professor Schlesinger has
shown, much in this area depends on the means available for proof
of foreign law, and these have been made rational (again largely
due to his efforts) only quite recently.
433
A more serious matter, and one that concerns comparative
lawyers directly, is the neglect of canon law and ecclesiastical
history. Little will be gained here by dwelling upon the sins of the
past. For the future, however, it seems inconceivable that compara-
41 The invaluable Seville Archives are indexed in J. DE LA PER A, E. BURRuS, C.
O'NEILL & M. GARCIA, CATALOGO DE DOCUMENTOS DEL ARCHIvo GENERAL DE INDIS
(SEcCI6N V, GOBIERNO. AUDIENCIA DE SANTO DOMINGO) SOBRE LA EPOCA ESPANOLA DE
LuISIANA (1969) (2 vols.). Copies of the originals may be obtained from Seville, Spain;
microfilms may be viewed a; Loyola University of New Orleans. See O'Neill, The State of
Studies on Spanish Louisiana, THE SPANISH IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 1792-1804 16, 25 (J.
McDermott ed. 1974).
432 See text accompanying notes 192-214, 353-81.
433 R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 38-187, 618-36 (3d ed. 1970); FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1
(effective July 1, 1966). Professor Schlesinger made substantial contributions to the drafting
of this rule. Interest in law reform in this area is largely due to his efforts.
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tive lawyers and legal historians in the United States, especially in
the Southwest, will continue to neglect printed canon law treatises,
monographs, and other related sources; the invaluable Vatican
archival materials pertaining to the United States are now avail-
able,4 34 in addition to the treasures of American diocesan ar-
chives. 435 The present study has illustrated the usefulness of the
consultation of these materials for obtaining new insights into
issues of legal history that are otherwise clouded by the lack of
reliable documentation.
Finally, those with more philosophical interests might wish to
pursue the jurisprudential implications of the interaction of secular
and ecclesiastical law as outlined in the present study, and more
particularly, some of the interactions of legal values within canon
law as a self-contained system. To cite one example, a noted
ecclesiastical historian observed, with respect to the matter here
studied: "In parts of the United States formerly under the Spanish
flag Tridentine rigidity surrounded the law of marriage down to
the twentieth century. '43 6 He attributed the perseverance of this
"severe legislation" to the "crippling use of the pase regio" and said
that there was "no estimating the range of the restriction brought
upon all [the] people" living in those areas.437 A quick answer
would be that the statement of law is simply not true, for the
Benedictine Declaration was extended to Louisiana and the
Floridas in 1824 and to all other Tridentine parts of the Continen-
tal United States in 1885. Further, he should really have asked
instead why the latter change was not made sooner.438 On a more
elevated level of analysis, until the nineteenth century, Spanish law
generally excluded non-Roman Catholics from the colonies and
punished such local heretics as were convicted by the Inquisi-
tion;4 3 9 the local adoption of the Benedictine Declaration under
such circumstances would have been an invitation to self-
incrimination.
But there is a much more fundamental point. How could it ever
134 A most valuable guide is UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS IN THE PROPAGANDA FIDE
ARCHIVES (F. Kinnealy ed. 1974) (lst series, 5 vols.).
4:5 E.g., Catholic Archives of Texas, supra notes 29, 280; Notre Dame Archives, supra
note 244. See generally P. HORGAN, supra note 164.
436 E. SHIELS, KING AND CHURCH, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PATRONATO REAL 190
(1961).
437 Id. at 190.
4" See text accompanying note 176 supra.
4'9 See text accompanying notes 206-12 supra. The Inquisition was introduced in Santa
F6 on January 25, 1626. Scholes, Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico, 7
N.M. HIST. R. 32, 71 (1932).
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be, as a matter of canon law, that the formal validity of marriage
depended upon historical and geographical factors so easily mis-
stated, as this example shows, even by church historians? Is the
mission of mercy and the care of souls compatible with the imposition
of such technical legal constraints? A negative answer to this question
was given almost a century ago by Rudolf Sohm in a famous dictum:
"Das Kirchenrecht steht mit dem Wesen der Kirche in Wider-
spruch.''440 More recently, the same argument has been made, with
great passion and eloquence, by a dissident Roman Catholic clergy-
man in the United States. 441 The present study has also shown,
however, that canon law is not insensitive to the appeals of equity.
The Church accepted the maxim that no one is obligated to do the
impossible as excusing failure to comply with Tametsi, and it inter-
preted that maxim rather broadly.442 Furthermore, at least two
bishops with jurisdiction in North America inclined towards extend-
ing the Benedictine Declaration without direct papal authority, and
in complicated cases, the power of radical sanction or validation of
formally defective marriages was employed. 44 3 Thus, there is much
to be said on the other side as well, and the debate started by Rudolf
Sohm is still far from concluded. 444 Is it not appropriate for legal
philosophers in the United States to discuss such questions, or at least
to acknowledge their existence?
These concluding remarks are to some extent critical. Their
message can be summed up briefly. The historical materials avail-
able in the past were adequate, but on the whole, their treatment by
lawyers was not. The materials available now are superb, and we must
do much better.
440 "Ecclesiastical law is incompatible with the essence of the church." R. SOHM,
KIRCHENRECHT 1 (1892) (trans. by author). See also, e.g., id. at 482-83 (1892).
441 J. KAVANAUGH, A MODERN PRIEST LOOKS AT HIS OUTDATED CHURCH, 68-81 (1967).
442 See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra.
44' See text accompanying notes 129, 235, 256 supra.
444 D. STOODT, WORT UND RECHT, RUDOLF SOHM UND DAS THEOLOGISCHE PROBLEM DES
KIRCHENRECHTS (1962), conveniently summarizes the pertinent literature through 1960.
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